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Abstract:
This cumulative dissertation covers the conceptual foundations and historical evolution of vari-
ous aspects in accounting. The fi rst article discusses the conceptual framework of the U.S. stan-
dard setter FASB and shows that the evolution of the U.S. GAAP conceptual framework in the 
1970s and 1980s was considerably infl uenced by economic factors. The second manuscript em-
ploys a conditional-normative approach to analyze the 2010 joint conceptual framework of the 
international and the U.S. standard setter, in particular the qualitative characteristics of useful 
fi nancial information. The paper shows that the qualitative characteristics are not a suffi cient 
basis for developing accounting standards. The third article focuses on the regulatory history 
of asset valuation in Germany and explains regulatory changes by socio-economic and political 
events. The fourth and fi nal article contains a historical-critical analysis of the concept of ac-
countability, which forms the basis of accounting. The article analyzes accountability at a Ger-
man university during the Nazi regime and illustrates the limits of the concept.
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1 Introduction to the Research Context 
Accounting can be traced back to ancient civilizations that used it for a variety of 
purposes ranging from recording transactions to contracting and taxation (see, 
e.g., Carmona and Ezzamel, 2009). Most of these functions have persisted 
throughout history, whereas others have been added. Accounting has emerged as 
the backbone of our society in that it represents the central pillar of a functioning 
corporate and financial world. Over the last century, we have witnessed a profes-
sionalization of accounting practice and an increase in the regulation of account-
ing, in particular financial reporting. Corresponding to that evolution, accounting 
research, starting in the late 1960s, has changed from a normative to a more posi-
tive, economic-driven, approach, representing a development that has been li-
kened to a Kuhnian paradigm shift (Cushing, 1989). Nonetheless, understanding 
the conceptual and historical foundations of accounting remains vital, as can be 
seen by the relative flourishing of accounting history research in the 1990s, which 
represents the “golden decade” of the research stream (Fleischman and Radcliffe, 
2005). Since then, normative and historical research has been established as an 
essential research approach in accounting, also evidenced by the rise of historio-
graphies, i.e. studies of “how and why accounting has been written about as an 
object of historical study” (Napier, 2009, p. 30). 
The four manuscripts of this cumulative dissertation are to provide “insights into 
accounting’s present and future through its past” (Carnegie and Napier, 1996). 
Summarized under the title “Conceptual and Historical Underpinnings of Ac-
counting”, the manuscripts can be classified into two major areas (see Figure 1). 
Manuscript A (chapter II.) and Manuscript B (chapter III.) focus on the concep-
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tual foundations of financial reporting, in particular according to United States 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) and International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Manuscript C (chapter IV.) and Manuscript D 
(chapter V.) analyze historical underpinnings of accounting in the German context 
by focusing on regulatory aspects and the accountability concept, respectively. 
Figure 1: Organization of Dissertation 
The first manuscript, entitled “Inflation, Exchange Rates and the Conceptual 
Framework – The FASB’s Debates from 1973 to 1984”, investigates the con-
ceptual framework project of the US standard setting body, the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB). While the framework has been subject to a 
large number of studies (e.g. Zeff, 1999), Manuscript A contributes to the ac-
counting literature by examining in detail how the adverse economic environment 
in the 1970s and 1980s affected the course and the eventual outcome of the con-
ceptual framework project. By doing so, the study sheds light on how the concept 
Conceptual and Historical Underpinnings of Accounting –
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of “other comprehensive income” was introduced into US GAAP and the FASB’s 
conceptual framework. These aspects have not yet been covered by the account-
ing literature and are particularly relevant given that standard setters are in delibe-
rations regarding a revised conceptual framework and a conceptual basis for other 
comprehensive income. 
Manuscript B, “The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard 
Setting”, follows up on the previous manuscript by examining the joint concep-
tual framework of the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). The Boards are in the process of revising their individual conceptual 
frameworks and in 2010 issued parts of their joint work, which covered the objec-
tive of general purpose financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of 
useful financial information. The manuscript contains a normative analysis of the 
qualitative characteristics by analyzing whether and to what extent they are suited 
to recommend an accounting solution to a controversial standard setting issue, 
such as the accounting for research and development expenditures. The article 
contributes to the literature by providing a timely analysis of the new conceptual 
framework and by informing the current standard setting debate on both the con-
ceptual framework and research and development expenditures, which, in due 
time, will return to the standard setters’ agendas. 
The second stream of the dissertation, which covers historical underpinnings of 
accounting, begins with Manuscript C, entitled “The Regulation of Asset Valua-
tion in Germany”. Given there is only little literature in English on German ac-
counting history (Evans, 2005, p. 229), a longitudinal study seems particularly 
suited to provide an overview of regulatory aspects of asset valuation in German. 
Conceptual and Historical Underpinnings of Accounting –
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The article analyzes how regulation has evolved over the years by reacting to the 
socio-economic and political environment and thus provides the historical back-
ground to the debate on fair value accounting in the most recent financial crisis. 
Supplementing the literature by the German case, the manuscript adds to recent 
articles on the history of fair valuation, e.g. in Britain (Georgiou and Jack, 2011), 
France (Richard, 2004) and the United States (Nouri and Pannone, 2010). 
Manuscript D, “The Ubiquity of Accountability – The Handelshochschule
Leipzig in the Claws of Nazism”, draws on the extreme conditions imposed on 
the German society during the Nazi regime to examine the concept of accounta-
bility at a university, i.e. an institution of higher morality (Rorty, Reuben, Mars-
den, 2000). The manuscript sheds light on how excessive demand for accountabil-
ity poses an ethical and moral threat in that it violates the accountable self and 
corrupts its personal conscience. The study connects to the literature on accounta-
bility and contributes to this area by furthering our understanding of the limita-
tions of accountability, which have been theorized only recently (Messner, 2009) 
and on which little evidence exists so far in the accounting literature. 
Conceptual and Historical Underpinnings of Accounting –
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2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts 
The article “Inflation, Exchange Rates and the Conceptual Framework – The 
FASB’s Debates from 1973 to 1984” is a historical study that explains how two 
economic forces of the 1970s and 1980s, namely volatile exchange rates and high 
rates of inflation, affected the FASB’s debates on a conceptual foundation for 
financial reporting and standard setting. The rising price environment of the time 
encouraged the standard setter to consider a move towards greater flexibility in 
measurement of financial statement elements. By contrast, the accounting for for-
eign currency translation had first been addressed in 1974 when the FASB issued 
an accounting standard that was highly controversial. The volatility of exchange 
rates produced a strong sentiment against the standard such that the FASB recon-
sidered it and embraced a distortion of the traditional income concept, which later 
became known as other comprehensive income. The distortion was expected to be 
healed in the course of the conceptual framework project. However, due to con-
troversies, the FASB eventually abandoned further work on reporting income and 
included an insufficient ex-post rationalization of other comprehensive income in 
the concepts statement on recognition and measurement, making the new concept 
largely unprincipled. The study, which is solely authored by the doctoral candi-
date, has been discussed with several people that were involved in the above-
mentioned standard setting project. Among them are then-FASB Chairman Do-
nald Kirk, then-FASB Director of Research and Technical Activities Jim Leisen-
ring and then-FASB Project Manager Tim Lucas. In addition, the study has been 
presented at one of HHL’s research colloquia on January 18, 2013 and at the 
Bundeswehr University in Munich on February 5, 2013. The article is intended 
for submission to Accounting Horizons (ISSN 0888-7993). 
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The manuscript “The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard 
Setting” analyzes normatively whether the joint conceptual framework of FASB 
and IASB is suited for its major purpose, i.e. to help the Boards find a solution to 
a standard setting issue. Assuming absence of political and pragmatic compromis-
es, the study employs accounting theories to derive accounting methods for the 
controversial issue of research and development expenditures. To complement the 
article’s conditional-normative approach, the accounting alternatives are assessed 
against the standard setters’ qualitative characteristics, which is an approach the 
Boards assert to use. Instead of coming up with an accounting method that is in 
line with accounting theory and the conceptual framework, the study shows that 
the conceptual framework can hardly be used as a normative-deductive basis for 
standard setting issues. As a result, an analysis that relies on the framework is 
inevitably based on assumptions and interpretations. The article thus points to 
major concerns regarding the conceptual framework’s adequacy for standard set-
ting, which pertain to inconsistent and incomplete definitions, and shows how the 
framework may be improved to provide a consistent basis for standard setting. 
The study is co-authored by Sebastian Hoffmann and the doctoral candidate. Dif-
ferent versions of it have been presented at a number of conferences and seminars, 
including the 35th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, held 
in May 2012, and the joint conference of the Accounting Section of the German 
Academic Association for Business Research (AS-VHB) and the International 
Association for Accounting Education and Research (IAAER), held in February 
2013, as well as at the University of Dundee and the University of Strathclyde in 
March 2012 and the Free University of Amsterdam in March 2013. The article is 
intended for submission to Schmalenbach Business Review (ISSN 1439-2917) or 
British Accounting Review (ISSN 0890-8389). 
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The article “The Regulation of Asset Valuation in Germany” is a historical 
study that spans the time from the 15th century to the implementation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community’s Fourth Directive in 1986. The longitudinal analysis 
places changes of asset valuation regulation in their socio-economic and political 
context, arguing that looser regulation was in vogue in times of economic booms, 
while valuation requirements often became more restrictive following crises. In 
the context of the 19th century industrialization, historical cost accounting was 
replaced by fair valuation, which subsequently saw much criticism during a se-
vere economic crisis in the 1870s, the Gründerkrise. In the aftermath, stock com-
panies, which were at the forefront of regulatory developments in Germany, were 
regulated more strictly in that these companies had to apply historical costs as an 
upper valuation boundary. Since the requirements left much room for interpreta-
tion and discretion, a lively debate arose after 1900, which centered on the objec-
tive and contents of principles-based accounting. Following the years of hyperin-
flation in the 1920s and the Great Depression, the government implemented his-
torical costs as a lower boundary to asset valuation of stock companies in 1931. 
After World War II, these regulations were extended to all company forms, also 
as a result of the European harmonization efforts. The article, which is co-
authored by Sebastian Hoffmann and the doctoral candidate, is accepted for pub-
lication in Accounting History (ISSN 1032-3732) and has been presented, inter 
alia, in a research seminar of the University of Stirling, held in March 2012, and 
at the joint conference of the Accounting Section of the German Academic Asso-
ciation for Business Research (AS-VHB) and the International Association for 
Accounting Education and Research (IAAER), held in February 2013. 
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The fourth manuscript, entitled “On the Ubiquity of Accountability – The Han-
delshochschule Leipzig in the Claws of Nazism”, is a historical-critical analysis 
of the concept of accountability, according to which an accountable self is to take 
responsibility for fulfilling its duties and, if necessary, for any deviations from the 
targets imposed on it. The study argues that, during the Nazi regime from 1933 to 
1945, an excessive demand for accountability was placed on the German society, 
which was required to politically align and act in the interests of the regime. By 
using the context of an institution of higher morality, which universities tend to 
represent, the study shows how the ubiquity of accountability altered organiza-
tions and individuals. In particular, it is shown that the regime changed the tar-
gets, with which the accountable self needed to comply, and threatened the ac-
countable self with severe penalties. Evidence for these findings is presented re-
garding the school’s charters and regulations, reporting, recruiting, publishing and 
educational routines. As a result, fear of penalization caused the accountable self 
to betray its personal conscience either by aligning with the ideology or, in con-
trast, by exploiting the regime for its personal benefit, e.g. by denunciations. Ac-
countability, at the margin, is a decision and behavior influencing concept that 
ethically and morally violates the accountable self. The study extends the litera-
ture on the limitations of accountability by providing insights into the use and 
abuse of the concept in a dogmatic society. The article is co-authored by the doc-
toral candidate and Sebastian Hoffmann and is invited for presentation at the Car-
diff Business School in May 2013. It is intended for submission to Accounting,
Organizations and Society (ISSN 0361-3682) or Accounting History Review
(ISSN 2155-2851). 
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Overall, the four manuscripts are to further our understanding of the conceptual 
foundations and the historical underpinnings of accounting as follows (see Fig-
ure 2): 
(i) By providing new insights into the evolution of the FASB’s con-
ceptual framework, in general, and the concept of other compre-
hensive income, in particular (Manuscript A), 
(ii) By analyzing normatively the revised conceptual framework’s qua-
litative characteristics regarding their adequacy for solving a stan-
dard setting issue (Manuscript B), 
(iii) By illustrating how the regulation of asset valuation in Germany 
responded to socio-economic and political sentiments and by pro-
viding afterthoughts to the debate on fair value accounting in the 
most recent financial crisis (Manuscript C), and 
(iv) By discussing the limitations of the accountability concept, which, 
at the margin, ethically violates the accountable self, even at insti-
tutions of higher morality, which universities tend to represent 
(Manuscript D). 
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Figure 2: Results of the Dissertation 
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INFLATION, EXCHANGE RATES AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
– THE FASB’S DEBATES FROM 1973 TO 1984
Abstract
In this historical study, I explain how two economic forces of the 1970s and 
1980s, volatile exchange rates and inflation, affected the FASB’s debates on its 
conceptual framework. While it has been acknowledged that rising prices contri-
buted to a move towards greater flexibility in measurement, the impact of volatile 
exchange rates on the framework project has not been addressed so far. When, in 
1976, a first foreign currency translation standard became effective, it sparked 
considerable controversy such that the FASB reconsidered the statement, embrac-
ing an exception to the all-inclusive income concept. This distortion, which later 
became known as other comprehensive income (OCI), was intended to be healed 
in the further course of the conceptual framework project. However, the Board 
was not able to agree on its recognition and measurement project, issuing a de-
scriptive Concepts Statement No. 5. By abandoning further work on reporting 
income, the FASB included an insufficient ex-post justification of OCI in SFAC 
No. 5, making the concept largely unprincipled. 
Keywords:  current values, comprehensive income, inflation, foreign currency 
 translation, conceptual framework, history 
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1 Introduction
Following the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 
1930s, the prevailing accounting model in the U.S. featured two characteristics: 
An all-inclusive income statement, in which all revenues, gains, expenses and 
losses are included regardless of whether or not they are recurring, as well as his-
torical cost accounting, which purports valuation at historical cost in a company’s 
financial statements. While challenges to this “traditional” accounting model have 
persisted throughout the years, it was not until the late 1970s that calls for a devia-
tion from the prevalent model stood a chance. 
In this article, I argue that the economic environment of the 1970s and 1980s left 
its mark on the members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and created a sense of urgency to change financial reporting. Volatile exchange 
rates following the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system made the 
Board reconsider its first, highly controversial foreign currency translation state-
ment and embrace an exception to the all-inclusive income statement.1 This treat-
ment became later known as “other comprehensive income” (OCI) accounting. 
The period of high inflation showed a need to account for the effects of price level 
changes in financial statements and produced supplementary disclosures of gener-
al price level and current cost data contributing to a perceived need for greater 
flexibility in measurement. 
1  Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 12 “Accounting for Certain Marketa-
ble Securities”, issued in December 1975, was the first disruption of the all-inclusive income 
concept by excluding from income changes in the valuation allowance, i.e. the difference be-
tween aggregate cost and market value of non-current securities (see, e.g., Grinnell and Nor-
gaard, 1980). The Statement provided remedy to an industry-specific, high-priority emerging 
problem and did not include conceptual considerations. Walter Schuetze, a fervent fair value 
advocate, called SFAS No. 12 the FASB’s “first crack at mark-to-market-accounting.” Not be-
ing successful in pursuing fair value accounting in Statement No. 12 was the reason Schuetze 
left the FASB in 1976 (Schuetze, 2006, p. 8). 
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Both economic forces were most prevalent when the FASB embarked on its con-
ceptual framework project.2 Although a decision-usefulness objective had been 
adopted early on, it was not until the late 1970s that the Board moved from the 
abstract to the concrete and approached reporting of income and recognition and 
measurement of financial statement elements. Aiming to display economic reality, 
the Board introduced a new all-inclusive income concept – comprehensive in-
come – which separated operating performance from other results such as holding 
gains and losses. Comprehensive income would on the one hand have healed the 
distortion of all-inclusive income introduced by the revised foreign currency 
translation standard. On the other hand, it would have enabled the Board to meas-
ure more financial statement elements at current values without distorting the ca-
pacity of earnings as a performance indicator. 
When in the 1980s the economic environment became less disruptive, showing 
the temporary character of the economic forces, the Board became divided on its 
recognition and measurement project and was unable to decide on a prescriptive 
approach. Eventually, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts (SFAC) No. 5 on recognition and measurement that merely described mea-
surement attributes used in accounting practice. Since this project had shown that 
the current Board’s efforts were spent, the FASB retreated from its reporting in-
come project, but carried forward comprehensive income in Concepts Statement 
No. 5, which included an insufficient rationale for OCI items. Thus, the impact of 
the 1981 foreign currency translation project, SFAS No. 52, was severe in that it 
led to a permanent disruption of the all-inclusive income statement, which was 
2  Appendix A provides a depiction of the two economic forces for the period of my study. 
I thank Jacco Wielhouwer for his suggestion to include these figures. 
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partly rectified in June 1997 when the FASB issued SFAS No. 130 “Reporting 
Comprehensive Income”. 
Three reasons render a joint consideration of exchange rates and inflation neces-
sary: First, both translation of foreign currency financial statements and account-
ing for inflation are similar accounting procedures in that they change the unit of 
measure in financial statements while leaving other accounting principles un-
changed.3 Second, the two economic forces are connected via the theory of pur-
chasing power parity. Third, the economic forces occurred at the same time and 
were so pervasive that they contributed to the “rise of economic consequences” as 
an argument in the standard-setting debate (Zeff, 1978, pp. 59-60). They had an 
impact on the FASB’s debate on the conceptual framework and help explain the 
descriptive format of Concepts Statement No. 5. 
This article adds to the recent study by Rees and Shane (2012), who conclude that 
OCI accounting was a result of ad-hoc decisions. By shedding light on how the 
concept came about, I argue that the FASB did not intend to move away from an 
all-inclusive income statement and that its rationale for SFAS No. 52 was not un-
principled. However, by abandoning its reporting income project, the Board was 
unable to provide an adequate conceptual basis for the 1981 foreign currency 
translation standard with the result that Concepts Statement No. 5 includes only a 
minimal, ex-post justification for the concept of OCI. Overall, I contribute to the 
literature by reassessing both SFAS No. 52 and OCI accounting and by showing 
3  E.g., SFAS No. 52 (para. 114) states that „an analogy may be drawn between the cumulative 
foreign currency translation adjustment and the difference between equity (net assets) meas-
ured in constant dollars and the same net assets measured in nominal dollars.”
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that not only inflation accounting but also the project on foreign currency transla-
tion had an impact on the course and the eventual outcome of the conceptual 
framework project. Broadly speaking, I demonstrate how the economic environ-
ment affects standard setters’ deliberations on accounting standards and funda-
mental concepts.4
I proceed by describing the prevalent pre-FASB accounting model, the FASB’s 
first statement on foreign currency translation, i.e. SFAS No. 8, and the early 
phases of the conceptual framework project.5 In subsequent sections, I outline the 
Board’s approach to inflation and revising Statement No. 8 and explain how these 
debates informed and affected the conceptual framework project. I conclude by 
showing the implications of the debates for subsequent standard setting efforts 
and providing some afterthoughts for the current debate on a conceptual frame-
work.
4  Confirming the general thrust of my article, Donald Kirk states: “The backdrop of inflation, 
floating exchange rates and prospects of other vexing valuation problems, some old and many 
then unknown, made general, understandable and implementable principles for recognition and 
measurement beyond the reach of the Board I chaired.” Communication to the author dated 
January 27, 2013. 
5  This article is not intended to give a comprehensive review of the conceptual framework 
project (see, e.g., Solomons, 1986; Gore, 1992; Miller, Redding and Bahnson, 1998, ch. 4; 
Zeff, 1999). Instead, I aim to selectively point out how the projects on foreign currency transla-
tion and inflation affected the course and outcome of the conceptual framework project. 
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2 The Early Debates: Considering Change 
2.1 The Pre-FASB Accounting Model 
Soon after the SEC was established in 1934, the American Accounting Associa-
tion (AAA) provided authoritative guidance to the regulator (AAA, 1936), which, 
along with revisions of and supplements to it, were cited with favor by the SEC’s 
accounting staff (Zeff, 1999, p. 90). The “Tentative Statement of Accounting 
Principles” established historical cost accounting as well as the all-inclusive in-
come statement: 
“1. The accountant’s valuation of physical assets at any given point of time 
involves the determination of what part of original cost should be written 
off to reflect consumed, expired, or lost usefulness, and what part should 
be carried forward as reasonably applicable to future operations. […] 
8. The income statement for any given period should reflect all revenues 
properly given accounting recognition and all costs written off during the 
period, regardless of whether or not they are the result of operations in that 
period: to the end that for any period of years in the history of the enter-
prise the assembled income statements will express completely all gains 
and losses.” (pp. 188-9) 
When elaborating on the AAA’s Statement, Paton and Littleton (1940), which 
“probably did as much as any single publication to perpetuate the use of historical 
cost accounting in the U.S.” (Zeff, 1999, pp. 90-1), took a similar position. With 
the exception of Chapter VII, the monograph endorsed historical cost accounting 
and an all-inclusive income statement. Subsequently, “accounting practice has 
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developed substantially along the lines specified in the monograph” and “rationa-
lization and theory consistent with the monograph […] have been common in au-
thoritative pronouncements” (Storey, 1981, p. 90). 
The SEC’s commitment to this accounting model blocked standard setters’ spo-
radic efforts to change. The Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) favored a 
current operating performance approach that excluded from net income “items 
which in the aggregate are materially significant in relation to the company's net 
income and are clearly not identifiable with or do not result from the usual or typ-
ical business operations of the period” (Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 
No. 32, “Income and Earned Surplus”, December 1947, para. 11). When the Bul-
letin was published in the January 1948 issue of The Journal of Accountancy, 
SEC Chief Accountant Earle C. King issued an accompanying letter that read: 
“Commission has authorized the staff to take exception to financial statements 
which appear to be misleading, even though they reflect the application of Ac-
counting Research Bulletin No. 32” (p. 25).6
The CAP’s successor, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), eventually em-
braced the all-inclusive income statement. In Opinion No. 9 “Reporting the Re-
sults of Operations”, issued in December 1966, the APB made an exception only 
for prior period adjustments, which would distort current income due to including 
items related to prior periods (para. 19). This approach was carried forward by the 
FASB in Statement No. 16 “Prior Period Adjustment”, issued in 1977. 
6  ARB No. 35, issued in October 1948, recommended that items excluded from net income be 
displayed in the surplus statement and not the income statement to avoid confusion about the 
bottom line, i.e. earnings. 
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In a similar manner, the SEC stuck to historical cost accounting defying attempts 
by the CAP and the APB to introduce flexibility in measurement. Zeff (2007) em-
phasizes the role of the SEC and its Chief Accountants in U.S. standard setting by 
treating episodes prior to 1972 when standard setting bodies unsuccessfully at-
tempted to depart from historical cost accounting. 
2.2 Foreign Currency Translation: The FASB’s First Attempt 
When the FASB began operations in July 1973, it added to its initial agenda for-
eign currency translation.7 As discussed in the February 21, 1974 Discussion 
Memorandum “Accounting for Foreign Currency Translation”,8 the project meant 
to give uniform guidance to the diverse accounting practice on translation of for-
eign currency financial statements.9 Increased international business activities and 
floating exchange rates following the 1971 demise of the Bretton Woods system 
of monetary management likewise made the project necessary. 
An important source for the Discussion Memorandum was Accounting Research 
Study (ARS) No. 12 written by Leonard Lorensen (1972), who proposed a new 
method for translating foreign currency statements, termed the temporal method.10
He argued that “a measurement conversion process only changes the unit of 
measure; it cannot be used to change the attribute measured” (p. 11) and proposed 
that “the assets and liabilities of foreign subsidiaries be translated in a manner that 
7  The Board’s first standard, SFAS No. 1, issued in December 1973, dealt with “Disclosure of 
Foreign Currency Translation Information”. 
8  Appendix B provides a list of relevant FASB documents by time of issue. 
9  The APB had also addressed the issue without proceeding beyond an Exposure Draft. Instead 
of promoting uniformity, the Exposure Draft fostered the diversity since some companies 
adopted its approach. 
10  The Board also considered a study by R. MacDonald Parkinson. However, Parkinson (1972) 
was not as prescriptive as Lorensen (1972) and played a less significant role. 
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retains the accounting principles used to measure them in the foreign money fi-
nancial statements” (p. 17). The temporal method thus requires that the translation 
process follows the underlying measurement principle of the respective item: As-
sets measured at historical cost would be translated using the historical exchange 
rate, while assets carried at “current values”, e.g. cash, would be translated at the 
current exchange rate. For Lorensen (1972, p. 48), the treatment of translation 
adjustments was clear-cut:11 They were a gain or loss and should be reported in 
the income statement. 
In his comments to the research study, Reed K. Storey, then the director of ac-
counting research at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AIC-
PA), stated that Lorensen’s U.S. dollar perspective “is an assumption – a pre-
mise – about how those who read financial statements of U.S. companies stated in 
U.S. dollars see foreign operations of U.S. companies. Another assumption might 
lead to a different principle of translation” (p. 103). Other than that, Storey sup-
ported the study and emphasized its theoretical soundness. Connecting the treat-
ment of translation adjustments to the debate on historical cost accounting, Storey 
argues (p. 110): “Since losses on foreign debt from changes in foreign exchange 
rates are exactly the kind of losses that must be recognized under presently ac-
cepted conventions, deferring those losses is impossible unless financial account-
ing is changed significantly. However, talk of changing fundamentally or replac-
ing the accepted historical cost basis of accounting has so far been just that – talk. 
Historical cost accounting has been criticized harshly, and the need to consider 
11  Lorensen (1972, p. 48) disapproved of the term “translation adjustment”: “The change in net 
assets reported solely in the translated statements is sometimes called a “translation adjust-
ment” – a description that implies the change is the result of some imperfection in the transla-
tion process. That description is misleading.” 
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alternatives has been voiced repeatedly. […] Nevertheless, every proposal to 
change from historical cost is resisted fiercely, and the accounting profession has 
taken no significant step away from historical cost.” 
When, on December 31, 1974, the FASB issued the Exposure Draft “Accounting 
for the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Fi-
nancial Statements”, the document largely followed Lorensen (1972) by propos-
ing the temporal method for translation of financial statements and by requiring 
translation adjustments to be included in income.12 In its February 28, 1975 Status 
Report (No. 22, p. 2), the FASB pointed to the close link between the projects on 
foreign currency translation and inflation, on which it had issued an Exposure 
Draft in December 1974 (see below). The Board asked respondents to consider 
how their views on one project would affect the other project.13
In October 1975, with a 6-1 vote, the FASB issued Statement No. 8 “Accounting 
for the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Fi-
nancial Statements”. It did not materially differ from the Exposure Draft and was 
thus a logical and consistent outcome of the prevalent accounting model. The sole 
dissenter, Robert E. Mays, formerly a Controller at Exxon Corporation, seemingly 
anticipated the troubles yet to come: “[T]he use of the temporal method with the 
immediate recognition of the resulting exchange differences as gains and losses 
will, in the present environment of fluctuating exchange rates, cause erratic 
12  It has been proposed that, starting with the Exposure Draft, the FASB provided “mixed signals 
regarding its favored method” (Ziebart and Kim, 1987, p. 345). The argument suggests that the 
FASB was at least partly responsible for the ensuing controversy on foreign currency transla-
tion. 
13  In fact, respondents who did not address the inflation project in their comments received the 
above-mentioned article from the Status Report and an accompanying letter asking for a sup-
plemental comment letter. 
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changes in the reported results of companies with significant foreign operations. 
[…] He also has concern that current recognition in income of translation differ-
ences produced under the temporal method may induce uneconomic actions by 
companies to protect against what may be viewed as an accounting exchange ex-
posure, as contrasted with the actual exchange exposure.” (p. 12). 
Reflecting on Statement No. 8, Raymond E. Simpson, a project manager at the 
FASB, stated that “the Board concluded that the translation process could not 
produce a result that is compatible with the expected economic effects of a change 
in exchange rates without major changes in the present historical cost accounting 
model” (Simpson, 1981, p. 1). In a similar vein, Burton (1981, p. 64) wrote that 
“there is little question that of all the statements published by the FASB, the one 
that is most faithful to the historical cost accounting model, and the one that is 
most rigorously logical, is Statement no. 8.” In its early approach to standard set-
ting, the Board thus employed normative accounting research and aimed to issue 
conceptually consistent standards in a historical cost accounting framework. Non-
etheless, Robert Mays’ dissent demonstrates that the FASB had been aware of the 
limitations of its approach. Giving in to practical concerns would have implied a 
change in the Board’s underlying premises, which it was not yet ready to make. 
2.3 The Beginnings of the Conceptual Framework Project 
Although the Wheat Committee, which recommended establishing the FASB, did 
not envision the Board to develop a conceptual framework (Zeff, 1999, pp. 101-
2), the Board concluded early on that it would “address itself to the entire hie-
rarchy of financial accounting theory” (Status Report No. 6, November 28, 1973, 
p. 2). The Board based its consultations on the report of the Trueblood Commit-
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tee, which had been formed in 1971 to propose fundamental objectives of finan-
cial statements to guide the improvement of financial reporting.14 In its 1973 re-
port, the Committee concluded that “[a]n objective of financial statements is to 
provide information useful to investors and creditors for predicting, comparing, 
and evaluating potential cash flows to them in terms of amount, timing, and re-
lated uncertainty” (Objectives of Financial Statements, p. 20). The report “became 
a kind of blueprint for the [FASB’s] conceptual framework project” (Zeff, 1999, 
p. 101), although the Board initiated its own study and, on December 2, 1976, 
issued its “Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Financial Statements”. It 
would take another two years until, in November 1978, Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 1 “Objectives of Financial Reporting by Busi-
ness Enterprises” was issued establishing the decision-usefulness objective for the 
Board’s standards.15
It has been suggested that such an objective promotes a “forward-looking, eco-
nomic decision-oriented system of accounting”, which likely prefers current value 
accounting (Tweedie and Wittington, 1984, p. 165). While with hindsight this 
inference seems appealing, the FASB had merely followed the Trueblood Report 
without committing itself to a particular measurement system. This conclusion is 
evidenced by the documents issued along with “Tentative Conclusions”, in partic-
ular “Scope and Implications of the Conceptual Framework Project”, which in-
cluded a section that answered negatively the question “Is Current Value Account-
ing A Foregone Conclusion?” (pp. 18-9). 
14  For a detailed history and analysis of objectives of financial reporting, see Zeff (2012). 
15  The scope of the Concepts Statement was widened to all financial reporting to encompass a 
company’s entire external communication of accounting information (SFAC No. 1, paras. 5-8). 
Armstrong (1977, p. 77) reports that only 37 percent of respondents to the Discussion Memo-
randum supported the decision-usefulness objective. 
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In the Discussion Memorandum on “Elements of Financial Reporting and Their 
Measurement”, also issued on December 2, 1976, the Board criticized the existing 
approach to financial reporting, i.e. the revenue and expense view. It disapproved 
of the “nondistortion guideline” which “may have become the major standard of 
good matching in the minds of many proponents of the revenue and expense view. 
That is, the crucial question they ask […] is – Does it distort an enterprise’s peri-
odic earnings or the earnings trend?” (p. 47).16 While an objective criticism of 
corporate practice was given, the Board shared this view, calling the approach 
“subjective” and “vague” (p. 47). It frequently alluded to the asset and liability 
view “to put some boundaries on the resulting balance sheet debits and credits to 
determine that they are more than just bookkeeping residuals” (Kirk, cited in 
FASB Viewpoints, June 8, 1979, p. 3). 
The Discussion Memorandum presented different concepts of earnings but was 
faithful to the all-inclusive income concept, designating revenues, expenses, gains 
and losses as “the components of earnings” (p. 101). It discussed five measure-
ment “attributes” (historical cost, current cost, current exit value in orderly liqui-
dation, expected exit value in due course of business, present value of expected 
cash flows, p. 193) that had been used or proposed for measuring assets and liabil-
ities but it did not recommend one particular system.17 In addition, the Discussion 
Memorandum (pp. 125-9) distinguished the traditional view of maintaining finan-
cial capital, as measured by the amount of cash invested by shareholders, from 
16  The nondistortion guideline is described by Herman W. Bevis, a senior partner at Price Water-
house & Co.: “From among systematic and rational methods, use that which tends to minimize 
distortions of periodic net income” (Bevis, 1965, pp. 104-7). 
17  The Discussion Memorandum calls “inappropriate” the term “historical cost model” to charac-
terize the prevailing accounting model (p. 194). While acknowledging that accounting practice 
employed a variety of measurement bases, I continue the use of the term for the sake of con-
venience. 
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physical capital maintenance, i.e. the productive capacity of the enterprise. The 
latter concept was associated with current replacement costs, recognizing holding 
gains or losses not in earnings, but as capital maintenance adjustments of equity 
(p. 134). Financial capital maintenance can be combined with any of the five mea-
surement attributes mentioned by the Memorandum and disagreement exists about 
the timing of recognition of value changes in earnings (p. 126).18
Tweedie and Whittington (1984, pp. 164-5) suggest that “the possibility of current 
value accounting emerges clearly from the Discussion Memorandum.” This im-
pression was also conveyed to others as, e.g., shown by a campaign launched by 
Professor Robert Mautz, a partner at Ernst and Ernst. With the approval of his 
employer, Mautz, who earlier had been on the Board’s conceptual framework task 
force, toured more than sixty chapters of the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) 
criticizing the Discussion Memorandum, the asset and liability view and current 
value accounting (Gore, 1992, pp. 94-5). Feeling that Mautz had misrepresented 
the FASB’s views, Board members gave a number of talks themselves to clarify 
their approach. The speeches had the same tone: They emphasized that “the his-
torical cost system has served well the need for objective, verifiable information” 
and stressed the need for “an organized approach to assessing the benefits of any 
new measurement scheme” (Kirk, cited in Status Report No. 57, December 1, 
1977, p. 3).19
18  The Exposure Draft “Financial Reporting and Changing Prices” (para. 59) pointed out that the 
“vast majority” of respondents to the Discussion Memorandum had preferred the financial cap-
ital maintenance concept. 
19  See also the speeches cited in the January 5, 1978, August 4, 1978, and June 8, 1979 edition of 
FASB Viewpoints. 
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Overall, the early documents in the conceptual framework project displayed the 
Board’s intent to develop its own prescriptive theory, which it could henceforth 
follow in the attempt to minimize ad hoc standard setting.20 Reconsidering their 
current approach to standard setting and financial reporting, the “FASB created an 
environment in which major changes could take place” (Miller, 1990, p. 24). This 
environment was particularly hostile to subjective matching and the nondistortion 
guideline. By emphasizing the primacy of assets and liabilities, the Board aimed 
to ensure that accounting presented empirical measures of financial statement 
items based on actual observations instead of management intent (Miller and 
Bahnson, 2010, p. 428).21 Both the decision-usefulness objective and the asset and 
liability view were misunderstood as being catalysts for current values, although 
the Board explained that its approach did not preordain current value accounting 
(Kirk, 1989, p. 90). By contrast, it seemed that at that time historical cost account-
ing could still be expected to remain as a central pillar of financial reporting. 
Chairman Armstrong affirmed that “we do not contemplate a major change from 
the present historical-cost based measurements solely on the basis of this discus-
sion memorandum” (Status Report No. 43, December 17, 1976, p. 2). Instead, 
responses to the Memorandum would indicate which measurement bases required 
“more intensive consideration and experimentation before a final conclusion is 
reached.” 
20  Communication from Donald Kirk to the author dated January 27, 2013. 
21  Miller and Bahnson (2010, p. 426) assert that the subsequent SFAC No. 3, issued in December 
1980, displayed “the strongest evidence” of the asset and liability view. 
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3 Challenging the Existing Accounting Model 
3.1 Coping with Inflation: Loosening the Grip on Historical Costs 
Inflation had been a lingering concern in the United States following World 
War II such that in 1961 the APB started a project to determine appropriate ac-
counting under inflation. Its accounting research staff drafted ARS No. 6 “Report-
ing the Financial Effects of Price-Level Changes”, published in 1963. The study 
argued that accounting for the effects of price-level changes would increase the 
accuracy of the measurements of accounting numbers and recommended to dis-
close as supplementary schedules adjusted financial statements based on a general 
price level index (pp. xi-ii). Gains and losses from recognizing the inflation effect 
on monetary items would be included in income (p. xii). The study featured a dis-
claimer that would be common throughout the debate on inflation accounting: 
“Restatement by means of a single index of the general price level is not a means 
of introducing replacement costs into the financial statements” (ARS No. 6, 1963, 
p. xi). 
The APB’s Statement No. 3 “Financial Statements Restated for General Price-
Level Changes”, which was issued in June 1969, was largely based on ARS No. 6. 
Being a Statement instead of an Opinion, it was a recommendation rather than 
authoritative guidance. Indeed, Tweedie and Whittington (1984, p. 43) report that 
only one company, the Indiana Telephone Corporation, followed the Statement’s 
recommendations and it had been disclosing price-level data since before the 
Statement was issued. 
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In its first year of operations, the FASB likewise perceived a need for price-level 
data and responded to a sharp increase in the inflation rate, which soon reached 
levels above 10 percent. A February 15, 1974 Discussion Memorandum was fol-
lowed by the Exposure Draft “Financial Reporting in Units of General Purchasing 
Power”, issued on December 31, 1974.22 Neither document advanced conceptual-
ly beyond the recommendations of APB Statement No. 3 and ARS No. 6 (Twee-
die and Whittington, 1984, p. 43). Following an extended exposure period, the 
Board announced in late 1975 that it would not proceed with a standard that year 
because the proposed procedures had to be tested more extensively.23
In the meantime, a FEI-sponsored study argued that the usefulness of price-level 
adjusted financial statements for management decisions “would be marginal at 
best” suggesting a serious cost-benefit problem (Shank, 1975, p. 9). The study 
suggested that managers could “implicitly factor price level considerations into 
their interpretation of the historical cost based financial statements” concluding 
that such information would not change decision-making (Shank, 1975, p. 10). 
Preempting further action from the FASB, the SEC on March 23, 1976 issued 
ASR No. 190 “Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Regulation S-X Requiring 
Disclosure of Certain Replacement Cost Data”. The Release required large firms 
to disclose in a footnote unaudited replacement cost data for inventories, fixed 
22  Both Discussion Memorandum (p. 6) and Exposure Draft (p. iii) emphasized that price-level 
statements are based on historical cost and not current value. The consideration of measure-
ment bases, including current value accounting, was said to be within the scope of the concep-
tual framework project. All documents on inflation accounting discussed alternative measure-
ment attributes as supplementary disclosures such that at the time a deviation from historical 
cost accounting in the body of financial statements still seemed unlikely. 
23  By then, the FASB knew the SEC’s preference for replacement cost data, which had been out-
lined in an August 1975 rule proposal of what became Accounting Series Release (ASR) 
No. 190. 
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assets, cost of goods sold and depreciation charges. The release bore the handwrit-
ing of John C. (Sandy) Burton, SEC Chief Accountant since 1972, who was a crit-
ic of the FASB’s general price-level accounting because it disregarded the uneven 
effects of inflation on specific sectors and goods. In a speech given on May 30, 
1974, Burton had outlined his preferred approach based on replacement cost data 
(Burton, 1975). Making up for this embarrassment, the FASB receded from its 
project explaining that “general purchasing power information is not now suffi-
ciently well understood by preparers and users and the need for it is not now suffi-
ciently well demonstrated to justify imposing the cost of implementation upon all 
preparers of financial statements at this time” (Status Report No. 37, June 4, 1976, 
p. 1). 
By 1978, inflation had further increased and Sandy Burton had been replaced as 
SEC Chief Accountant by A. Clarence Sampson, who conducted his job in a 
much quieter way and respected the Board’s mandate more fully.24 The FASB 
approached the issue again, possibly taking advantage of the lower risk of “friend-
ly fire”. It went on to issue an Exposure Draft “Financial Reporting and Changing 
Prices” on December 28, 1978, which allowed large companies to choose between 
its favored solution of general price-level accounting, now called constant dollar 
accounting, and the SEC’s approach of current cost accounting, referring to an 
asset’s “value to the business”, i.e. its deprival value.25 The Board embraced a 
financial capital maintenance concept, according to which “changes in the prices 
of assets held by the enterprise can be recognized as income” (para. 60). Nonethe-
24  Sandy Burton at first wanted the FASB to “pre-clear everything with him and his office”. The 
relationship between Clarence Sampson and the Board, by contrast, was one of “mutual re-
spect” (Kirk, 2011, pp. 35 and 37). 
25  On March 2, 1979, the FASB published a supplement to its December 1974 Exposure Draft 
updating the first Draft to the constant dollar requirements. 
Inflation, Exchange Rates and the Conceptual Framework 
41
less, the FASB contemplated the usefulness of reporting separately the effects of 
inflation. In the spirit of SFAC No. 1’s decision-usefulness objective, the Board 
considered it “likely that the separation of income from continuing operations and 
holding gains or losses may provide an improved basis for [financial statement 
users’] assessment [of future cash flows]” (para. 71). Such a conclusion was likely 
to have a bearing on the ordering and presentation of the traditional income state-
ment. 
While requiring departure from historical cost in supplementary statements, the 
FASB gave a strong commitment to historical cost accounting in the body of fi-
nancial statements since historical prices depend on actual transactions and “tend 
to be capable of independent verification” (para. 3). The FASB – in spite of se-
rious challenges to historical cost accounting – had not bid farewell to the existing 
approach to measurement. It was alleged that “recently, something close to a con-
sensus has emerged”26 that “no major changes should be made in the financial 
statements at this time, but something must be done […] to provide more informa-
tion about the effects of price changes” (p. i).27
When, in September 1979, SFAS No. 33 “Financial Reporting and Changing 
Prices” was issued with a 5-2 vote, it bore large resemblance to the Exposure 
26  Tweedie and Whittington (1984, p. 166) assert that the Board referred to the written and oral 
submissions in response to the December 1976 documents as evidence for the consensus. 
27  Likewise, the Board concluded that “a [SFAC] on measurement should not be prepared at this 
time. Conceptual choices that would change the basic financial statements should not be consi-
dered until users and preparers of financial reports have obtained further practical experience 
with supplementary information based on current measurement concepts and on constant dollar 
accounting” (para. 52). This statement yields further evidence to the presumption that the 
Board was not convinced of the superiority of current value measures. 
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Draft.28 However, the FASB did away with its either-or-approach and required 
companies to disclose both constant dollar and current cost data.29 The Board also 
withdrew from the financial capital maintenance concept (para. 104) and, as a 
result, adopted a more neutral term for holding gains and losses, now called in-
creases and decreases in current cost amounts (para. 125). The value changes were 
to be excluded from income from continuing operations (para. 30), but the two 
components together would provide a “comprehensive measurement of enterprise 
performance” (paras. 131-136), foreshadowing the “comprehensive income” con-
cept. Five years after the issuance of SFAS No. 33, the Board was scheduled to 
review the Statement or, if necessary, amend it earlier (para. 15). The two dissen-
ters criticized the dual approach of the Statement. However, while David Mosso 
was doubtful of the constant dollar data, Ralph E. Walters criticized the current 
cost disclosures. 
FASB’s Director of Research and Technical Activities, Michael O. Alexander 
(1981, p. 1) stated that, if considered in context, Statement No. 33 was “the most 
important change in accounting in several hundred years”, possibly since it ex-
panded use of current value figures, albeit in supplementary disclosures only. 
However, standard setters, preparers and users were uncertain whether the eco-
nomic environment was a diversion from normal or a new reality, as can be seen 
by the Board’s experimental approach to SFAS No. 33, which considerably dif-
fered from the days of deductive reasoning based on pre-existing concepts and 
28  Following issuance of Statement No. 33, the SEC phased out ASR No. 190 in October 1979. 
29  The Board had set up task groups, which were to identify special measurement problems in six 
industries. Whereas banking and insurance were eventually included in the scope of SFAS 
No. 33, the other industries were exempt from the requirement to disclose current cost data and 
covered in Statements No. 39 (mining and oil and gas), No. 40 (forest products) and No. 41 
(real estate), respectively. 
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accounting theory. Displaying its pragmatism, the Board made “no pretense of 
having solved all of the implementation problems” (para. 14). In a similar vein, 
Chairman Kirk, in an address to the Business Council, appealed to the business 
community’s “willingness to view our decision not as some form of unwanted 
regulation but rather as an opportunity to communicate the different effects of 
inflation on the profits of your businesses. We think we have given you the tools, 
but the message is up to you” (Kirk, 1979, p. 3). 
3.2 Giving in to Pressure: Foreign Currency Translation Revisited 
Following issuance of Statement No. 8, preparers and academics launched criti-
cism at both the Board and the Statement.30 Foremost, it was alleged that the 
Statement created accounting exposure and ignored economic exposure such that 
companies engaged in uneconomic actions to avoid volatile earnings. For exam-
ple, Teck (1976, p. 71) reported that SFAS No. 8 “tends to discourage” hedging 
inventory because inventory is not exposed to currency fluctuations, but forward 
contracts are. 
In spite of this criticism, the FASB voted 6-1 against reconsidering the Statement 
in April 1976, when the requirements were effective for less than four months. 
The Board argued that the objective of accounting was not to minimize the fluctu-
ation of earnings (Status Report No. 36, April 28, 1976, pp. 1 and 3). It also re-
jected calls to exclude translation adjustments from the determination of income 
along the lines of SFAS No. 12 “Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities”. 
30  For a review of the criticism in the (business) press, practitioners’ as well as scholarly journals, 
see Shank, Dillard, Murdock (1979, pp. 95-125). At least one of the authors is strongly op-
posed to SFAS No. 8 (Shank, 1976), which is why the review may not be objective. However, 
Statement No. 8 was revised in response to the public opinion such that the review at least 
shows the extent of the negative reaction. 
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When criticism did not ebb, the Board in 1977 invited research papers on the eco-
nomic consequences of accounting standards.31 The FASB-sponsored research 
indicated that stock returns were not affected by SFAS No. 8 (Dukes, 1978), but 
that companies pursued more aggressive risk management and incurred additional 
cost to avoid an anticipated increase in volatility of earnings (Evans, Folks, Jil-
ling, 1978). A FEI-sponsored study argued that “managers are so committed to the 
importance of accounting numbers […] that they will undertake actions in the 
foreign currency area which they know to increase expected costs and risk levels 
in order to preserve desired relationships in those numbers” (Shank, Dillard, Mur-
dock, 1979, p. 4). The economic environment of floating – possibly volatile – ex-
change rates amplified these concerns since “the dollar value of foreign currency 
items on balance sheets and income statements was subject to increased variability 
with the possible result that net earnings could become more volatile” (Makin, 
1978, p. 42). 
Responding to a recommendation by the Structure Committee of the Financial 
Accounting Foundation to experiment with a more formal post-enactment review 
process, the FASB in May 1978 issued an invitation for public comment on 
Statements that had been in effect for at least two years (i.e. Statements No. 1-12). 
The invitation included specific reference to SFAS No. 5 and No. 8 as the most 
controversial standards so far. The Board received more than 200 letters and 88 
percent of respondents expressed concerns with SFAS No. 8 (Van Riper, 1994, 
31  In its May 23, 1977 Status Report (No. 48, p. 2), the Board also requested comments on exist-
ing standards. Over the next 18 months, the Board received 20 requests on SFAS No. 8, by far 
the most on any standard, which asked for interpretation or even reconsideration of the State-
ment. 
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p. 32). As a consequence, SFAS No. 8 was given particular emphasis in the sub-
sequent review. 
Nevertheless, public speeches of Board members implied that they were not en-
tirely certain whether the public criticism was warranted. Oscar S. Gellein (1978, 
p. 2) called it “a serious charge” that management was taking uneconomic actions 
in response to some of the Board’s standards. Chairman Kirk struggled with the 
need to represent in financial statements economic reality, which he called “elu-
sive” (FASB Viewpoints, January 26, 1978, p. 3). Referring to the reaction to 
SFAS No. 8, he criticized managements’ attitude of trying to avoid volatile earn-
ings: “It is only human nature […] to look for accounting methods that will tend 
to mitigate the effects of uncontrollable but very real economic events. The end 
result is that the current financial statements, those which are to tell the story of 
current performance, will not include a peak or a valley but rather will show what 
a manager honestly believes to be his “true” earnings. This approach to account-
ing for uncontrollable events is characteristic of one widely held conceptual view 
of earnings that is often called the “nondistortion” view” (FASB Viewpoints, Au-
gust 4, 1978, pp. 4-5). 
Although being somewhat hesitant, the FASB voted unanimously to reconsider 
SFAS No. 8, adding the project to its agenda on January 31, 1979. The project 
was classified as high-priority and was assigned more staff resources than any 
other project except the conceptual framework (1979 Annual Report of the FASB, 
February 12, 1980, pp. 5-6). As early as June 1979 did the Board conclude that 
the current exchange rate was to be used and that translation adjustments should 
be excluded from income. Chairman Kirk emphasized that “the members of the 
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FASB recognize, I assure you, that corporate executives have a distaste for earn-
ings volatility – particularly and understandably for earnings fluctuations caused 
by events beyond their control” (FASB Viewpoints, November 9, 1979, p. 2). The 
solution to the criticism seemed driven by pragmatism. 
On August 28, 1980, the Exposure Draft “Foreign Currency Translation” was is-
sued featuring the functional currency, i.e. “the primary currency of the economic 
environment in which the entity generates and expends cash” (para. 8). It required 
use of the current rate (para. 9) and translation adjustments to be recorded in a 
separate component of stockholders’ equity. The Board had given in to requests 
along these lines and even admitted it had done so by citing the most frequently 
made recommendations regarding changes to Statement No. 8 (para. 46). Possi-
bly, the Board aimed to show it had taken care of its constituency’s concerns. 
Three Board members dissented to the Exposure Draft, inter alia, because the pro-
posed statement “has the potential to reduce the credibility of financial reporting” 
(para. 102.d.).32 For the dissenters, the Exposure Draft was a capitulation of the 
FASB to the business community. They “recognize the extreme difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of developing standards for foreign currency translation that are 
conceptually consistent, practical to implement, and easy for users to understand” 
(para. 104). Calling the subject “the most complex and most controversial one that 
the Board has faced”, Chairman Kirk, who – along with Frank E. Block and Ro-
bert A. Morgan – was later identified as one of the dissenters, displayed frustra-
tion when describing the challenges of the project and the perceived inadequacy 
32  In 1977, the voting requirement was changed from a supermajority (5-2) to simple majority  
(4-3). 
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of accounting to portray economic reality: “The limits of accounting, the need for 
evenhanded solutions to accounting problems, and the harshness of the reality of 
floating exchange rates probably make popularity irreconcilable with concepts and 
reality” (Status Report No. 109, December 30, 1980, p. 2). 
While rejecting requests for an extended exposure period, as asked for by the 
FEI’s Committee on Corporate Reporting, the FASB decided to reexpose the mat-
ter since comments received required changes of sufficient magnitude. A revised 
Exposure Draft was issued on June 30, 1981, inter alia, including changes regard-
ing the determination of the functional currency. The second draft included more 
detailed basis for conclusions and described that the assenters to the Statement 
had two conceptual views of translation adjustments. The first view regarded the 
adjustments as reflecting an economic effect of exchange rate changes (para. 111), 
whereas the second view considered them a mechanical by-product of the transla-
tion process (para. 112). The Board did not consider it necessary to conclude on 
one view because “both views exclude these adjustments from net income and 
include them in equity” (para. 110). Of the seven Board members, only four as-
sented and these members had two conceptually different views, showing the con-
troversial nature and, possibly, lacking theoretical justification of the solution. 
Despite some misgivings concerning the practical impact of SFAS No. 8, it was 
theoretical arguments that had produced the first foreign currency translation 
standard. The developments in the course of the second project show a considera-
ble change in the Board’s attitude reflecting the rise of economic consequences 
(Zeff, 1978) and, to a degree, the changing premises of financial reporting. 
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The dissents indeed pointed, inter alia, to the lacking relationship to preexisting 
fundamental concepts: “The dissenters believe the functional currency perspective 
[…] challenges and rejects the U.S. dollar perspective that underlies existing theo-
ries of […] historical cost and capital maintenance, […] and inflation accounting. 
[…] The rejection of the U.S. dollar perspective has ramifications far beyond this 
project and was unnecessary in a translation project.” (para. 150). The dissenters 
criticized the renunciation of traditional accounting premises by explaining that 
“[the Statement] remeasures the U.S. dollar equivalent cost while the item is held 
[…] and treats that remeasurement as a translation adjustment, seldom if ever re-
ported in net income. The implication of that is not only to change income mea-
surement concepts in the basic financial statements but also to modify the mea-
surement of changes in current costs (sometimes referred to as holding gains and 
losses) in Statement 33” (para. 151). The vehemence of the dissent gives testi-
monial to the controversial debates taking place concerning changing premises of 
accounting theory. Giving in to pragmatism also implies that the Board was 
guided by its decision-usefulness objective when it issued Statement No. 52 “For-
eign Currency Translation” by a 4-3 vote on December 8, 1981 without material 
changes to the revised Exposure Draft.33
The FASB subsequently sponsored three research studies to examine Statement 
No. 52. Evans and Doupnik (1986a) concluded that the functional currency me-
thod was being applied according to the Statement’s objective. Evans and Doup-
nik (1986b) found that firms exerted less effort on exchange risk management, 
which respondents to their survey attributed to factors other than SFAS No. 52. 
33  Following issuance of SFAS No. 52, Statement No. 33 on inflation accounting needed to be 
adapted to reflect the functional currency approach, which was done by issuing SFAS No. 70 
“Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Foreign Currency Translation” in December 1982. 
Inflation, Exchange Rates and the Conceptual Framework 
49
Griffin and Castanias (1987), who interviewed users of financial statements, con-
cluded that most analysts were “better off” with SFAS No. 52, although some 
analysts indicated that earnings quality had increased. An FEI-sponsored study by 
Arnold and Holder (1986) suggested that “SFAS No. 52 has contributed substan-
tially to quieting the controversy […]. Measured against the criterion of general 
acceptability, the standard must be considered a success” (p. viii). 
Overall, it seems that companies had not handled well the new regime of floating 
exchange rates following the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system. The 
volatility of exchange rates impeded managers in their attempts to smooth earn-
ings or present the expected income. When the Board reacted to the widespread 
criticism and changed reporting requirements, it not only gave up its commitment 
to traditional accounting premises, as evidenced by the departure from an all-
inclusive income statement beyond the limited scope of SFAS No. 12. To a de-
gree, it also gave up control over the standard setting process. 
3.3 The Trouble Ends: A Declining Inflation Rate 
On January 6 and 7, 1983, the FASB held a research conference in White Plains, 
New York, on the usefulness of inflation-adjusted disclosures. Several of the 15 
research projects that were presented indicated that the investment community 
made only limited use of the changing prices disclosures (Freeman, 1983, p. 1). 
Nonetheless, it was contended that current cost data would eventually become 
more useful. Constant dollar information was viewed less optimistically. 
In the course of its scheduled review, the FASB in July 1983 appointed a task 
force and, on December 27, 1983, issued an Invitation to Comment. The approx-
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imately 400 responses suggested that both number of users and extent of use were 
limited suggesting a cost-benefit problem of the supplementary information (Sta-
tus Report No. 159, August 20, 1984, p. 1). Possibly, the declining rate of infla-
tion contributed to this assessment. After having peaked at 13.5 percent in 1980, 
inflation declined to 3.2 percent in 1983. 
While deciding to continue the changing prices disclosures, the Board in Novem-
ber 1984 issued SFAS No. 82 “Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Elimi-
nation of Certain Disclosures”. Following the responses received earlier, the 
Statement eliminated the requirement to disclose constant dollar information, 
which had shown to be of limited use. In addition, an Exposure Draft was issued 
in December 1984 to combine the remaining pronouncements in one standard. 
Respondents to the Draft recommended that the supplementary disclosures be 
discontinued altogether. In view of these comments, the Board refrained from 
issuing a Statement, but decided to continue existing requirements, i.e. disclosure 
of current cost information, and to undertake a major project to improve the use-
fulness of present requirements (Status Report No. 171, November 8, 1985, p. 1). 
Only in mid-1986 did the FASB change its views. Although wanting to continue 
its course of action, the Board acknowledged that the rate of inflation justified 
neither disclosure of current cost data nor a major project on inflation accounting 
(Status Report No. 177, July 7, 1986, p. 6). In December 1986, it issued Statement 
No. 89 “Financial Reporting and Changing Prices” making the supplementary 
disclosures optional (para. 3). While following the concerns of the business com-
munity, the Statement was issued with a 4-3 vote only. The dissenters – David 
Mosso, Raymond C. Lauver and Robert J. Swieringa – believed that the main 
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thrust of Statement No. 33, i.e. the fact that inflation distorts historical cost-based 
information, remained unchanged. They argued that the Board would be asked 
again for supplementary disclosures when inflation rose. Such efforts would be as 
difficult, time-consuming, and costly as the development of Statement No. 33, 
which was why they preferred to devote adequate resources to the project now. 
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4 Implementing Change in the Conceptual Framework? 
4.1 Towards a New Income Concept 
During most of the conceptual framework project, both volatile exchange rates 
and high inflation seemed to represent a new economic reality which accounting 
had to cope with and which challenged the prevalent accounting model. Chairman 
Kirk welcomed the coincidence of the Changing Prices Exposure Draft with the 
reconsideration of foreign currency translation and the project on elements of fi-
nancial statements as “a formidable task but also an extraordinary opportunity to 
set the course for future standards” (FASB Viewpoints, June 8, 1979, pp. 3-4). 
Both changing prices and foreign currency translation projects were to employ 
common definitions of financial statement items and could thus inform the stan-
dard setter on the definition of financial statement elements. 
This striving for conceptual purity was apparent in the Discussion Memorandum 
“Reporting Earnings”, issued on July 31, 1979, in which the need for a consistent 
treatment of elements of earnings was stressed (p. 1). The Memorandum em-
ployed a “broad and all-inclusive” (p. 3) working definition of earnings and fo-
cused on the reporting of earnings without dealing with measurement aspects 
(p. 4). Inter alia, it debated a separate reporting of certain components of earnings, 
e.g. in a multiple-step income statement to reduce the emphasis on the “bottom 
line” (p. 79), and the exclusion from the earnings statement of some revenues, 
expenses, gains, and losses, which could be shown as direct adjustments to equity 
(p. 80). Alluding to the Changing Prices Exposure Draft, the Discussion Memo-
randum (pp. 71-2) suggested the separate reporting of holding gains from earn-
ings, but deferred the issue until experience had been gained with supplementary 
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schedules before introducing such a requirement in the body of financial state-
ments. Being a Discussion Memorandum, the document suggests that the issues 
discussed were merely ideas on which the Board sought comments instead of ten-
tative conclusions. However, the frank discussion signifies that by mid-1979 
changes to the conventional earnings statement were seriously considered.34
The discussion developed towards a roughly defined concept in the December 28, 
1979 Exposure Draft “Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises”. 
The Exposure Draft introduced the term “comprehensive income”, which in Con-
cepts Statement No. 3, issued in December 1980, was defined as “the change in 
equity (net assets) of an entity during a period from transactions and other events 
and circumstances from nonowner sources. It includes all changes in equity dur-
ing a period except those resulting from investments by owners and distributions 
to owners” (para. 56). Both the 1979 Exposure Draft (para. 37) and SFAC No. 3 
(paras. 56-7) emphasized that the Board had not decided on its preferred capital 
maintenance concept. Thus, although comprehensive income implied a return on 
financial capital, the Board left earnings undefined or “reserved” for “possible use 
to designate a different concept that is a component part of – that is, is narrower 
than or less than – comprehensive income” (Exposure Draft, para. 37). 
Although support for change was wavering either due to indecision or disagree-
ment, the FASB embraced a new all-inclusive concept – comprehensive income –, 
defined as the enhancement of wealth, possibly separating operating performance, 
34  The Memorandum also cited user concerns as an affirmation of its position. The Financial 
Analysts Federation had commented on the December 19, 1977 Exposure Draft: “[N]et income 
determined on an all-inclusive basis contains too much “noise”. […] Hence investors usually 
will consider underlying earning power from continuing activities as a more meaningful con-
cept of income” (p. 8). 
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i.e. earnings, from holding gains. The missing piece for such a concept was the 
decision on a capital maintenance concept, which was said to be part of a separate 
project. Depending on earnings being a return on physical or financial capital, 
meaning and appropriate display of earnings could change. Accordingly, the dif-
ference between comprehensive income and earnings were “perhaps “capital 
maintenance adjustments””, which in that case would become a separate element 
of financial statements (Exposure Draft, para. 37). SFAS No. 33, which was is-
sued three months prior to the Exposure Draft, similarly represents the status quo 
of the Board’s deliberations. One of the objectives of the Statement is the “as-
sessment of enterprise performance”, which distinguishes operating performance 
from the effect of changing prices. Such a notion was in line with the comprehen-
sive income concept. 
Explaining the Board’s ongoing discussions, Bryan Carsberg, Academic Fellow 
and Assistant Director of Research and Technical Activities and “largely respon-
sible for SFAS No. 33” as well as some of the conceptual framework documents 
(Gore, 1992, p. 112), stated that, by including all changes in net assets apart from 
transactions with owners, the new comprehensive income concept was based on 
financial capital maintenance. In addition, several Board members believed that 
the concept needed to be applied in a manner that recognized the impact of infla-
tion (Carsberg, 1981, p. 1). 
“Intermediate components” of comprehensive income could be reported, e.g. to 
distinguish central operations from results of other kinds. To do so, the Board re-
treated from the term earnings, which “has come to be regarded in current practice 
as representing a key aspect of performance. Consequently, to label one compo-
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nent as earnings might be to invite an excessive emphasis on that component. […] 
Several members of the Board attach importance to the disclosure of a component 
called operating income or operating earnings. However, the Board believes that it 
should not describe such a component as earnings alone but rather give each com-
ponent a fully descriptive label” (Carsberg, 1981, pp. 3-4). 
The November 16, 1981 Exposure Draft “Reporting Income, Cash Flows, and 
Financial Position of Business Enterprises” displayed considerations along the 
lines of Carsberg’s remarks, while reaffirming the Board’s preference for financial 
capital maintenance. The FASB gave examples of components of comprehensive 
income that could be reported as sub-totals without developing specific definitions 
for these components:
a. Income from continuing central operations for the period,  
b. Income from discontinued operations,  
c. Income from peripheral or incidental transactions,  
d. Income from price changes, i.e. holding gains (para. 151).
The list was described as illustrative and not exhaustive, emphasizing that the 
Board’s approach was not very prescriptive. Only hinting at the direction the 
FASB was contemplating, the wording suggests indecision and controversy, 
which the Board may have intended to solve by referring the issue to its constitu-
ents. 
Nonetheless, the Board continued on its way to a new income concept by calling 
information based on historical prices “not sufficient for all uses of financial re-
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ports”. Current exchange prices “may need to be provided either in the primary 
financial statements or as supplementary information” (para. 12), which was a 
considerable advancement over earlier commitments to historical cost accounting. 
However, by retreating from the concept of earnings, the FASB provoked the dis-
sent of an unnamed Board member, likely John W. March, who, in Concepts 
Statement No. 5, made clear his aversion to comprehensive income and his prefe-
rence for physical capital maintenance. The dissenter was “concerned that this all-
encompassing concept of income will cause misunderstanding about the levels of 
enterprise performance, return on investment, and profitability” (para. 183). By 
defying the Board’s strive for unanimity on the framework documents (Kirk, 
1989, p. 100), the opposition to the Exposure Draft showed that there was a seed 
of doubt within the Board that would soon grow to outright confrontation. 
The extent of the conflict could, however, not be foreseen. Reed K. Storey, Assis-
tant Director of Research and Technical Activities and “the real author of much of 
the conceptual framework” (Gore, 1992, p. 113), indicated widespread agreement 
when he captured the sentiment at the beginning of the 1980s: 
“It was a mode of thought that made “matching” into a religion, a doctrine 
sufficient to justify some highly questionable procedures. It made account-
ing results much more a matter of opinion and judgment than they need to 
be. […] First, I think the handwriting is already on the wall for the present 
model (which is often mislabeled “historical cost accounting”) because, 
among other things, it can’t cope with everyday complications, such as 
changing prices and fluctuating foreign exchange rates. […] Moreover, 
even if the weaknesses of deferring costs are magnified enough for all to 
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see, as they are by changing prices or fluctuating foreign exchange rates, 
we are more inclined to attempt to patch up the existing model than to ad-
mit that it is the basic source of our problems. […] I expect changes in the 
existing model to be evolutionary, perhaps over a long time. The concep-
tual framework won’t cause those changes – they are already inevitable. 
But the concepts can make clear the reasons for the changes, guide the 
changes that need to be made, and make the process of change orderly and 
consistent rather than ad hoc and potentially inconsistent” (Storey, 1981, 
pp. 3-5). 
By harshly criticizing existing practice, Storey described the FASB’s steering 
away from preexisting fundamental premises. The new income concept would 
rightly take into account the prevalent economic reality. By separating operating 
performance from changes in net assets, the effects of rising prices and fluctuating 
exchange rates could be excluded from the former and, via capital maintenance 
adjustments, shown in comprehensive income. Thus, the appeal of comprehensive 
income was that the two economic forces would be accounted for in a consistent 
manner, as had been intended by the Board. Possibly, the concerns regarding 
SFAS No. 8 had shown the need of modifying the traditional income statement 
towards a layered presentation of income components. Alternatively, it was that 
concept on the horizon that encouraged the FASB to exclude foreign currency 
translation adjustments from earnings in SFAS No. 52. 
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4.2 Stopping Short of Change 
While seeking consensus among Board members, the FASB was prepared for 
opposition from other sides and expected that “changes, no matter how inevitable 
or needed, will be resisted. […] That resistance is natural and, within limits, 
healthy. […] Resistance to pronouncements commonly results in better pro-
nouncements, and FASB’s due process procedures are specifically intended to 
assure that the necessary skepticism is heard” (Storey, 1981, p. 5). Obstacles to 
the remaining major project on recognition and measurement would turn out to be 
largely internal (Kirk, 1989, p. 100).35
When, in 1982, the rate of inflation declined considerably, “counterreformation 
made its appearance known during the recognition and measurement phase of the 
[conceptual framework] project” (Miller, 1990, p. 28). Had the Board been paving 
the way for a new income concept that would have allowed larger consideration of 
current values, it now became apparent that at least some of the Board members 
had second thoughts regarding the path they were on. Expecting large rates of 
inflation to be a new economic reality, they seemed to perceive a need to change 
accounting, as evidenced by Statement No. 33 being “the testing ground for the 
application of the current cost system [and] for the validity and utility of the con-
cept of physical, rather than financial, capital” (Kirk, 1988, p. 16). When inflation 
started to appear as a temporary factor, the Board members, who now decidedly 
examined measurement, found that current value accounting was no panacea. 
35  The two projects on recognition and measurement had been combined since they were consi-
dered inseparable (e.g. Status Report No. 132, July 13, 1982, p. 3). 
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FASB’s Director of Research and Technical Activities, Michael O. Alexander 
(1982, p. 5) still warned of the consequences of ignoring changing prices and 
stressed the need to reflect “important price change events”. He added that current 
values “will only gain acceptance as we become more comfortable about their 
reliability and more convinced of their relevance”, which was an early mention of 
current values trading off between the qualitative characteristics of relevance and 
reliability. The statement also implies that the macroeconomic environment had 
driven the FASB towards greater consideration of current values, contributing to 
the project developing a course of its own. Referring to Horngren (1981), one sus-
pects that the disruptive economy had aligned the Board members’ individual 
frameworks. Now that the economy had calmed, some Board members refrained 
from too revolutionary changes.36 Perhaps it was the prospect of current values in 
the body of the financial statements, instead of supplementary schedules, that 
made some of the Board members ardent defenders of the status quo. By the end 
of 1982, the Board was split into two groups: Frank E. Block, John W. March and 
Robert A. Morgan favored the existing historical cost framework, being “very 
recalcitrant” and “hesitant about saying anything favorable about [what later be-
came known as] fair valuing” (Kirk, 2011, p. 39). David Mosso, Robert T. 
Sprouse and Ralph E. Walters, by contrast, advocated a more flexible approach. 
Donald J. Kirk, while somewhere between the groups, tended to side with the lat-
ter position but declined joining either, producing stalemate in October 1982.37
36  Gore (1992, pp. 105-10) describes in detail the events that led to the issuance of SFAC No. 5. 
37  The issue of current prices had been a constant part of the conceptual framework debate. Dis-
cussing Board members’ views at a July 26, 1978 Board meeting, Gellein (1992, pp. 197-8) as-
serts that the Board was equally divided in members who thought that historical cost “should 
survive indefinitely”, members who thought that “value-based accounting was the accounting 
of the future” and members who thought that “historical cost would survive indefinitely but 
that the time was right for thorough consideration of the merits of value-based accounting.” 
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The March 2, 1983 Status Report (No. 140, pp. 3-4) emphasized that the debate 
was about “the circumstances in which [Board members] would recognize current 
prices as alternatives to historical costs” instead of an unconditional and complete 
turn towards current value accounting: “No member of the Board (or staff) favors 
reporting only historical costs or only current prices in all circumstances.” The 
Board members’ views on recognition “closely parallel[ed]” their views on the 
nature and meaning of income as revealed in the debate on the November 1981 
Exposure Draft, which “can be oversimplified as the difference between “earn-
ings” and “comprehensive income””. While acknowledging this interrelationship, 
the Board attributed more significance to the recognition and measurement project 
and deferred deliberations on reporting income “until it has made basic decisions 
about recognition and measurement”. It seemed that, instead of a comprehensively 
defined concept, a piecemeal solution had become more likely. 
By that time, the first results of the changing prices experiment had come in show-
ing that users did not find the supplementary disclosures useful. Inflation had 
ebbed to a level below 5 percent. As a result, moving towards more flexibility in 
measurement became less important and a solution was nowhere near. When Pro-
fessor Robert Mautz was brought in by the Board members favoring the status 
quo, it appeared that accounting would not see major changes. However, neither 
Mautz’s approach to build on existing Concepts Statements nor the one by Timo-
thy S. Lucas, a project manager, to help each Board member state their preferred 
view succeeded. In September 1983, Mautz suggested that the Board admit that it 
could not agree (Gore, 1992, p. 108). In the end, a subcommittee consisting of 
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Victor H. Brown, Robert T. Sprouse and Ralph E. Walters was set up to seek 
common ground.38
On December 30, 1983, the Board issued an Exposure Draft “Recognition and 
Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises” by unanimous 
vote. SFAC No. 5 followed one year later, in December 1984, eventually support-
ing financial capital maintenance (para. 45). Although being a “modest improve-
ment” (Solomons, 1986, p. 122), the Concepts Statement continued the main 
thrust of the Exposure Draft by being a descriptive rationalization of corporate 
practice without recommending one measurement basis.39 SFAC No. 5 merely 
named those bases that were currently in use: historical cost, current (replace-
ment) cost, current market value, net realizable value and present value of future 
cash flows (para. 67). The only measurement guidance SFAC No. 5 gave was “a 
carefully worded proposition” (Zeff, 1999, p. 114), which represented “extremely 
weak guidance” (Storey and Storey, 1998, p. 159), but had been “a major conces-
sion to the Board members who favored more market value accounting” (Mosso, 
cited in Zeff, 1999, p. 115): “Information based on current prices should be rec-
ognized if it is sufficiently relevant and reliable to justify the costs involved and 
more relevant than alternative information” (para. 90). The statement had been 
phrased by John W. March who dissented to SFAC No. 5 because the Statement 
did not commit itself to a historical cost framework. March believed that the para-
graph would prevent current values from ever being introduced in financial state-
ments since, in his opinion, current values would never be more relevant than his-
38  Victor H. Brown had replaced Robert A. Morgan on January 1, 1983. 
39  The Board “left further conceptual guidance on recognition and measurement to come from 
future standard setters” since “the then FASB was spent.” Communication from Donald Kirk 
dated February 19, 2013. 
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torical cost information.40 In his dissent to SFAC No. 5, March also opposed the 
comprehensive income concept as defined in SFAC No. 3, giving “a full blast 
endorsement of existing practices, meaning in large part historical cost and match-
ing” (Kirk, 2011, p. 39). Since he had earlier agreed to Concepts Statement No. 3, 
his “retroactive dissent” (Storey and Storey, 1998, p. 153) suggested that “he did 
not realize the full implications of what he was doing at the time” (Gore, 1992, 
p. 103). The economic environment as well as the Board’s striving for unanimity 
on the conceptual framework likely added to March’s earlier actions. 
With regard to a changing income concept, the FASB decided against following 
up on its 1981 Exposure Draft and deferred this issue to future standard setters: 
“The Board expects the concept of earnings to be subject to the process of gradual 
change or evolution that has characterized the development of net income. Present 
practice has developed over a long time, and that evolution has resulted in signifi-
cant changes in what net income reflects, such as a shift toward what is commonly 
called an “all-inclusive” income statement” (para. 35). The traditional income 
statement had been sustained, although, ironically, not in an all-inclusive form due 
to translation adjustments and value changes of certain marketable securities be-
ing excluded from earnings. The Board indicated that “perceptions about characte-
ristics such as realizability and volatility” help explain why these items are ex-
cluded from income (para. 46). Such practice appears ad-hoc and stands in stark 
contrast to the objective and consistent approach the Board had been aiming at. 
The subjective reasoning rather appeared as a minimal ex-post justification that 
40  This fact was provided to the author by Jim Leisenring in a communication dated January 17, 
2013. 
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was along the lines of the nondistortion guideline, against which the Board had 
launched major criticism. 
A number of reasons have been advanced for the Board coming short of a pre-
scriptive recognition and measurement statement.41 It has been suggested that the 
project had not been planned properly (Gore, 1992, pp. 43-4) and that the political 
nature of standard setting had not sufficiently been taken into account. In particu-
lar, when Roger Smith in 1981 became chairman of both General Motors and the 
Accounting Principles Task Force of the Business Roundtable, it seemed that lob-
bying became a major factor in standard-setting debates (Van Riper, 1994, 
p. 119). Companies were not willing to accept something other than the status quo 
and lobbied according to their long-standing fear that the asset and liability view 
would open the door for current values (Miller, 1990, p. 28). Likely, Board mem-
bers who had leaned towards the status quo saw themselves confirmed by compa-
nies’ actions.42
It also appears that the Board had underestimated the extent of the changes it had 
been contemplating in that they would have revolutionized the income statement 
and more widely considered current values in the body of financial statements. 
Only when the FASB moved to concrete implications of abstract concepts, i.e. 
recognition and measurement, and when inflation declined did the Board mem-
bers’ views spark more controversy and prove an insurmountable hurdle. See-
mingly unable to take great leaps, financial reporting turned out to evolve much 
41  See Zeff (1999, pp. 119-25) for an assessment of the conceptual framework project and Storey 
and Storey (1998, pp. 158-60) for an evaluation of SFAC No. 5. 
42  Jim Leisenring, then the Director of Research and Technical Activities, denies that companies’ 
lobbying activities were “more than normal” during the framework project. Communication 
dated January 17, 2013. 
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slower than had been expected. Had inflation remained on its previous level, 
chances for a prescriptive Concepts Statement may have been higher. Likewise, it 
seems compelling that current values might also have been more widely accepted, 
although it can only be speculated whether the SEC, in light of its long-standing 
support of historical cost accounting, would have accepted current values in the 
body of financial statements. 
In light of the difficulty with which SFAC No. 5 was issued, the Board refrained 
from attending to the reporting income project such that the debate on comprehen-
sive income had been addressed insufficiently. Anthony (1987, p. 76) commented: 
“Comprehensive income is a meaningless term. I have not seen it before [the con-
ceptual framework project] and I doubt that I will see it again.” SFAC No. 5 car-
ried forward both concepts of earnings and comprehensive income and introduced 
a statement of comprehensive income (para. 30) as a “concession to those Board 
members and constituents who wanted the conceptual framework to endorse a 
greater use of current market values” (Miller, Redding and Bahnson, 1998, 
p. 113). Comprehensive income thus persisted as an incoherently introduced con-
cept. It was only in June 1997 that the FASB, at the request of users, readdressed 
the sole reminder of the envisaged concept in SFAS No. 130 “Reporting Compre-
hensive Income”. 
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5 Conclusions
In this article, I explain that two economic forces, namely volatile exchange rates 
and inflation, challenged the prevalent accounting model and informed the debate 
on the conceptual framework. The Board was contemplating a new all-inclusive 
income concept – comprehensive income –, which could have separated operating 
performance from holding gains. Although the 1981 Exposure Draft on Reporting 
Income did not take a very prescriptive stand, such a model could also have incor-
porated larger consideration of current values. When the economic forces turned 
out to be temporary in nature and the FASB considered its recognition and mea-
surement project, some of the Board members blocked any deviation from the 
status quo. As a result of its spent efforts, the Board abandoned the reporting in-
come project and SFAC No. 5 became the deficient conceptual home for OCI 
accounting. The disruption of the all-inclusive concept, which had been intro-
duced willingly in SFAS No. 52 with the prospect of being healed ex-post in the 
reporting income project, became a permanent feature of GAAP, making OCI an 
unprincipled accounting concept. 
Previous authors have pointed to a sea change in the 1970s but have largely fo-
cused on the process of standard setting. Solomons (1978) discussed the politici-
zation of accounting, whereas Zeff (1978) pointed to economic consequences be-
ing a new argument in the standard setting process. In assessing the FASB’s first 
ten years, Paul A. Pacter (1983), then Executive Assistant to the FASB Chairman, 
suggests that the end of 1977 was a dividing line between two “eras” of the Board. 
My article supports Pacter’s (1983) assessment with respect to accounting models. 
It was at that time that the FASB changed its views on foreign currency transla-
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tion and regained standard setting authority on inflation accounting after the SEC 
had preempted earlier actions by the Board. Responding to the pervasiveness of 
the economic forces, the FASB acknowledged departure from an all-inclusive 
income statement and historical cost accounting as alternatives for future account-
ing standards. 
The year 1983 may be seen as a similar dividing line in that the FASB’s concep-
tual framework project came to an end, at least for the time being. The Board had 
come short of issuing a prescriptive recognition and measurement statement and 
abandoned its reporting income project. The resulting deficiency of the earnings 
and comprehensive income definitions as well as the limitations of the measure-
ment section exposed subsequent standard setting efforts to other forces, as evi-
denced by future comprehensive income requirements being the result of ad-hoc 
decisions (Rees and Shane, 2012) and political pressure (e.g. Johnson and Swie-
ringa, 1996). By contrast, the experience with SFAS No. 8 emphasized that adher-
ing to preexisting concepts makes accounting vulnerable to practical concerns and 
reduces standard setting flexibility. The advantage of looser fundamental con-
cepts, and possibly the decision-usefulness objective, is demonstrated by the fact 
that the Board has been able to use the concept of OCI, e.g. in the case of 
pensions, to recognize current measures of assets and liabilities in financial state-
ments that otherwise would have appeared in footnotes at best.43 Thus, a coherent 
system of fundamental concepts may, on the one hand, help to develop concep-
tually consistent standards. On the other hand, a system that is too tightly knit 
around concepts may preempt a solution that is widely accepted and provides re-
43  Tim Lucas, then a project manager and later FASB’s Director of Research and Technical Ac-
tivities, provided this fact to the author in a communication dated January 17, 2013. 
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medy to a widespread concern. While it can be hoped that a revision of the Con-
cepts Statements, which have survived largely unchanged, will be conducted in a 
less disruptive economic environment that affects the course of the debate, the 
episode narrated in this article emphasizes the need for a coherent, but nonetheless 
flexible, conceptual framework. 
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Appendix A: Major Exchange Rates and Rate of Inflation44
Panel A: Daily Exchange Rates of the U.S. Dollar against Major Currencies 
Note: The time period spans Jan 4, 1971 through Dec 31, 1984. The series are indexed by setting 
the first data point, Jan 4, 1971, to 100 for each currency (DEM = German Mark; FRF = French 
Franc; GBP = British Pound; JPY = Japanese Yen). Source: Federal Reserve Bank, accessed 
April 2, 2013. 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Exchange Rates 
Note: Panel B is based on the data points included in Panel A (DEM = German Mark; FRF = 
French Franc; GBP = British Pound; JPY = Japanese Yen).
44  I thank Jacco Wielhouwer for his suggestion to include these figures. 
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DEM 2.4960 0.4646 1.7080 3.6450
FRF 5.3691 1.3464 3.8462 9.6525
GBP 2.0344 0.3686 1.1580 2.6440
JPY 262.3479 40.5131 177.0500 358.4400
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Panel C:  Annual Rate of Inflation from 1970 to 1985 based on Consumer Price 
 Index 
Note: The figure depicts the annual rate of inflation in the United States based on the consumer 
price index (all items, all urban consumers). Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed April 2, 
2013. 
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Appendix B: Relevant FASB Documents by Time of Issue 
Date Project Document Title 
Feb 15, 1974 Inflation DM Reporting the Effects of General Price-Level 
Changes in Financial Statements 
Feb 21, 1974 Foreign 
Currency 
DM Accounting for Foreign Currency Translation
June 6, 1974 Framework DM Consideration of the Report of the Study 
Group on the Objectives of Financial State-
ments 
Dec 31, 1974 Inflation ED Financial Reporting in Units of General Pur-
chasing Power 
Dec 31, 1974 Foreign 
Currency 
ED Accounting for the Translation of Foreign 
Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency 
Financial Statements 
Oct 1975 Foreign 
Currency 
SFAS No. 8 Accounting for the Translation of Foreign 
Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency 
Financial Statements 
Dec 2, 1976 Framework n/a Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Fi-
nancial Statements of Business Enterprises 
Dec 2, 1976 Framework n/a Scope and Implications of the Conceptual 
Framework Project 
Dec 2, 1976 Framework DM Elements of Financial Statements and Their 
Measurement 
Dec 29, 1977 Framework ED Objectives of Financial Reporting and Ele-
ments of Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises
Nov 1978 Framework SFAC No. 1 Objectives of Financial Reporting by Busi-
ness Enterprises 
Dec 28, 1978 Inflation ED Financial Reporting and Changing Prices 
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Mar 2, 1979 Inflation ED Constant Dollar Accounting 
July 31, 1979 Framework DM Reporting Earnings 
Aug 9, 1979 Framework ED Qualitative Characteristics: Criteria for Se-
lecting and Evaluating Financial Accounting 
and Reporting Policies 
Sep 1979 Inflation SFAS No. 33 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices 
Dec 28, 1979 Framework ED Elements of Financial Statements of Busi-
ness Enterprises 
May 1980 Framework SFAC No. 2 Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information 
Aug 28, 1980 Foreign 
Currency 
ED Foreign Currency Translation 
Dec 1980 Framework SFAC No. 3 Elements of Financial Statements of Busi-
ness Enterprises 
Dec 15, 1980 Framework DM Reporting Funds Flows, Liquidity, and Fi-
nancial Flexibility 
June 30, 1981 Foreign 
Currency 
ED Foreign Currency Translation 
Nov 16, 1981 Framework ED Reporting Income, Cash Flows and Financial 
Position of Business Enterprises 
Dec 8, 1981 Foreign 
Currency 
SFAS No. 52 Foreign Currency Translation 
Dec 30, 1983 Framework ED Recognition and Measurement in Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises 
Nov 1984 Inflation SFAS No. 82 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: 
Elimination of Certain Disclosures 
Dec 1984 Framework SFAC No. 5 Recognition and Measurement in Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises 
Dec 1986 Inflation SFAS No. 89 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices 
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THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK’S (IN-)ADEQUACY 
FOR STANDARD SETTING
Abstract
Set against the background of the stalled convergence of R&D accounting, our 
article examines whether the FASB’s and IASB’s revised conceptual framework 
is suited to resolve the question of recognition of R&D expenditures. Based on a 
conditional-normative research approach, we first examine accounting theories to 
come up with a set of accounting methods for the treatment of R&D costs. Next, 
we assess these alternatives against the revised qualitative characteristics, which is 
an approach that the Boards assert to employ. We find that the conceptual frame-
work is ill-suited to bring about a solution for R&D accounting. Our findings raise 
concerns on the adequacy of the conceptual framework for standard setting, which 
relate to inconsistencies in the framework and ill-defined qualitative characteris-
tics. The framework seems to fall short of its pronounced purpose, which is to 
assist the Boards in solving standard setting issues. Our article reveals in which 
respects the framework would need to be revised and thus demonstrates how 
theory contributes to standard setting. 
Keywords:  conceptual framework, accounting theory, normative research, 
 FASB, IASB, R&D accounting 
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1 Introduction
According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) Rules of Pro-
cedures and the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) Preface to 
IFRSs, the joint conceptual framework is the foundation on which accounting 
standards and financial reporting practice is supposed to rest. It is the ‘deductive 
basis for the setting of accounting standards in accordance with a predetermined 
objective for financial reporting’ (Loftus, 2003, p. 298) and is consulted when 
taking standard setting decisions (Barth, 2007a, p. 8). In 2010, the Boards fina-
lized Phase A of their joint conceptual framework project which included the Ob-
jective of General Purpose Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of 
Useful Financial Information. In these documents, the Boards re-formulated and 
made explicit their basis for decision-making on standard setting issues. 
Our article examines whether the joint conceptual framework suits its pronounced 
purpose by applying the framework’s decision-making process to the controver-
sial issue of accounting for research and development (R&D) expenditures. Based 
on a conditional-normative research approach, we introduce an analytical frame-
work that combines accounting theory with evaluation criteria, which serve as the 
conditional element in our analysis. We first derive several accounting methods 
which accounting theories postulate regarding recognition of R&D. Next, we ex-
amine the Boards’ conceptual frameworks to determine decision criteria that the 
standard setters use. Each previously derived accounting method is then assessed 
concerning the extent to which the method fulfills the pre-determined evaluation 
criteria. By applying the Boards’ criteria for decision-making, we would come up 
with an accounting alternative for the treatment of R&D expenditures that is in 
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line with both accounting theory and the Boards’ prescribed characteristics of ac-
counting information. Our analysis would also yield an accounting method best 
suited for converging US GAAP and IFRS with respect to the treatment of R&D. 
However, we show that the Boards’ conceptual framework is not suited to eva-
luate accounting alternatives. The proclaimed qualitative characteristics are not 
defined properly which makes their application highly interpretive. In addition, by 
not defining what the criteria actually mean the Boards make an evaluation nearly 
impossible. Accordingly, our analysis exposes in which ways the criteria are open 
for interpretation and we suggest that, if the Boards want their decision-making 
process to be considered objective, they need to reconsider the qualitative charac-
teristics. Overall, we draw the conclusion that the qualitative characteristics are 
not suited for solving recognition questions, but present a tool to come up with 
transactions on which financial information should be disclosed, disregarding the 
way such a reporting should be designed. An alternative explanation could be that 
the Boards use the conceptual framework in their decision-making process, but 
have qualitative characteristics in mind that are more clearly defined and more 
precise than the ones published in the framework. 
We consider the recognition of R&D expenditures suited well for this purpose for 
two reasons.1 First, Sprouse (1988) writes of the time around issuing Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 2 in 1974 that ‘the absence of mea-
ningful concepts of assets and liabilities in the authoritative literature and lack of 
established criteria for accounting recognition were particularly frustrating in the 
1  We explicitly leave out measurement aspects. While being aware that recognition and mea-
surement are closely related, a comprehensive analysis of both aspects would be beyond the 
scope of our article. 
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research and development [...] project[s]’ (p. 124). Likewise, Kirk (1988, p. 15) 
called the R&D project a catalyst for the FASB’s Statement of Financial Account-
ing Concepts (SFAC) No. 3 on financial statement elements. Examining R&D 
expenditures also seems to be promising as Camfferman and Zeff (2009, p. 259) 
note that these costs might be in line with the framework’s recognition criteria, 
although they are not capitalized. Second, R&D accounting is a controversial fi-
nancial reporting issue that waits to be resolved for some time and remains one of 
the issues on which US GAAP and IFRS still differ. While the FASB’s SFAS 
No. 2 requires an automatic expensing of all R&D costs, International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 38 requires entities to capitalize development costs of an R&D 
project if certain criteria are fulfilled. What is more, efforts to converge the ac-
counting rules have been halted since 2007. 
Overall, our paper serves several purposes: First, by applying the Boards’ deci-
sion-making process, we make inconsistencies in the conceptual framework ap-
parent and demonstrate in what respect the Boards’ proclaimed evaluation criteria 
are unsuitable. We are thus in line with Barth (2007a, p. 8) who asks for research 
that questions the conceptual framework and rethinks the qualitative characteris-
tics of financial reporting. Second, it analyzes R&D accounting from a condition-
al-normative perspective using a theoretical, and thus rarely applied, approach. In 
light of the large number of empirical works on R&D accounting, this endeavor 
seems reasonable given the mixed results of accounting literature (e.g. Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1999; Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002).2 Our analysis follows 
Bennett, Bradbury and Prangnell (2006) who argue that joint qualitative criteria 
2  For an overview of accounting research on intangibles see Cañibano, García-Ayuso, and 
Sánchez (2000). Wyatt (2008) provides a more recent overview of literature on the value-
relevance of intangibles. 
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are needed to analyze and discuss a joint accounting standard on R&D. Third, it 
answers Dichev’s (2008) call for a renewed interest in normative research that 
provides clear recommendations for policy making and thus aims at improving 
financial reporting. 
Our article proceeds as follows: In a first step, we build our analytical framework 
and derive four accounting methods for the treatment of R&D expenditures. Next, 
we use the standard setters’ conceptual frameworks to find criteria on which we 
conduct an evaluation of the accounting alternatives. Our subsequent analysis dis-
cusses each accounting method with respect to the evaluation criteria and reveals 
in what respects the Boards’ evaluation criteria are futile. 
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2 Analytical Framework 
2.1 Outline of the Analysis 
Our analysis makes use of the controversial issue of R&D accounting to examine 
whether the Boards’ joint conceptual framework is suited to evaluate recognition 
concepts and propose a first best solution. In order to choose an accounting option 
for a specific issue, standard setters typically prefer ex ante research (Schipper, 
1994, p. 62) that mainly relies on empirical research methodologies (Schipper, 
1994, pp. 63-6; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001). Nevertheless, concepts such 
as standard setters’ conceptual frameworks are formed by normative analysis and 
can best be examined by using a normative approach. Similarly, Fülbier, Hitz and 
Sellhorn (2009, p. 468) point out that normative, policy-related research can be 
useful for standard setters. They refer to conditional-normative research (Mattes-
sich, 1995, pp. 187-210), i.e. research grounded in theory that uses and explicates 
evaluative criteria based on the objectives and criteria sets of the standard setter at 
whom the research is directed. This research explicitly neither takes into consider-
ation influences of political lobbyists (e.g. Zeff, 2002) nor analytical processes or 
compromises within the standard setting bodies (Miller and Bahnson, 2010). 
Hence, the outcome of our research can be seen as input to the political and prag-
matic compromises standard setters are confronted with. 
Accounting theories determine possible accounting options for an identified stan-
dard setting issue. These options have to be evaluated against a set of criteria that 
are pre-specified by the standard setter(s). Accordingly, we first identify account-
ing theories that suggest answers to the question of recognition of R&D expendi-
tures. As we do not aim to provide an overview of accounting theories or a discus-
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sion of basic accounting concepts, we first have to derive a set of accounting theo-
ries that is useful for our purpose. Finding that accounting theories are categorized 
differently,3 we cluster the theories that aim at postulating accounting norms into 
two main strands: On the one hand, there are the classical income measurement 
approaches which define how ‘true income’ is measured based on neoclassical 
economic theory4 and propose how transactions are to be recognized. The works 
by Paton and Littleton (1940) and Sprouse and Moonitz (1962) fall into this cate-
gory.
On the other hand, the decision-usefulness approaches, beginning with Staubus 
(1954) and Chambers (1955), describe what kind of information is useful to inves-
tors and how this information should be recognized and measured. Two main sub-
categories can be defined: value approaches and the events approach. Value ap-
proaches are mainly concerned with alternatives to measure assets. Several 
schools of thought can be identified that include a valuation at replacement cost 
(e.g. Edwards and Bell, 1961), at exit value (e.g. Chambers, 1966), and at net rea-
lizable value (e.g. Sterling, 1970). We summarize these approaches into one cate-
gory as they are concerned with measuring assets and do not propose different 
concepts for the recognition of transactions. By contrast, the events approach, 
developed by Sorter (1969), criticizes the value approaches and promulgates a 
different accounting theory. The author suggests that users’ needs are best satis-
fied if they receive disaggregated information on the major transactions that a 
3  American Accounting Association (AAA, 1977) and Whittington (1986) use research ap-
proaches as a distinguishing characteristic. Some approaches have been assigned to different 
categories by different researchers (e.g. Revsine, 1981, p. 343). 
4  According to AAA (1977), ‘true income’ theories assume that income should be measured 
using one valuation base. Such an income would meet the needs of all users and thus represent 
‘true income’. 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
86
company conducts during the year. Sorter (1969) does not suggest an appropriate 
degree of aggregation and, hence, does not prescribe how information on the 
transactions should be presented. However, he requires recognition of important 
transactions in general. 
The qualitative criteria for evaluating accounting options have to be derived for 
both the IASB and the FASB. These criteria are given in the Boards’ conceptual 
frameworks, which have a guiding function for both standard setting bodies. Ac-
cording to the FASB’s Rules of Procedure (ch. II.C., p. 3), the SFACs are useful 
in ‘providing a frame of reference, or conceptual framework, for resolving ac-
counting issues’. In addition, the Rules of Procedure (ch. II.D., p. 4) prescribes 
that FASB members are to ‘issue high-quality standards, which are grounded in a 
consistently applied conceptual framework.’ A more precise definition of the 
FASB’s Concepts is given in ‘Scope and Implications of the Conceptual Frame-
work Project’, published on December 2, 1976: ‘A conceptual framework is a 
constitution, a coherent system of interrelated objectives and fundamentals that 
can lead to consistent standards [...]. The fundamentals are the underlying con-
cepts of accounting, concepts that guide the selection of [...] the means of summa-
rizing and communicating [events] to interested parties’ (p. 2, emphasis in the 
original). 
In the IFRS environment, the Preface to IFRSs (para. 8) postulates that ‘IFRSs are 
based on the Conceptual Framework’. Thus, it is the ‘objective of the Conceptual 
Framework […] to facilitate the consistent and logical formulation of IFRSs’. 
Finally, the Boards’ joint framework sets out that it is to guide the Boards in ‘de-
veloping accounting and reporting guidance by providing the Board[s] with a 
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common foundation and basic reasoning on which to consider merits of alterna-
tives’ (preface to SFAC No. 8, p. 5). Hence, we follow the objectives and prin-
ciples set out in the conceptual framework(s) and derive criteria that an account-
ing option would have to be evaluated against. By assessing each option based on 
these criteria, we reproduce the Boards’ decision-making process to come up with 
an accounting alternative for R&D expenditures that is in line with both account-
ing theory and the standard setters’ criteria for high-quality accounting standards. 
Our analysis allows us to test whether the qualitative criteria suit their purpose of 
being the evaluating frame for accounting concepts and, possibly, reveals incon-
sistencies or shortcomings of the qualitative characteristics. 
Despite their fundamental importance for standard setters, conceptual frameworks 
have been criticized as unsuitable for conditional-normative analyses. Especially 
the FASB’s conceptual framework has drawn a lot of criticism over the years. 
Several authors (e.g. Miller, 1985; Christensen, 2010, pp. 297-8) have argued that 
the conceptual framework is incoherent and too detailed. In addition, they doubt 
that a framework is suited to provide financial reporting with an appropriate theo-
retical foundation and can hardly be considered suitable for assessing accounting 
alternatives. Similarly, Christensen and Demski (2007) show that the framework’s 
focus on qualitative characteristics of financial information prevents accounting 
standards from being based on economic fundamentals. Regardless of this criti-
que, standard setters have used and will continue to use conceptual frameworks 
when developing accounting standards (Gallery and Gallery, 2004; Whittington, 
2008). Our article thus needs to be seen in the context of studies that test whether 
accounting standards are consistent with the conceptual framework(s) (e.g. Moz-
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es, 1998; Loftus, 2003; Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005) rather than articles that 
assess the general suitability of a conceptual framework. 
In 2004, the FASB and the IASB began developing a joint conceptual framework 
as a basis for future joint work. The Boards approached the project by splitting it 
into eight phases that were initially planned to be completed by 2010. However, 
they have halted the project as it was considered low priority in the context of the 
financial crisis.5 By now, the objective and qualitative characteristics (Phase A) 
have been finished and published. Elements and recognition as well as measure-
ment (Phase B and C) have merely been discussed, whereas the Boards have pub-
lished an exposure draft on the reporting entity concept (Phase D). The other 
phases (Phase E through H) have not yet been approached. 
We will make use of the joint conceptual framework as far as possible. Nonethe-
less, we need to conduct parts of our analysis based on the Boards’ individual 
conceptual frameworks. In particular, we take the definition and recognition crite-
ria of financial statement elements from the FASB’s SFACs No. 5 and No. 6 and 
the IASB’s 1989 version of the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of 
Financial Statements, respectively. Other sections of the conceptual frameworks 
are not relevant for our analysis. 
2.2 Normative Theory and Accounting Concepts 
We proceed by examining the accounting theories regarding their views on the 
recognition of R&D expenditures. Following a brief introduction of each theory, 
5  By now, the IASB has re-begun its work on the framework, continuing the project without the 
FASB. 
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we analyze which recognition option they explicitly or implicitly suggest for 
R&D. By doing so, we ensure that the accounting alternatives examined in later 
chapters are grounded in theory. 
Starting with the income measurement approaches, we begin with the work by 
Paton and Littleton (1940), also known as the revenue-and-expense view. This 
theory hinges on the principle that expenses are assigned to revenues, i.e. ex-
penses or costs are recorded in the income statement once the revenue associated 
with the product or service that caused the costs is recognized. In turn, costs are 
recorded as assets if revenue streams are expected in future periods. Thus, assets 
are ‘revenue charges in suspense’ that await ‘some future matching with revenue 
as costs or expenses’ (Paton and Littleton, 1940, p. 25). 
It follows that R&D expenditures also need to be matched with revenues that re-
sult from R&D projects. Hence, all R&D costs would be recorded on the balance 
sheet and transferred to the income statement once the corresponding R&D 
project yields a product that generates revenue. However, an R&D asset would 
have to be transferred to the income statement earlier if a project will eventually 
not result in a revenue-generating product. Based on this reasoning, Paton and 
Littleton (1940, pp. 91-2) argue that it may be advisable to not fully match the 
costs for R&D. That would be the case if circumstances suggest that a procedure 
other than full matching is more appropriate or if it is not feasible to properly 
match expenses with revenue. As a result, anything between full matching, i.e. 
capitalization of all costs, and immediate expensing of R&D costs can be recom-
mended. Circumstances suggest how the entity accounts for their R&D expendi-
tures. 
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The second income measurement approach is the theory formulated by Sprouse 
and Moonitz (1962), later known as the asset-and-liability view. The authors (p. 5) 
argue that Paton and Littleton’s (1940) strong focus on the income statement does 
not produce satisfactory results. They aim to shift emphasis to the balance sheet 
and, accordingly, define its elements, postulating that all elements that are assets, 
liabilities or equity should be carried on the balance sheet. Hence, we would need 
to analyze whether R&D expenditures fulfill one of the authors’ definitions. How-
ever, Sprouse and Moonitz (1962, p. 22) conduct this analysis themselves and 
describe that ‘research and development costs also fall within the class of assets 
[…] because they create or embody future economic benefits.’ They continue to 
describe R&D costs as ‘assets in their “purest” form because their value depends 
directly on “future economic benefits”’ (p. 36). Thus, according to Sprouse and 
Moonitz (1962), R&D expenditures are assets and should be carried on the bal-
ance sheet.6
Sprouse and Moonitz (1962, p. 36) acknowledge that it may be difficult to value 
R&D assets because current or future exchange prices are unobservable. As a re-
sult of these measurement problems, an alternative accounting concept can be 
offered. Johnson (1976) suggests using contra-equity accounting for R&D 
projects. According to this approach, R&D projects would be charged directly to a 
contra-equity account, i.e. as a reduction of equity, to report the usage of resources 
in the course of the project. Subsequently, when knowing that a certain project is 
successful, the entity would transfer the contra-equity R&D project to the asset 
6  SFAS No. 2 is often considered a standard that shows the FASB’s commitment to the asset-
and-liability view (e.g. Zeff, 2005). One could argue that capitalizing R&D expenditures would 
not be in line with this theory. However, our analysis bases solely on Sprouse and Moonitz 
(1962), who explicitly discuss the treatment of R&D expenditures. 
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side of the balance sheet. Alternatively, if the project was not successful, the con-
tra-equity account would be transferred to retained earnings.7 By using this ap-
proach, an entity would report the R&D project as an asset ‘on hold’ as long as its 
future economic benefits are uncertain, doing so in a contra-equity account. 
Sprouse (1966) could be interpreted as criticizing such an approach because of a 
possible violation of the accounting equation. Nonetheless, contra-equity account-
ing for R&D does not violate the equation because equity may well be a negative 
number. When conducting R&D, both assets and equity are reduced, balancing 
out the equation. Hence, two accounting alternatives are derived from the asset-
and-liability view: full capitalization of R&D expenditures and contra-equity ac-
counting.
Next, we turn to the decision-usefulness approaches that postulate which informa-
tion is useful for investors and should be reported. We note that, to the best of our 
knowledge, these theories do not clearly suggest which items should be carried on 
the balance sheet or recorded in the income statement. Instead, they emphasize 
measurement aspects, prescribing that assets should be measured, e.g., at replace-
ment cost (Edwards and Bell, 1961), exit value (Chambers, 1966) or net realizable 
value (Sterling, 1970). We conclude that the theories defer the issue of recogniz-
ing R&D expenditures to the measurement stage, i.e. each project will be recog-
nized individually when it is acquired and measured at a certain value. The value 
of an R&D project can still be zero, implying that all costs are charged to the in-
come statement, either directly or by immediately writing off the asset. 
7  Carrying this idea forward to today’s financial reporting environment, such a method would 
involve ‘other comprehensive income’ in one way or another. 
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Finally, we examine the events approach based on Sorter (1969) who prescribes 
that the purpose of accounting is providing information about events relevant for 
decision-making. Accordingly, financial statements should report the main events 
of the period and from the time of the entity’s founding. The reporting should be 
done in a disaggregated form. Following the events approach, we conclude that 
R&D projects are relevant events for a company as they may be seen as an indica-
tor of entities’ future competitiveness (e.g. Lev and Sougiannis, 1996) and that a 
company would need to report them in its financial statements. However, part of 
the criticism the events approach drew is that it does not prescribe how and in 
which form events should be reported (Johnson, 1970). Thus, the events approach 
does not seem to favor one of the accounting alternatives, but permits all of the 
previously derived methods as they all imply that R&D projects are reported in 
the financial statements: full capitalization, full expensing, contra-equity account-
ing, and partial capitalization. 
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3 Evaluation Method 
The application guidance for the qualitative characteristics is a new feature of the 
joint conceptual framework. Previously, the frameworks only included a list of 
qualitative characteristics without explaining how these are applied. The Boards 
thus now disclose an evaluation process using the qualitative characteristics or, 
given their claim to use the framework in standard setting, their normative deci-
sion-making process. The application guidance helps us identify a deductive deci-
sion model that is open to a normative assessment regarding its suitability to rec-
ommend an accounting solution. 
After having identified an economic phenomenon that may be useful to users of 
financial statements, it needs to be evaluated whether financial information about 
that phenomenon fulfills the fundamental qualitative characteristics of ‘relevance’ 
and ‘faithful representation’ (QC18). If both characteristics are fulfilled, the fi-
nancial information is decision useful (QC18). If not, the assessment ‘is repeated 
with the next most relevant type of information’ (QC18). These requirements 
yield a first level for an analytical framework on which relevance and faithful re-
presentation of accounting alternatives are assessed. The method that leads to 
highest relevance and ensures faithful representation is preferred. 
However, we need to question how the two characteristics are linked. Although 
the word ‘and’ (QC4) suggest an additive link, we do not find more information 
on this. Based on QC18’s decision rule, we could also argue that the most relevant 
solution should be chosen given it is faithfully represented. In that case, faithful 
representation would only be a constraint that, if not fulfilled, hinders the most 
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relevant alternative from being chosen. Similarly, it remains unclear whether re-
levance and, in particular, faithful representation are scaled or binary characteris-
tics.8 Arguably, relevance is scaled since one accounting alternative can be more 
relevant to users than another and the most relevant alternative should be assessed 
first. Faithful representation seems to be either fulfilled or not (QC18). However, 
the framework indicates that there can also be lower degrees of faithful represen-
tation (QC12). In addition, having three sub-criteria, i.e. completeness, neutrality 
and freedom from error, suggests that faithful representation can be partially ful-
filled. That is, unless partial or non-fulfillment of one of the sub-criteria signifies 
lack of faithful representation. For the sub-criteria, it is also not specified whether 
they are linked additively, multiplicatively or whether there is an emphasis on one 
(or two) of the criteria. 
According to the framework, further analysis of accounting methods employs the 
enhancing qualitative characteristics of comparability, verifiability, timeliness and 
understandability, which are considered only if relevance and faithful representa-
tion of two or more accounting concepts is fulfilled to a similar extent (QC19).9
Again, it is questioned how the characteristics interact and whether they can be 
fulfilled in part. It is also unclear which kind of analysis the guidance on the en-
hancing characteristics requires. QC33 requires that ‘enhancing qualitative charac-
teristics should be maximized to the extent possible’. Thus, the accounting con-
cept which leads to the highest performance on all four enhancing qualitative cha-
8  The same question can be asked for decision usefulness itself since fundamental qualitative 
characteristics make information useful, i.e. it is useful, but enhancing qualitative characteris-
tics can increase usefulness. 
9  The application guidance for the fundamental qualitative characteristics suggests that the first 
level assessment is ‘subject to the effects of enhancing characteristics and the cost constraint’. 
This statement is inconsistent with the remaining guidance, which argues that, in a first step, 
only the fundamental qualitative characteristics matter. 
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racteristics is preferred. On the other hand, QC34 suggests that ‘one enhancing 
qualitative characteristic may have to be diminished to maximize another’. As a 
result, an individual judgment would be required that assesses the relative impor-
tance of one enhancing qualitative characteristic over another with the overall goal 
to maximize all enhancing characteristics jointly. Is an analysis objective if it en-
tails an estimating the effects of the individual enhancing criteria on relevance and 
faithful representation? In fact, the evaluation process may turn out to rely solely 
on individual judgment. Adding to this is the vague description that the applica-
tion ‘is an iterative process that does not follow a prescribed order’ (QC34). Given 
a normative understanding of an evaluation process, a decision-making tool 
should be based on an objectified assessment that leaves out subjective compo-
nents. As a result, the framework’s application guidance lacks definitional clarity. 
In addition, for all qualitative characteristics, we need to question to what they 
actually pertain. Are they needed for the recognition of a transaction, for measur-
ing an element, or are they equally important for both stages? Vice versa, we 
question whether the characteristics can be applied at all to recognition and mea-
surement separately or whether accounting solutions need to be considered in their 
entirety. How is uncertainty considered in the standard setting decision? What role 
do disclosures play? An evaluative frame would require that there is a clear defini-
tion of the scope of application. Otherwise, the characteristics as well as the eval-
uation process leave room for interpretation and do not represent an objective de-
cision-making process. 
The final step in the evaluation introduces a cost constraint on useful financial 
reporting (QC34-39). This constraint comes into effect only once accounting al-
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
96
ternatives have been evaluated and is assessed by seeking information from dif-
ferent sources such as providers of financial information. It has no effect on the 
actual evaluation or ranking of accounting concepts based on the framework’s 
criteria. It may only hinder the first-best accounting concept from being imple-
mented, if this concept imposes on preparers costs that are not justified by corres-
ponding benefits. 
Again, the cost constraint’s inherent subjectivity, which the framework itself men-
tions (QC39), needs to be criticized. Since the description of costs and benefits is 
very vague, it is nearly impossible to reproduce such an assessment or to conduct 
an objective cost-benefit-analysis of a proposed accounting alternative. The 
Boards had been aware of this issue (Barth, 2007a, p. 9) but did not change the 
cost constraint in their joint framework. We may well speculate whether this is 
due to the mere impossibility of an objective assessment of costs and benefits or 
whether the Boards embrace the constraint as a final means of preventing unwel-
come accounting concepts from coming into effect. Due to the inherently subjec-
tive nature of a cost-benefit analysis and the lack of information on how to con-
duct such an assessment, we refrain from analyzing the accounting methods re-
garding costs and benefits and focus our following analysis on the qualitative cha-
racteristics. 
3.1 First Evaluation Level: Relevance 
Financial information is relevant if the information ‘is capable of making a differ-
ence in the decisions made by users’ (QC6), regardless of whether users take ad-
vantage of this information and actually act differently. Information can make a 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
97
difference in users’ actions if it has predictive or confirmatory value or both 
(QC7).
Such a description leaves plenty of room for interpretation because there is no 
additional explanation included on what the definition actually entails. Hence, the 
framework’s definition of ‘relevant information’ seems impracticable to work 
with for standard setters and preparers: What information has predictive or con-
firmatory value and should be reported in financial statements? The definition 
implies that relevance can only be measured by examining users’ knowledge 
growth from receiving financial information. Given this understanding, the cha-
racteristic is not operational for a normative analysis but might require empirical 
examination, rendering an ex-ante assessment difficult. 
Nevertheless, by defining elements of financial statements like assets, liabilities 
and equity and pointing out their importance for financial reporting by describing 
that these elements represent economic resources and claims, the Boards come up 
with an implicit assertion: Everything that is an asset, liability, equity, revenue or 
expense is relevant; otherwise these elements would not be reported. The FASB’s 
now superseded SFAC No. 2 yields support for this assessment since it describes 
that ‘information about the present status of economic resources or obligations or 
about an enterprise’s past performance is commonly a basis for expectations’ 
(SFAC No. 2.48) and thus for information to be relevant. Hence, our analysis of 
relevance entails an assessment of whether element definitions and, if applicable, 
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recognition criteria provided in the framework are fulfilled by the accounting al-
ternatives under review.10
Since we examine full capitalizing, full expensing, contra-equity accounting, and 
partial capitalization, we need to find definitions for these elements. Given that 
the revised framework has not yet proceeded to financial statement elements, we 
need to include the Boards’ individual frameworks at this stage and, if necessary, 
combine the definitions. 
Full capitalization implies recognition of all R&D expenditures as assets and we 
need to define what a recognizable asset constitutes. According to the IASB’s 
Framework, an asset is ‘a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past 
events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’ 
(F4.4(a)). It can be recognized if ‘(a) it is probable that any future economic bene-
fit associated with the item will flow to or from the entity; and (b) the item has a 
cost or value that can be measured with reliability’ (F4.38). The FASB uses a sim-
ilar definition, describing an asset as ‘probable future economic benefits obtained 
or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or events’ 
(SFAC No. 6.25). Under US GAAP, an asset can be recognized if the item meets 
the element definition, is measurable with sufficient reliability, is capable of mak-
ing a difference in user decisions (relevance), and is representationally faithful, 
verifiable, and neutral (reliability) (SFAC No. 5.63). The latter terms of relevance 
and reliability are taken from the qualitative characteristics and assumed to be 
10  Our reasoning is at least partly backed by Barth (2007a, p. 8): ‘the definitions identify what 
should be measured’. That is, they identify what should be on a balance sheet. However, Barth 
(2007b, p. 57) points out the following question for future research: ‘Should all assets and li-
abilities be recognized, or should there be additional criteria imposed?’ 
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given if the asset definition is fulfilled. Consequently, we exclude these two crite-
ria and find the following criteria to be used by either of the two Boards: ‘con-
trolled resource’, ‘past event’, ‘probability of future economic benefits’, ‘reliable 
measurement’. Our analysis only covers the recognition of R&D costs which is 
why we consider the criterion of ‘reliable measurement’ to be fulfilled or at least 
achievable by the preparer, e.g. by implementing an adequate costing system. 
According to full expensing, all R&D costs are expensed as they are incurred. For 
the IASB, expenses entail both expenses in a narrower sense, which exclusively 
arise in the course of an entity’s ordinary business activities, and losses, which 
may or may not occur in the course of ordinary business. Losses are not regarded 
as a separate element in the conceptual framework (F4.34), which is why we do 
not consider them necessary for our purpose. Expenses are defined as ‘an outflow 
or depletion of assets’ (F4.33). The FASB separates expenses and losses and de-
fines expenses as ‘outflows or other using up of assets or incurrences of liabilities 
(or a combination of both)’ (SFAC No. 6.80). Consequently, our definition of 
expenses entails the following two characteristics: ‘outflow or usage of assets’ and 
‘incurrence of liabilities’. 
Contra-equity accounting requires a company to defer the recognition decision by 
debiting the equity account ‘contra-equity – R&D project’. Both Boards define 
equity as a residual, namely ‘the residual interest in the assets of the entity after 
deducting all its liabilities’ (F4.4(c)) and as ‘net assets, the difference between the 
enterprise’s assets and its liabilities’ (SFAC No. 6.60), respectively. A joint defi-
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nition would thus encompass: ‘assets less liabilities’.11 While we define assets 
above, we refrain from pursuing a definition of liabilities because R&D activities 
typically do not influence an entity’s liabilities directly and this part of the ac-
counting equation remains constant or is only marginally influenced.12
We further need to consider whether there is a certain emphasis among financial 
statement elements. That is, if there is a transaction that fulfills the definition of 
more than one element, we need to know which element should be preferred. A 
first approach to this issue would be to consider the Boards’ assertion to take an 
asset-and-liability view to financial reporting, which implies that the balance sheet 
is more important than the income statement. If a transaction fulfills both asset 
and expense definitions, the financial information would need to be reported as an 
asset. Similarly, if the Boards were to follow a revenue-and-expense view, the 
solution to the problem would be vice versa. These considerations hinge on the 
assumption that the Boards indeed take a consistent theoretical view to financial 
reporting. While Zeff (2005, p. 20) confirms that the FASB generally follows an 
asset-and-liability view, Wüstemann and Kierzek (2005, pp. 75-6) show that the 
Boards take a mixed approach to financial reporting. According to Storey and 
Storey (1998, p. 79), the normative frame of the conceptual framework gives con-
ceptual primacy to assets and liabilities. Does this normatively stated preference 
for the asset-and-liability view mean that assets are more relevant than expenses? 
Not necessarily. Gellein (1986, p. 15) argues that ‘[c]onceptual primacy has noth-
11  Contra-equity accounting may require a treatment based on other comprehensive income. Since 
the framework does not include a definition of this element, we cannot conduct such an analy-
sis.
12  Partial capitalization alternates between expensing and capitalizing R&D costs and thus con-
cerns only elements that are already defined. 
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ing to do with the question of what information is most useful or of how it is 
measured. It refers only to the matter of definitional dependency.’ As a result, it 
remains unclear whether taking an asset-and-liability view means that balance 
sheet elements are more relevant than income statement elements. 
It might even be argued that the framework’s preference for accrual accounting 
(OB17) expresses an emphasis of a matching approach to financial reporting. As a 
result, taking a revenue-and-expense view would imply a preference for income 
statement elements. Given that there is no statement on the hierarchy of elements 
or consistency of the underlying theoretical view on financial reporting, we con-
clude that under the current framework an unambiguous assessment of what is 
more relevant needs to rely on additional assumptions. Alternatively, there may 
also be no hierarchy among the elements because ‘income statements and balance 
sheets work together to indicate firm value, and each statement can correct for the 
deficiencies in the other’ (Penman, 2009, p. 359). 
3.2 First Evaluation Level: Faithful Representation 
An economic phenomenon is faithfully represented if it suffices the three charac-
teristics of completeness, neutrality and freedom from error (QC12). Obstacles to 
assessing faithful representation foremost relate to the concept of an economic 
phenomenon, which is not defined. While the Objective of Financial Reporting 
uses the term ‘economic resources and claims’ to describe financial statement 
elements, it is only in the introduction to the Qualitative Characteristics that these 
terms are mentioned. Instead, that chapter discusses, but does not define, ‘eco-
nomic phenomena’, in particular in the context of faithful representation (QC12). 
While it is apparent that a resource or claim is different from a phenomenon, the 
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Boards seem to assign similar meanings to the expressions (QC2). Based on 
common sense, we suppose that an economic phenomenon is something like a 
transaction or an event that arise in the course of business. Still, it is not clear how 
to distinguish between phenomena that should be accounted for and those that 
should not be reported in financial statements. Also, it is not specified what such a 
phenomenon comprises, whether it is only one action in an enterprise or a combi-
nation of those. In the case of R&D, we would need to determine whether an eco-
nomic phenomenon comprises a company’s entire R&D program, one particular 
R&D project or one action in an R&D project, such as an experiment. This dis-
cussion raises the issue of the portfolio level on which R&D projects can be eva-
luated and which reduces uncertainty of the outcome (Bierman and Dukes, 1975, 
p. 50). 
Similarly, it can be questioned what an economic phenomenon constitutes when 
discussing interactive activities such as R&D. Certain activities or transactions 
may not be unanimously classified as research or development, at least not from a 
practical point of view. That is, is research or development the phenomenon or is 
research and development the economic phenomenon whose faithful representa-
tion should be assessed? 
Without resolving this issue, we assume that R&D is an economic phenomenon in 
the sense of the framework that should be reported. In addition, we need to as-
sume that the reporting entity is aware of its R&D projects and, consequently, 
possesses or is able to generate financial information needed to recognize these 
projects.
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The framework goes on to define completeness as being fulfilled if all information 
necessary for a user to understand the underlying phenomenon is depicted in the 
financial statements (QC13). Completeness entails both numerical as well as ver-
bal descriptions of the phenomenon such that explaining a transaction in words 
helps achieve completeness and contributes to faithful representation. In turn, this 
effect implies that no matter which recognition alternative is chosen, a verbal de-
scription in the notes can heal lack of completeness. It can be doubted whether 
completeness is a suitable tool to distinguish between recognition alternatives. 
These concerns can be rephrased: Which accounting concept is ‘more complete’ if 
disclosure reduces lack of completeness? This conclusion weighs more gravely if 
we consider that it is not clear in what respect completeness should be achieved. 
Which underlying economic characteristics should be reported to achieve com-
pleteness? If the characteristic relates only to cash flows, capitalizing all R&D 
expenditures depicts all cash flows just as complete as a full expensing of the 
costs. If, by contrast, we assume that completeness also entails the likelihood of 
success of an R&D project, neither full capitalization nor full expensing fulfills 
the criterion. For the purpose of standard setting, completeness seems ill-defined 
and does not represent a criterion to choose between alternatives. As a result, we 
exclude the characteristic from our analysis. 
Neutrality of financial information is given if a depiction is without bias, i.e. if the 
information given is ‘not slanted, weighted, emphasized, de-emphasized or other-
wise manipulated’ (QC14). By including neutrality, the Boards decided against 
conservatism (BC3.27-3.29). This decision brings about a substantial change from 
the traditional way of accounting which is based on conservatism (e.g. AAA 
FASC, 2011, p. 579). However, the Boards do not explicate whether neutrality 
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pertains to recognition or measurement or both. Christensen and Demski (2007) 
implicitly assume that neutrality mainly refers to the measurement of financial 
statement elements. In that sense, the term ‘bias’ seems key to understanding neu-
trality, although it is not specified in what regard financial information should not 
be biased. That is, should the financial position not be biased? Should the eco-
nomic phenomenon not be presented in a biased way? When the FASB’s SFAC 
No. 2 defined bias in its glossary of terms, it spoke of ‘bias in measurement’ and 
‘bias in accounting measures’, but not of recognition. Considering the further 
framework text on neutrality, it seems indeed that neutrality addresses mainly 
measurement aspects of financial statement elements and seems to be directed 
largely at preparers. Nonetheless, we suggest that it also alludes to the recognition 
of transactions because a weighting or emphasis of certain information may be 
achieved by choosing among recognition options. A neutral depiction then is best 
achieved if companies are not given the opportunity to emphasize or deemphasize 
information and an accounting alternative not granting discretion to preparers with 
respect to recognition would be preferred. 
As a final step to achieving faithful representation, the framework requires infor-
mation to be free from error, which relates mainly to the process of generating the 
reported information and the application of a model. While not meaning accurate 
in all respects, the characteristic implies that estimates should be determined using 
an appropriate process. The criterion, due to its frequent reference to prices, val-
ues and estimates, suggests that it addresses mainly how an element is measured. 
In addition, the Boards state that preparers can describe an amount as being an 
estimate to fulfill the criterion, which again indicates that verbal disclosure can 
heal an error. However, to some extent, freedom from error also affects recogni-
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tion of a transaction since it requires that ‘no errors or omissions in the description 
of the phenomenon’ (QC15) are made. If ‘description’ is understood as depiction 
in financial statements, the criterion requires the presented information to corres-
pond to the underlying economic characteristics of the phenomenon, avoiding 
erroneous reporting or lack of information. Freedom from error may even require 
that all economic characteristics of a transaction are presented correctly, i.e. it 
could be a completeness requirement for reporting underlying economic characte-
ristics. Still, the question of precisely what an error constitutes remains unans-
wered. Is it a misrepresentation of the underlying transaction or a mistake made in 
the application of a measurement method? Does the framework’s understanding 
of an error correspond to the one of IAS 8 and SFAS No. 154, respectively? If we 
understand an error as a mistake, we might conclude that, from a recognition 
perspective, neutrality covers an intentional bias, whereas freedom from error 
aims to avoid an unintentional bias. 
3.3 Second Evaluation Level: Comparability 
Comparability of financial information is achieved if users are able to judge fi-
nancial information against similar one from another entity (inter-entity compara-
bility) and against similar one from the same entity over time (inter-period compa-
rability) (QC20). The framework further states that ‘some degree of comparability 
is likely to be attained by satisfying the fundamental qualitative characteristics’ 
(QC24). An accounting method presenting relevant information in a faithful way 
is most likely comparable. However, if a method allows different accounting for 
the same economic phenomenon giving preparers discretion, its comparability is 
reduced although the method may satisfy the two fundamental characteristics 
(QC25). This example suggests that allowing preparers to choose among options 
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reduces comparability. The Boards seem to assume that taking discretion from 
preparers maximizes comparability in both dimensions. 
Accounting literature questions whether the criterion is suited for solving account-
ing issues. Dyckman (1988, p. 11) states that comparability is ‘a concept not easi-
ly applied even if easily defined’. Young and Williams (2010) and Durocher and 
Gendron (2011) indicate that comparability requires a value judgment due to an 
assessment of the (dis-)similarity of transactions, which significantly questions the 
practicability of the entire concept. Despite these concerns, we postulate – based 
on the Boards’ assumption derived above – that an accounting method providing 
fewer accounting options and giving preparers less discretion improves the com-
parability of financial information. 
3.4 Second Evaluation Level: Verifiability 
Faithful representation is enhanced if financial information is verifiable. This cha-
racteristic entails the requirement that different independent observers arrive at a 
similar estimate for an event (QC26). The Boards seemingly assert that there is a 
third party – leaving open whether this is just one person or a ‘jury’ – that can 
reproduce and confirm that a company’s accounting for a transaction is a faithful 
representation. That third party would need to cross-check whether completeness, 
neutrality and freedom from error are fulfilled. The external party would need 
access to data and internal information as well as have knowledge about both the 
transaction and the company to arrive at a conclusion. 
Verifiability does not seem to be helping standard setters since it merely requires 
re-examining faithful representation. It is to assure that there is no bias in the in-
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formation and that there are no errors in the process of generating information, but 
it does not concern the evaluation of accounting alternatives from a standard set-
ter’s point of view. In addition, the framework states that verifiability can be en-
hanced by disclosure (QC28), which also helps achieve completeness, another 
sub-criterion of faithful representation. As a result, it remains unclear which addi-
tional aspect verifiability covers that is not part of faithful representation. We do 
not see a distinction between the two characteristics and suggest that verifiability 
is to ensure credibility of accounting information. In that case, the criterion would 
require appropriate disclosure to support faithful representation or be included for 
practical purposes, i.e. for helping preparers apply accounting rules and helping 
users evaluate accounting information. However, since verifiability does not add 
to evaluating accounting alternatives, we exclude the characteristic from further 
analysis. 
3.5 Second Evaluation Level: Timeliness 
Timeliness requires that users receive information in time such that they may be 
able to change their decisions based on this information (QC29). It purports that a 
transaction should be reported as soon as the preparer observes the transaction. 
However, once established that an economic phenomenon should be recorded in 
the financial statements, it is debatable whether timeliness is suitable for choosing 
among accounting alternatives. The company observes a transaction and subse-
quently records it according to the respective accounting method. Thus, timeliness 
is entity-specific and not a standard setting concept (Bradbury and Harrison, 
2012) and we exclude it from our analysis. 
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3.6 Second Evaluation Level: Understandability 
Understandability requires an entity to classify, characterize and present informa-
tion in a clear and concise manner (QC30). The Boards acknowledge that some 
economic phenomena are complex and cannot be depicted in a way that is unders-
tood easily. To not exclude this information, the Boards make clear that financial 
statements are prepared for users with reasonable knowledge of business and eco-
nomics and that ‘even well-informed and diligent users may need to seek the aid 
of an adviser’ (QC32). Accordingly, complexity of an accounting method cannot 
hinder it from being desirable, given the other criteria are maximized. Simulta-
neously, complex transactions are to be presented ‘clearly and concisely’ (QC30, 
BC3.42). We cannot determine how this self-contradictory statement is solved. 
Given the predominant position of the core text over the Basis for Conclusions, 
the irrelevance of complexity tends to prevail and we exclude it from our further 
analysis. 
3.7 Assessment of Second Evaluation Level 
We find that not all enhancing qualitative characteristics help select an accounting 
method. More precisely, verifiability, timeliness and understandability are irrele-
vant for or cannot be applied to standard setting questions. Only comparability, 
which requires a value judgment, seems to contribute to standard setters’ debates. 
However, this enhancing characteristic is ill-defined in that it remains unclear 
exactly what should be comparable. As a result of our discussion, the Boards’ 
second level analysis collapses to an evaluation of comparability. Table 1 summa-
rizes the criteria on which we base our analysis. 
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First evaluation level: Fundamental qualitative characteristics
Relevance (QC6-10) 
Recognizable Asset
(F4.4 / 4.38 and SFAC No. 6.25 / 5.63) 
- Controlled resource 
- Past event 
- Probable future economic 
benefit
Expense
(F4.35 and SFAC No. 6.80) 
- Outflow or usage of assets 
- Increase in liabilities 
Equity 
(F4.4 / 4.38 and SFAC No. 6.60) 
- Assets less liabilities 
Faithful representation (QC12-16) 
Completeness (QC13) 
Neutrality (QC14) 
Free from error (QC15) 
Second evaluation level: Enhancing qualitative characteristics
Comparability (QC20-25) 
Table 1: Overview of Evaluation Criteria Used in the Analysis
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4 Analysis
Since our earlier discussion questions whether the framework is suitable to decide 
between recognition alternatives for R&D accounting, we describe in the follow-
ing in what respect and to which extent we base our analysis on assumptions. We 
also discuss how interpretations dominate the final selection of a recognition al-
ternative. Nonetheless, we will be able to come up with a ranking of the account-
ing alternatives, which due to our assumptions and interpretations may be a sub-
jective outcome. At the same time, our analysis reveals how interpretation of the 
framework’s characteristics influences the decision-making process and may thus 
serve as a recommendation to re-examine the criteria. 
4.1 First Level Analysis: Relevance 
4.1.1 Full Capitalization 
Full capitalization advocates recognizing all R&D expenditures on the balance 
sheet. Thus, we need to assess whether there is a resource that is controlled by the 
entity, results from a past event, and yields probable economic benefits. 
While legal rights to a resource are sufficient to fulfill the control criterion, they 
are not essential to control a resource. Instead, an entity needs to be able to obtain 
the benefits from the resource and control others’ access to it to exercise control. 
New knowledge generated by R&D and kept within an entity is proprietary and 
therefore not accessible by others. The company is the only one that can obtain the 
benefits flowing from the resource and can be assumed to exercise control over 
internal R&D projects. 
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Concerning the past event, Johnson (1994, pp. 7-8) observes that recognition deci-
sions often differ, although the same definitions of assets and liabilities are used. 
He argues that there are two important events, the original transaction and its rea-
lization, in our case conducting R&D being the first and obtaining economic bene-
fits being the second. The one-event view proposes that the transaction should 
give rise to recognition as long as there is sufficient probability for the second 
event. The latter group, however, considers the occurrence of the second event, 
i.e. realization, as the basis for making recognition decisions. While the Boards 
are silent on how they define an event, we conclude that the one-event view do-
minates because the framework specifies that economic benefits, i.e. the second 
event, need to be probable to recognize an asset. Full capitalization requires an 
entity to capitalize all R&D costs that were incurred in one period. Thus, only past 
expenditures are capitalized, i.e., the asset created by this accounting alternative 
would be a result of past events. 
Next, we assess whether R&D activities produce probable future economic bene-
fits. In SFAS No. 2, the FASB acknowledged that an entity conducts R&D activi-
ties to obtain future economic benefits. Otherwise, companies would not engage 
in them (par. 51). However, the Board doubted that individual research programs’ 
benefits are probable enough to justify capitalization of the associated costs. If 
probability is defined as ‘virtually certain’, full capitalization is certainly inappro-
priate since it treats all R&D expenditures alike and does not consider that some 
projects may not result in future economic benefits. Referring to this issue, Bier-
man and Dukes (1975, p. 50) indicate that an entity can considerably reduce its 
uncertainty regarding the profitability of R&D by observing the probability of 
future economic benefits on a portfolio level. Doing so, entities can be reasonably 
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sure that benefits will flow to the company. In its criticism of this reasoning, the 
FASB expressed doubts mainly concerning measurement aspects, leaving out rec-
ognition considerations. 
In the framework, the Boards argue that companies are to consider uncertainty in 
the context of measurement and valuation, not recognition. As an example, the 
IASB refers to receivables, which are recognized in spite of the uncertainty re-
garding whether or not cash is collected (F4.40). Instead of altering recognition, 
companies account for the remaining risk by including an allowance for uncollect-
ible accounts. Given that R&D projects yield future economic benefits with a giv-
en probability, capitalization of the corresponding expenditures might be appro-
priate, if uncertainty was considered in the measurement stage. This example indi-
cates that distinguishing between recognition and measurement of an asset is not 
entirely possible. 
Overall, it remains unclear (1) how ‘probability’ is defined, (2) whether R&D 
projects should be evaluated on a project or portfolio level, and (3) whether uncer-
tainty should be taken into consideration in the recognition or in the measurement 
phase. As a result, we cannot unambiguously determine whether full capitalization 
is in line with the requirement of probable future economic benefits. 
4.1.2 Full Expensing 
Regarding full expensing, we need to analyze whether R&D expenditures are out-
flows or usage of assets or whether the entity incurs liabilities in the course of 
R&D projects. The first part of the definition is always fulfilled because R&D 
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activities require an entity to use up some of its assets. For example, this usage 
may be a result of it paying researchers’ salaries or acquiring raw materials and 
supplies that are used in R&D activities. In addition, if an entity, for example, 
contaminates land while conducting R&D, it also incurs a liability. We conclude 
that full expensing is in line with the definition of expenses and is therefore a re-
levant alternative. 
4.1.3 Contra-Equity Accounting 
Contra-equity accounting requires that two element definitions need to be ana-
lyzed, namely the one of a recognizable asset and the one of equity. Concerning 
the definition of a recognizable asset, we refer to our discussion of full capitaliza-
tion. At least some R&D expenditures fulfill the definition of a recognizable asset, 
while other R&D projects will not yield economic benefits. The most severe 
weakness we identified is the inadequate definition of probability and the treat-
ment of uncertainty. In the case of contra-equity accounting, however, both issues 
are of lower importance because R&D expenditures are recognized as assets only 
if an entity is certain that it receives economic benefits. Contra-equity accounting 
thus employs Johnson’s (1994, pp. 7-8) second event, i.e. obtaining economic 
benefits. As a result, assessing the probability of economic benefits would be 
avoided.
Prior to being able to determine a project’s success, an entity records R&D costs 
in a contra-equity account. R&D activities always coincide with outflows or a 
using up of assets, which, ceteris paribus, reduces the total asset balance without 
changing the liabilities of a company and equity is reduced. This relationship is 
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correctly represented by a debit to a contra-equity R&D project account and a 
credit to an asset account. We would arrive at a similar conclusion if we used the 
frameworks’ definition of equity as the ownership interest in an entity (SFAC 
No. 6.60). By using up assets in the course of an R&D project, ceteris paribus, the 
ownership interest is reduced. Taking into account that both the definition of a 
recognizable asset and the one of equity are fulfilled, we conclude that the finan-
cial information produced by contra-equity accounting is relevant. 
4.1.4 Partial Capitalization 
While we established earlier that R&D costs are expenses in the sense of the 
framework, a discussion of R&D expenditures that are recorded as assets is war-
ranted. Referring to the discussion held on full capitalization, we argue that this 
alternative aims at reducing the uncertainty inherent in R&D projects by allowing 
an expensing of certain costs. More specifically, the alternative wants to avoid 
capitalizing expenditures that do not yield future economic benefits. Nevertheless, 
some uncertainty remains as an entity needs to assess subjectively which costs are 
expensed and which are capitalized. In other words, the alternative requires an 
entity to assess the point in time at which Johnson’s (1994, pp. 7-8) second event 
is sufficiently probable to recognize subsequent expenditures as assets. Since the 
alternative requires an ex ante decision on the outcome of R&D projects, the me-
thod misstates information in the case of expenditures initially recorded as ex-
penses although the corresponding project turns out to be successful. In hindsight, 
these expenditures would have had to be recorded as assets, and vice versa. 
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Overall, partial capitalization seems to produce more relevant information than 
full capitalization because it allows flexibility in the treatment of R&D expendi-
tures and, to an extent, reduces the entity’s uncertainty of assessing the probability 
of future economic benefits. Nevertheless, this flexibility relates to subjective as-
sessments that may easily turn out to be wrong, implying that some uncertainty 
remains in the depiction of R&D. As this problem does not arise for the other al-
ternatives, partial capitalization ranks below full expensing and contra-equity ac-
counting.
4.2 First Level Analysis: Faithful Representation 
4.2.1 Full Capitalization 
To analyze faithful representation, we begin by assessing neutrality, which, ac-
cording to our interpretation, is applicable to recognition aspects in one particular 
dimension. That is, an accounting alternative not granting discretion to preparers 
is preferable to one that does. According to full capitalization, all R&D expendi-
tures are recorded in one way, i.e. all R&D costs are capitalized. Preparers do not 
have an opportunity to bias information and full capitalization produces neutral 
financial information. 
Freedom from error, which mainly relates to the measurement of financial state-
ment elements, pertains to recognition questions in that it requires the description 
of the phenomenon to be related to the underlying transaction. In our assessment 
of the relevance of the information produced by full capitalization, we concluded 
that depicting all R&D expenditures as assets at least partially misstates the under-
lying transaction since it includes unsuccessful R&D projects. Expenditures relat-
ing to these projects would have to be recorded as expenses because they do not 
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produce future economic benefits. Consequently, R&D assets resulting from full 
capitalization contain some misrepresentation. Additionally, there seems to be a 
problem with the depiction of the economic phenomenon because all R&D ex-
penditures are treated as if they result in future economic benefits. We conclude 
that full capitalization ranks low on freedom from error but fulfills the neutrality 
criterion. Both evaluations are entirely due to the fact that there is no flexibility 
for an entity to influence the accounting for R&D expenditures and, possibly, 
communicate private information about the respective R&D projects. 
4.2.2 Full Expensing 
Similar to the concept of full capitalization, preparers do not have an option to 
weigh or otherwise manipulate the financial information they report. Hence, ex-
pensing all R&D expenditures depicts the economic phenomenon neutrally. It 
seems noteworthy that full expensing represents a conservative accounting me-
thod (Flegm, 2004, pp. 102-3) because it understates income by expensing any 
R&D expenditures. 
Regarding freedom from error, we can refer to our analysis of full capitalization. 
Reporting all R&D expenditures as expenses is at least partly erroneous because 
some of the R&D projects will produce future economic benefits. As a result, 
there is a misrepresentation when automatically expensing all costs while some 
economically beneficial discovery will be made. An economic assessment sug-
gests that full expensing even more inadequately represents the underlying trans-
action since, on average, there should be more successful than unsuccessful 
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projects. Otherwise, businesses would not spend money on R&D. In summary, 
full expensing produces neutral financial information, but is not free from error. 
4.2.3 Contra-Equity Accounting 
Regarding neutrality, we make similar points as for the two prior alternatives. To 
bridge the time of uncertainty concerning future economic benefits, all R&D ex-
penditures are recorded in a contra-equity account, which is why entities do not 
have any potential to report biased information. Only when a project is success-
ful13 does the company reclassify the R&D project to an asset account.14 Preparers 
do not have a choice regarding how to account for R&D expenditures and we con-
sider the information neutral. 
According to contra-equity accounting, R&D expenditures are first recorded as a 
reduction in ownership interest, while assets are displayed once it is certain that an 
R&D project is successful. Both depictions are free from error because, on the one 
hand, the contra-equity account reduces the ownership interest, which is a true 
depiction of the underlying economic phenomenon, at least at the time when R&D 
is performed and when it is uncertain whether the corresponding project is suc-
cessful. On the other hand, the company’s financial statements show an asset only 
if the R&D project has produced an asset.15 Both depictions correctly represent 
13  Johnson (1976), who suggested contra-equity accounting, is silent on how and when a project 
is considered successful. A distinction between successful and unsuccessful projects would 
need to rely on certain criteria, which, to be neutral, would have to be free from an entity’s dis-
cretion. For example, a company could be required to provide evidence for a project’s eco-
nomic benefits, i.e. demonstrate realization. 
14  Reclassification takes place on a project basis and does not prescribe a measurement base. 
Instead, the value of the R&D asset would need to be assessed based on appropriate measure-
ment concepts. 
15  Johnson (1976) proposed to report unsuccessful R&D projects as a capital loss in equity, im-
plying that unsuccessful projects would never touch profit or loss. While there is no conceptual 
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the underlying transactions and we conclude that contra-equity accounting reports 
financial information that is free from error. 
4.2.4 Partial Capitalization 
Partial capitalization permits any treatment of R&D expenditures ranging from 
full capitalization to full expensing. The accounting is subject to the preparer’s 
assessment of an R&D project or, more precisely, their assessment of the likelih-
ood of receiving future economic benefits. To gain at least some neutrality, stan-
dard setters have introduced certain criteria to determine which portion of the 
costs should be capitalized.16 To assess the neutrality of this alternative, we can 
use the FASB’s rationale when it considered partial capitalization. In SFAS No. 2, 
the Board gives detailed reasoning as to why partially capitalizing R&D expendi-
tures may not be neutral. Most notably, none of the criteria that the Board could 
potentially have used to distinguish between costs that need to be capitalized and 
costs that need to be expensed were considered objective. The FASB argued that 
companies would always be able and need to exercise judgment to determine the 
portion of R&D expenditures that can be capitalized. Hence, two companies that 
conduct similar projects would most likely not come up with the same portion of 
costs to capitalize because the companies would interpret the criteria in different 
ways. Thus, a subjective capitalization, or even an accounting choice on a case by 
case basis, results from partial capitalization. We are in line with the FASB’s rea-
basis that contradicts such a treatment, there is a number of precedents for it, e.g., the account-
ing for revaluation surpluses under IFRS. However, if this form of accounting was considered 
undesirable, unsuccessful projects could be recorded as expenses later. This ‘recycling’ proce-
dure has been employed for cash flow hedges. 
16  Under IFRS, abstract criteria are used to determine expenditures that can be capitalized (e.g. 
demonstrating the technical feasibility of completing the asset, IAS 38.57). The FASB, by con-
trast, prescribes exceptions for certain types of costs that can be capitalized, e.g., for develop-
ing computer software (SFAS No. 86). 
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soning and conclude that partial capitalization does not result in a neutral depic-
tion of financial information. 
The accounting method also accepts a misrepresentation of information in two 
ways. On the one hand, the question remains whether all R&D expenditures that 
are capitalized actually produce future economic benefits. Compared to full capi-
talization, the alternative likely reduces the number of capitalized unsuccessful 
projects. Nevertheless, some doubts remain as to whether all capitalized R&D 
expenditures relate to successful projects. On the other hand, partial capitalization 
depicts the underlying transaction inadequately because an entity capitalizes only 
a certain portion of total R&D costs. Thus, not all expenditures relating to a suc-
cessful project are capitalized. To mitigate this finding, the FASB considered re-
troactive capitalization of the previously expensed costs. However, such a treat-
ment would entail a distortion of prevailing financial reporting paradigms, accord-
ing to which the initial accounting for transactions is not changed in hindsight. We 
follow the FASB’s reasoning and conclude that partial capitalization is not free 
from error. Nevertheless, by distinguishing successful from unsuccessful R&D 
projects, the misrepresentation of the economic phenomenon seems to be lower 
than in the full capitalization or full expensing case. 
4.2.5 Summary of First Level Analysis 
In the course of our analysis, we aimed to expose the Boards’ assertions used in 
the framework and supplemented these by assumptions and interpretations. On 
this basis, we were able to come up with an assessment of accounting concepts for 
the recognition of R&D activities. 
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Concerning relevance, we pointed out the Boards’ assertion that financial infor-
mation is relevant if the proposed concepts are in line with the definitions of the 
financial statement elements. An analysis still depends on how the definition and 
recognition criteria are comprehended. This issue foremost relates to the term 
‘probable’ as a basis for the asset definition, which is not appropriately defined in 
the framework. Trying to make as few assumptions as possible and thus, for ex-
ample, avoiding a decision on the relative importance of the financial statement 
elements, our analysis yielded that full expensing and contra-equity accounting 
present financial information of the highest relevance. Both alternatives suggest a 
treatment that is in line with the element definitions and recognition criteria pre-
sented in the conceptual frameworks, although contra-equity accounting could be 
subject to further analysis of ‘other comprehensive income’. 
Partial capitalization produces information to which we attribute somewhat lower 
relevance because uncertainty remains when entities partially recognize R&D 
expenditures as assets. Full capitalization cannot be assessed entirely because the 
uncertainty inherent in R&D activities can be completely deferred to the mea-
surement of the R&D assets. In that case, the resulting assets may be relevant. 
However, since measurement is excluded from our analysis, full capitalization 
entails relatively high uncertainty regarding the probability of future economic 
benefits, which is why the portrayed financial information loses some of its relev-
ance. Thus, in assessing full capitalization, it becomes most apparent that the term 
‘probability’ is not defined properly. The resulting vagueness hinders a sound 
evaluation of relevance. 
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Regarding faithful representation, we first showed that completeness does not 
seem to contribute to standard setting decisions since the characteristic is achieva-
ble by adequate disclosure. We further assumed that restricting preparer’s judg-
ment by proclaiming a uniform treatment for all R&D expenditures fosters neu-
trality. Thus, full capitalization, full expensing and contra-equity accounting pro-
duce neutral information. By contrast, partial capitalization does not result in neu-
tral information because preparers may influence the recognition of R&D expend-
itures. We regarded freedom from error as being essential for assessing whether 
the underlying transaction is accurately depicted. Contra-equity accounting does 
not produce misleading information, which would make this alternative preferable 
to the others. Full capitalization and full expensing perform lower because a rela-
tively large misrepresentation results if all R&D expenditures are automatically 
capitalized (expensed) while there is evidence that at least some of the R&D 
projects are unsuccessful (successful). Partial capitalization performs lowest be-
cause it accepts misrepresentations of the underlying economic transactions in two 
dimensions. 
Since it is unclear how the sub-categories of faithful representation are linked, we 
need to stick to the qualitative assessment made above. However, our analysis 
yields that contra-equity accounting performs best on faithful representation since 
it is at least as good as full capitalization and full expensing on neutrality and bet-
ter than the other methods on freedom from error. Next, full capitalization and full 
expensing are comparable with respect to faithful representation as they perform 
similarly regarding neutrality and freedom from error. Partial capitalization per-
forms lowest. 
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An overall assessment again depends on the way by which relevance and faithful 
representation are merged. Contra-equity accounting seemingly dominates other 
alternatives because the concept performs best with respect to relevance and faith-
ful representation. Contingent on our assumptions, the concept would be the pre-
ferred accounting for the recognition of R&D expenditures. Full expensing is the 
second best solution as it is of higher relevance and of equal faithful representa-
tion compared to the next best alternatives. Both full capitalization and partial 
capitalization perform somewhat lower because full capitalization is less relevant 
but may be a better faithful representation than partial capitalization, and vice ver-
sa. Nonetheless, an assessment of relevance for full capitalization remains debata-
ble.
4.3 Second Level Analysis 
To further assess the alternatives, we address the second level analysis, which 
requires an analysis of the enhancing qualitative characteristics. Since only com-
parability is suited to distinguish between accounting alternatives, we limit the 
analysis to this characteristic. Given that we relied on assumptions on the first 
level and faced some discretion in the assessment, we conduct the second level 
analysis for all four accounting alternatives. 
Since full capitalization satisfies both relevance and faithful representation, we 
can assume some degree of comparability (QC24). The method requires all com-
panies to capitalize all R&D expenditures incurred in a particular year such that 
there is no discretion with regard to how the expenditures are treated. As a conse-
quence, the financial information produced by full capitalization is comparable 
both between entities and over time. 
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This conclusion also holds for full expensing: Inter-period comparability is 
achieved as there is only one method to be used by entities. Inter-entity compara-
bility is also assured because two entities facing the same situation end up with 
the same accounting treatment, which is immediately expensing all R&D costs. 
Full expensing thus achieves comparability and differs from full capitalization 
only regarding the section of the financial statements, i.e. balance sheet versus 
income statement, where investors obtain the comparable information on a com-
pany’s R&D activities. 
Contra-equity accounting also attains a certain degree of comparability due to its 
relevance and faithful representation. Comparability over time does not pose a 
problem as the entity has no options to change the accounting treatment from one 
period to another. Given that entities have no discretion concerning their assess-
ment of success, inter-entity comparability is also fulfilled as different companies 
would need to treat similar situations alike. Subject to a unanimous definition of 
‘success of an R&D project’, comparability would be given to the same extent as 
for full capitalization and full expensing. 
Partial capitalization, however, would not necessarily result in a comparable 
treatment of transactions neither between entities nor over time since the method 
allows alternative treatments for the same economic phenomenon and introduces 
an accounting option that may be exercised on a case by case basis. What is more, 
companies could simply treat expenditures differently due to their different as-
sessments of the R&D projects. As outlined above, this dilemma is not overcome 
by introducing additional criteria and the financial information portrayed by par-
tial capitalization cannot be considered comparable (QC25). 
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As a result, full capitalization, like full expensing and contra-equity accounting, 
performs better on comparability than partial capitalization. Accordingly, the 
second level analysis suggests that full capitalization would overall be preferred to 
partial capitalization since its higher comparability makes it more decision-useful.
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5 Conclusions
Our article examined the conceptual framework’s adequacy for solving recogni-
tion issues in standard setting. Based on a conditional-normative research ap-
proach, we examine traditional income measurement theories and decision useful-
ness approaches to come up with four accounting methods that the theories rec-
ommend for R&D: full capitalization, full expensing, contra-equity accounting, 
and partial capitalization. As a conditional element, we employ the qualitative 
characteristics of the conceptual framework to analyze the four accounting me-
thods, which is an approach that both FASB and IASB assert to follow when for-
mulating accounting standards. 
Our analysis reveals that the Boards’ decision making tool features inconsisten-
cies and several deficiencies. Foremost, we find that the qualitative characteristics 
are inadequately defined and thus often require interpretation. While we come up 
with a recommendation regarding the recognition of R&D projects, contra-equity 
accounting, our analysis relies too much on assertions made by the Boards and 
own assumptions that it can hardly be seen as an input to the Board’s political and 
pragmatic standard setting process. 
As a result, we conclude that in its current form the conceptual framework is not 
suited to help standard setters make deductive recognition decisions that refer to 
self-constituted quality criteria and are comprehensible by third parties. We offer 
two explanations for this result: First, the Boards do not use the conceptual 
framework for solving standard setting questions but approach issues on a stan-
dard-by-standard basis. To paraphrase Storey and Storey (1998, p. 50), assets are 
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whatever the Boards or the standards say they are. Possibly, the debates between 
board members as well as political forces may prove too strong for a standard 
setting regime to be conceptually consistent. As a result, the framework may give 
Board members only rough ideas or guidelines on self-prescribed criteria that are 
useful as a reference frame. In that case, it would not be a deductive basis for de-
riving accounting solutions and a normative analysis such as ours would not be 
suited to assess accounting methods. Alternatively, the qualitative characteristics 
are only used at the margin, i.e. to stress a particular point when assessing differ-
ent methods. The lacking hierarchy of elements and the relatively vague evalua-
tion process support this assessment. It could also be the case that the qualitative 
characteristics merely state which financial information should be reported and 
not how or that the characteristics were mainly made for preparers to provide them 
with guidance on how to resolve not yet regulated accounting matters. Overall, it 
is not clear which approach dominates since the guidance to the characteristics is 
inconsistent and implies either multiple uses or lack of awareness of inconsisten-
cies. As a consequence, the true purpose of the qualitative characteristics remains 
somewhat in the open. 
Our second explanation suggests that the Boards do use the framework when set-
ting standards but have a different understanding of it than was used in our analy-
sis. Consequently, the Board members would have more precise and better de-
fined qualitative characteristics in mind than are written down (Horngren’s (1981) 
‘individual conceptual frameworks’). Considering that the FASB’s framework 
was criticized as being too detailed, we suppose that the Boards, aiming to adhere 
to this critique, made the revised framework less wordy. However, while eliminat-
ing some of the detailed descriptions, the Boards did not erase their understanding 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
127
of the characteristics. As a consequence, more detailed – ‘historical’ – definitions 
could still be valid, e.g. in the case of ‘bias’. An interpretation close to the frame-
work’s actual text may thus produce different outcomes compared to the Boards’ 
analysis. As a result, we may conjecture that the conceptual framework is not an 
objective evaluation tool because it is not written as such. Possibly, the standard 
setting’s political process may have further watered down the evaluative power of 
the framework. 
Failure to achieve operationalization of the framework implies that the characte-
ristics and definitions are concepts without an apparent meaning. In addition, the 
inability to use the framework suggests that the qualitative characteristics are dis-
pensable or as Macve (1997, p. 76) points out for the FASB’s revised framework: 
‘[D]efining usefulness in terms of say ‘relevance’ and ‘reliability’ only shifts the 
area of disagreement over any particular problem back from ‘Is this information 
useful?’ to ‘Is this information reliable?’ or ‘Is it relevant?’’. As a result, the in-
troduction of qualitative characteristics would ‘merely lead to word-shuffling’ 
(Macve, 1997, p.76). Such a conclusion weighs heavily on the standard setters, all 
the more when considering that the Boards are aware of the need for a coherent 
foundation of accounting standards: ‘Standard setters cannot fulfill their missions 
without a sound and unified conceptual underpinning that guides and provides 
discipline to decisions about whether one solution to a financial reporting issue is 
better than other potential solutions’ (IASB, 2006, p. 16). 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
128
References 
American Accounting Association’s (AAA) Committee on Concepts and Stan-
dards for External Financial Reports. 1977. Statement on Accounting Theory and 
Theory Acceptance. Sarasota: AAA. 
American Accounting Association’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee 
(AAA FASC). 2011. Accounting for Revenues: A Framework for Standard Set-
ting. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 577-592. 
Barth, M. E. 2007a. Standard-Setting Measurement Issues and the Relevance of 
Research. Accounting and Business Research, Special Issue: International Ac-
counting Policy Forum, pp. 7-15. 
Barth, M. E. 2007b. Research, Standard Setting, and Global Financial Reporting. 
Foundations and Trends in Accounting, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 71-165. 
Barth, M. E., W. H. Beaver, and W. R. Landsman. 2001. The Relevance of Value 
Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting: Another View. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1-3, pp. 77-104. 
Bennett, B., M. Bradbury, and H. Prangnell. 2006. Rules, Principles and Judg-
ments in Accounting Standards. Abacus, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 189-204. 
Bierman, Jr., H., and R. E. Dukes. 1975. Accounting for Research and Develop-
ment Costs. Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 139, No. 4, pp. 48-55. 
Bradbury, M. E., and J. Harrison. 2012. An Analysis of the FASB’s Dissenting 
Opinions and the Conceptual Framework. Unpublished Working Paper, Massey 
University / University of Auckland.
Camfferman, K., and S. A. Zeff. 2009. Financial Reporting and Global Capital 
Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cañibano, L., M. García-Ayuso, and P. Sánchez. 2000. Accounting for Intan-
gibles: A Literature Review. Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 19, pp. 102-
130.
Chambers, R. J. 1955. Blueprint for a Theory of Accounting. Accounting Re-
search, Vol. 6, pp. 17-25. 
Chambers, R. J. 1966. Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior. Engle-
wood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Christensen, J. 2010. Conceptual Frameworks of Accounting from an Information 
Perspective. Accounting and Business Research, Special Issue: International Ac-
counting Policy Forum, pp. 287-299. 
Christensen, J., and J. S. Demski. 2007. Anticipatory Reporting Standards. Ac-
counting Horizons, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 351-370. 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
129
Dichev, I. D. 2008. On the Balance Sheet-Based Model of Financial Reporting. 
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 453-470. 
Durocher, S., and Y. Gendron. 2011. IFRS: On the Docility of Sophisticated Us-
ers in Preserving the Ideal of Comparability. European Accounting Review,
Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 233-262. 
Dyckman, T. R. 1988. Credibility and the Formulation of Accounting Standards 
under the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Journal of Accounting Litera-
ture, Vol. 7, pp. 1-30. 
Edwards, E. O., and P. W. Bell. 1961. The Theory and Measurement of Business 
Income. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1976 (December 2). Scope and 
Implications of the Conceptual Framework Project. Stamford: FASB. 
Flegm, E. H. 2004. Accounting: How to Meet the Challenges of Relevance and 
Regulation. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Fülbier, R. U., J. M. Hitz, and T. Sellhorn. 2009. Relevance of Academic Re-
search and Researcher’s Role in the IASB’s Financial Reporting Standard Setting. 
Abacus, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 455-492. 
Gallery, G., and N. Gallery. 2004. Applying Conceptual Framework Principles to 
Superannuation Fund Accounting. Abacus, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 117-131. 
Horngren, C. T. 1981. Uses and Limitations of a Conceptual Framework. Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 151, No. 4, pp. 86-95. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 2006. Discussion Paper: Pre-
liminary Views on an improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting.
London: IASB. 
Johnson, L. T. 1994. Future Events: A Conceptual Study of their Significance for 
Recognition and Measurement. Stamford: FASB. 
Johnson, O. 1970. Toward an “Events” Theory of Accounting. The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 641-653. 
Kirk, D. J. 1988. “Looking Back on Fourteen Years at the FASB: The Education 
of A Standard Setter”. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 8-17. 
Kothari, S. P., T. E. Laguerre, and A. J. Leone. 2002. Capitalization versus Ex-
pensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expendi-
tures versus R&D Outlays. Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 355-
382.
Lev, B., and T. Sougiannis. 1996. The Capitalization, Amortization, and Value-
Relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, 
pp. 107-138. 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
130
Loftus, J. A. 2003. The CF and Accounting Standards: The Persistence of Discre-
pancies. Abacus, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 298-309. 
Macve, R. 1997. A Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Report-
ing: Vision, Tool, or Threat? New York: Routledge. 
Mattessich, R. 1995. Critique of Accounting. Westport: Quorum Books. 
Miller, P. B. W. 1985. The Conceptual Framework: Myths and Realities. Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 159, No. 3, pp. 62-71. 
Miller, P. B. W., and P. R. Bahnson. 2010. Continuing the Normative Dialog: 
Illuminating the Asset/Liability Theory. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 24, No 3, 
pp. 419-440. 
Mozes, H. A. 1998. The FASB’s Conceptual Framework and Political Support: 
The Lesson From Employee Stock Options. Abacus, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 141-161. 
Paton, W. A., and A. C. Littleton. 1940. An Introduction to Corporate Accounting 
Standards. No place: AAA. 
Penman, S. H. 2009. Accounting for Intangible Assets: There is also an Income 
Statement. Abacus, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 358-371. 
Revsine, L. 1981. The Theory and Measurement of Business Income: A Review 
Article. The Accounting Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 342-354. 
Schipper, K. 1994. Academic Accounting Research and the Standard Setting 
Process. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 61-73. 
Sorter, G. H. 1969. An “Events” Approach to Basic Accounting Theory. The Ac-
counting Review, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 12-19. 
Sprouse, R. T. 1966. Accounting for What-You-May-Call-Its. Journal of Accoun-
tancy, Vol. 122, No. 4, pp. 45-53. 
Sprouse, R. T. 1988. Commentary on Financial Reporting: Developing a Concep-
tual Framework for Financial Reporting. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
pp. 121-127. 
Sprouse, R. T. and M. Moonitz. 1962. A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Prin-
ciples for Business Enterprises. New York: AICPA. 
Staubus, G. J. 1954. An Accounting Concept of Revenue. Ph.D. Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Chicago, partly reprinted in: Staubus, G. J. 2000. The Decision-
Usefulness Theory of Accounting: A Limited History. New York: Routledge. 
Sterling, R. R. 1970. The Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise Income. Law-
rence: University Press of Kansas. 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
131
Storey, R. K., and S. Storey. 1998. The Framework of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts and Standards. Stamford: FASB. 
Whittington, G. 1986. Financial Accounting Theory: An Over-View. British Ac-
counting Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 4-41. 
Whittington, G. 2008. Fair Value and the IASB/FASB Conceptual Framework 
Project: An Alternative View. Abacus, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 139-168. 
Wüstemann, J., and S. Kierzek. 2005. Revenue Recognition under IFRS Revi-
sited: Conceptual Models, Current Proposals, and Practical Consequences. Ac-
counting in Europe, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 69-106. 
Wyatt, A. 2008. What Financial and Non-Financial Information on Intangibles is 
Value-Relevant? A Review of the Evidence. Accounting and Business Research,
Special Issue: International Accounting Policy Forum, pp. 217-256. 
Young, J. J., and P. F. Williams. 2010. Sorting and Comparing: Standard-setting 
and “Ethical” Categories. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 21, No. 6, 
pp. 509-521. 
Zeff, S. A. 2002. ”Political” Lobbying on Proposed Standards: A Challenge to the 
IASB. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 43-54. 
Zeff, S. A. 2005. The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces Behind Pro-
fessional Standards. CPA Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 19-29. 
The Conceptual Framework’s (In-)Adequacy for Standard Setting 
132
The Regulation of Asset Valuation in Germany 
133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. 
 
THE REGULATION OF ASSET VALUATION IN GERMANY 
 
MANUSCRIPT C. 
 
 
 
 
IV. THE REGULATION OF ASSET VALUATION IN GERMANY 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Sebastian Hoffmann 
Assistant Professor 
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
Chair of Accounting and Auditing  
Jahnallee 59, D-04109 Leipzig 
email: sebastian.hoffmann@hhl.de 
tel. +49 (0) 3 41 – 9851 708 
 
 
 
Dominic Detzen 
Research Associate 
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
Chair of Accounting and Auditing  
Jahnallee 59, D-04109 Leipzig 
email: dominic.detzen@hhl.de 
tel. +49 (0) 3 41 – 9851 670 
 
 
 
 
  
The Regulation of Asset Valuation in Germany 
134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This manuscript is accepted for publication in Accounting History (ISSN 1032-3732).  
For copyright reasons, pages 134-186 were excluded from this version of my dissertation. 
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
187
V.
ON THE UBIQUITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
– THE HANDELSHOCHSCHULE LEIPZIG IN THE CLAWS OF NAZISM
MANUSCRIPT D.
V. ON THE UBIQUITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY – THE HANDELSHOCHSCHULE LEIPZIG
IN THE CLAWS OF NAZISM
Dominic Detzen 
Research Associate 
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
Chair of Accounting and Auditing
Jahnallee 59, D-04109 Leipzig 
email: dominic.detzen@hhl.de
tel. +49 (0) 3 41 – 9851 670 
Dr. Sebastian Hoffmann 
Assistant Professor 
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
Chair of Accounting and Auditing
Jahnallee 59, D-04109 Leipzig 
email: sebastian.hoffmann@hhl.de
tel. +49 (0) 3 41 – 9851 708 
We thank Hans Göschel for granting us access to the vast amount of information he collected over numerous 
years on the Handelshochschule Leipzig. We also thank the staff of the University of Leipzig archives. 
References to ‘he or she’ will be avoided; instead, ‘he’ will imply ‘he or she’. 
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
188
V. ON THE UBIQUITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
– THE HANDELSHOCHSCHULE LEIPZIG IN THE CLAWS OF NAZISM
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 190
2 Germany’s Business Schools and HHL from 1898 to 1933 ....................................... 195 
2.1 The Evolution of German Business Schools: 1898 to 1930 .................................... 195
2.2 Focusing on Professional Accountability: 1930 to 1933 ........................................ 197
3 Gleichschaltung of Charters and Regulations: 1933 to 1935 ..................................... 203
3.1 First Steps towards Coordination: 1933 .................................................................. 203
3.2 Dissemination of the Ideology: Aryan Faculty, Party Membership and  
Denunciations .......................................................................................................... 207
3.3 Implementing New Forms of Accountability: 1934 to 1935 .................................. 211
4 Dispersion of Accountability: 1935 to 1945 ................................................................ 218
4.1 Major Changes of HHL’s Faculty: 1935 to 1937 .................................................... 218
4.2 A Zealot Hands Over to a Liberal: 1937 to 1939 .................................................... 223
4.3 Hasenack’s Opposition in Times of War: 1939 to 1944 ......................................... 228
4.4 Outlook – The Regime’s Dissolution: 1945 ............................................................ 232
5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 234
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
189
ON THE UBIQUITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
– THE HANDELSHOCHSCHULE LEIPZIG IN THE CLAWS OF NAZISM
Abstract
In this article, we study the concept of accountability under extreme societal con-
ditions as imposed on Germany during the Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945. The 
Nazi ideology penetrated the entire society and caused, deliberate or reluctant, 
change of organizations, institutions and people. We refer to the Handelshoch-
schule Leipzig as the oldest business school in Germany to show how the Nazi 
doctrine found its way into an institution of higher morality, which universities 
tend to represent. While demonstrating that every aspect of the school’s routines 
was affected, we find that the occasional opposition to the regime was smothered 
by widespread actual or nominal loyalty. Due to the regime’s paranoia, political 
accountability became a ubiquitous and dominant governance instrument, influen-
cing individuals by threatening their moral integrity and corrupting the personal 
conscience of the accountable self. 
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1 Introduction
Ever since Scott and Lyman (1968) analyzed the employment of statements “to 
explain untoward behavior and bridge the gap between actions and expectations” 
(p. 46), the concept of accountability has been extended to large parts of society. It 
is “one of those golden concepts that no one can be against” (Bovens, 2007, 
p. 448), since, broadly speaking, it helps interested parties to obtain an under-
standing of whether and to what extent an accountable self deviated from a target 
imposed on it. By making someone take responsibility for his actions and thus for 
deviating from a previously specified target, accountability influences behavior 
and decisions. The psychological effects of the concept have long been acknowl-
edged (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999), although only recently the ethical problems of 
accountability were exposed (Messner, 2009). 
Given that there is no universal definition of accountability (e.g. Sinclair, 1995), 
we use the term to signify how the accountable self responds, or communicates 
his response, to duties externally imposed on it. The concept is divided in three 
dimensions: political, professional and personal. The political domain exclusively 
consists of obligations set by the state or politically affiliated organizations or 
individuals. The accountable self’s ethical and moral standards and beliefs deter-
mine what we label personal accountability. The professional dimension entails 
“the sense of duty that one has as a member of a professional or expert group” 
(Sinclair, 1995, p. 229). As will be shown, the dimensions tend to blur, especially 
due to the extreme demand of political alignment required from individuals. 
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This article is an attempt to further our understanding of the limits of accountabili-
ty by examining how extreme societal conditions, as exhibited in Nazi Germany 
between 1933 and 1945, change the norms which the accountable self needs to 
comply with. In addition, we show how the fear of penalization caused the ac-
countable self to betray its personal conscience by forcing it to adhere to the 
norms imposed on it or, in turn, by exploiting the ideology for its personal benefit. 
We extend Messner’s (2009) discussion of the ethical limits of accountability by 
providing insights into the use and abuse of accountability in a dogmatic society. 
In particular, we show that, at the margin, accountability is an all-encompassing 
instrument supporting overly suspicious or paranoid leaders of a centralistic or 
dictatorial system or organization, at the same time changing individuals’ beliefs 
or behavior. 
Early on in their regime, the Nazis implemented a new bureaucracy on top of ex-
isting structures, creating an inefficient apparatus of overlapping and confusing 
controls (Temin, 1991). Aiming at entrenching their ideology throughout society, 
every aspect of public and private life was penetrated with vehement propaganda. 
The regime needed to assure that people and organizations were politically 
aligned in everything they did and thus created strict reporting and control me-
chanisms. By doing so, the system contributed to a change in individuals’ moral 
integrity and ethical values by sanctioning any form of non-compliance with the 
newly established norms and, in turn, rewarding those who helped identify cases 
of non-compliance. Traditional societal and organizational hierarchies diffused 
because of the newly introduced bureaucracy, which featured a clear line of com-
mand, as well as due to the denouncing mechanism, which ran in all directions. 
The ubiquity of accountability thus contributed to further entrenchment of the 
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regime’s ideology and avoidance, or strong decline, of resistance. The result was 
what Butler (2005) designated “ethical violence”: the accountable self was threat-
ened by severe sentences, such as becoming a social outcast, losing its job, even 
imprisonment, deportation and death. Consequently, it was strongly incentivized 
to betray its personal conscience and adjust its behavior, aligning it with the polit-
ical norms. While ethically tormented, it tended to justify its behavior with the 
fear of the consequences of opposition. Eventually, the accountable self became 
part of and strengthened the system. 
Academic organizations, in particular universities, are generally considered insti-
tutions of high morality, tending to respond with hesitance to politically driven ad 
hoc changes in society’s moral standards (Rorty, Reuben and Marsden, 2000) and 
responding slowly to such externalities. Due to this characteristic, universities 
provide an ideal setting for studying accountability in extreme societal conditions. 
We examine to what extent the Nazi regime penetrated educational institutions by 
investigating changes in the schools’ regulations, reporting and recruiting as well 
as publishing and educational behavior. We argue that political accountability 
became ubiquitous and thus a moral burden for anyone not willing to align with 
the Nazi ideology. 
For our analysis, we chose the Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL) as an example 
for two reasons. First, being founded in 1898, HHL was the first business school 
in the German-speaking area. As such, it was the alma mater of numerous busi-
ness scholars of the first generation; its most prominent alumni include Eugen 
Schmalenbach, Fritz Schmidt and Heinrich Nicklisch. The school thus left a con-
siderable mark on the discipline of Betriebswirtschaftslehre (business economics) 
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in Germany. Second, after receiving the Promotionsrecht (right to confer docto-
rates) in 1930, HHL became an established and reputable business school with 
university rank that, nonetheless, was constantly threatened in its independence 
due to its relatively small financial endowment. As a result, it held close ties with 
the University of Leipzig, e.g. by sharing classes and lecturers. The school stands 
pars pro toto for the impact of the Nazi regime on business schools in Germany1
in that HHL was not one of those institutions extraordinarily affected by the re-
gime (Mantel, 2009, p. 225). 
We organize our study around the festivities for the inauguration of the new dean, 
during which the outgoing dean gives an account of his term in office. Following 
Sinclair (1995, p. 224), the official ceremonies allow us to observe the structural 
component of accountability, which is rational and delivered since it can be 
worked with and controlled. These accounts are supplemented by episodes that 
are to serve as an illustration of the widespread demand for accountability and its 
contrast to the individual’s moral and ethical dimensions of this concept. Refer-
ring to Sinclair’s (1995, p. 224) personal notion, the anecdotes show the ambigui-
ty of accountability, how the concept itself is feared and the accountable self is 
vulnerable to it. 
Our study is mainly based on primary source material from HHL’s archive.2 In 
particular, we accessed the proceedings of the inauguration festivities, the staff 
1  This study is not intended as a comprehensive review of the effect of the Nazi regime on busi-
ness professors or business schools (see, e.g., Gmähle, 1968; Hundt, 1977, ch. 3; Schneider, 
2001, pp. 216-237; Mantel, 2009). 
2  HHL’s archives are part of the archives of the University of Leipzig (UAL) and are registered 
under the shelf marks HHS 1 to HHS 640. For the sake of readability and brevity, we do not 
include the references to the archival material in the text. 
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records of the deans as well as their denazification files3, charters and regulations 
during that time as well as correspondence regarding these, minutes of the 
school’s decision-making bodies and deans’ correspondence, course catalogues, 
and, as far as available, professors’ correspondence and publications. Secondary 
sources, particularly other scholars’ research on Nazism and universities supple-
mented this database. 
We proceed as follows: After briefly introducing the emergence of business 
schools in Germany, we describe HHL as it entered the 1930s, starting with the 
celebration of its receiving the Promotionsrecht. This section portrays the busi-
ness school under “normal” circumstances, not influenced by extremist thinking. 
In subsequent chapters, we describe how the Nazi ideology, especially the so-
called Gleichschaltung, i.e. the process of coordinating all aspects of public life 
with the Nazi doctrine, influenced HHL’s formal accountability as set out in the 
school’s regulations. Next, we examine the time until the end of the Nazi regime, 
during which accountability largely dispersed. In a final section, we summarize 
our findings. 
3  These files were written post-World War II and were to demonstrate a person’s resistance to 
the regime. We are aware that the documents themselves represent “accounts”, used to white-
wash the accountable self, and thus need to be considered with some qualification. 
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2 Germany’s Business Schools and HHL from 1898 to 
1933
2.1 The Evolution of German Business Schools: 1898 to 1930 
While not necessarily instigating the development of Betriebswirtschaftslehre as 
an academic discipline, the formation of the German Handelshochschulen (col-
leges of commerce) played a major role in its evolution. Starting in 1898 with 
HHL, a number of business schools were founded in the German-speaking area.4
The schools primarily aimed at increasing merchants’ knowledge, in particular in 
the areas of languages, economics and law, whereas commercial or business-
related education gained importance only over the years (Schneider, 2001, p. 192). 
Moreover, the quality of the education as well as the admission criteria varied 
widely among the business schools such that they were seen as universities in the 
second or even third tier for a number of years (Mantel, 2009, p. 16). As a conse-
quence, the Handelshochschulen initially did not have the Promotionsrecht and, 
many being under supervision of the local Chambers of Commerce, lacked full 
academic independence.5 Only when allowed a Rektoratsverfassung (dean’s con-
stitution), which entitled the school to elect an academic dean from among its fa-
culty, and granted the Promotionsrecht were the schools considered of university 
rank. This evolution occurred largely simultaneously to the rise of Betriebswirt-
schaftslehre as an academic discipline.6
4  To name but a few, these include Aachen, St. Gallen and Vienna in 1898, Cologne and Frank-
furt in 1901, Berlin in 1906 and Mannheim in 1908. 
5  The business school in Cologne was the first independent Handelshochschule, having received 
a large financial endowment from entrepreneur and politician Gustav Mevissen. 
6  According to Schneider (2001, p. 201), the “breakthrough” of business administration were 
scholars’ suggestions and approaches to account for the effects of the early 1920s hyperinfla-
tion. Throughout that decade, business schools’ constitutions were reformed and Handelshoch-
schulen started to obtain the Promotionsrecht, inter alia at the initiative of Heinrich Nicklisch 
(Schneider, 2001, p. 210). 
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The Handelshochschule in Leipzig, like its peers, started out modestly by renting 
classrooms from other schools and by having its students attend courses from the 
University of Leipzig since HHL did not have its own lecturers.7 Over the years, 
the resources of the school increased and it saw the creation of an Institut für Re-
visions- und Treuhandwesen (institute for auditing and fiduciary activities), which 
began its operations following the creation of a Bücherrevisorenkurs (seminar for 
chartered accountants) in 1907. Other institutes followed, e.g. one for taxation in 
1920 and one for world economics in 1924. 
HHL gained full administrative independence in 1911 when it became a legal per-
son under public law, but gained a Rektoratsverfassung, i.e. academic indepen-
dence, only in 1923. From that time on HHL was under the supervision of the 
Sächsisches Wirtschaftsministerium (Saxonian department of economics). Ac-
cording to the new Rektoratsverfassung, the Rektor (dean) was elected from 
among the regular professors for two years and was to conduct the everyday busi-
ness of the school. The Professorenrat (council of professors) consisted of all full, 
adjunct and honorary professors as well as three representatives of the other lec-
turers and took the major decisions mainly regarding teaching and research. Final-
ly, the Senat (senate) carried out the tasks of a supervisory board. Following a 
constitutional reform in 1931, the Professorenrat was renamed Senat and the for-
mer Senat was labeled Kuratorium, while their duties remained unchanged. 
HHL’s faculty, like any school’s, was made up of teaching and research staff at 
various levels of their career path. Typically, after having obtained a doctorate, a 
7  This and the following paragraph draw from Grossmann (1950), who characterizes the begin-
nings and the evolution of HHL from 1898 to 1946. Grossmann was not only a professor at 
HHL for 22 years, but, having enrollment ID 74, also one of its first students. 
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lecturer became assistant to a full professor, pursuing his Habilitation or venia 
legendi, a post-doctoral degree necessary to become professor at a university. 
Having obtained this degree, the assistant was awarded the title Privatdozent,
which allowed him to give classes independently, approve examinations and su-
pervise research without holding a professorship. Afterwards, they became nicht-
planmässiger ausserordentlicher Professor (extraordinary adjunct professors), 
which was a non-tenured teaching position without a regular salary. A 
planmässiger ausserordentlicher Professor (ordinary adjunct professor) had a 
paid position without any or with only few research assistants and a lower budget 
than a planmässiger ordentlicher Professor (full professor), which was the highest 
position in German academe. Besides these positions, Lehrbeauftragte (lecturers) 
were often recruited from practice and supplemented the classes given by regular 
faculty members. 
2.2 Focusing on Professional Accountability: 1930 to 1933 
For a long time, HHL was not successful in its attempts to obtain the Promotions-
recht on the grounds that the school’s alumni could go to the University of Leip-
zig to pursue a doctorate (Grossmann, 1950, p. 37). It was only on 13 May 1930 
that HHL received the Promotionsrecht as the penultimate business school in 
Germany8 and became a recognized academic institution of the same status as a 
university. The business school had successfully added to its business faculty and 
amended its study regulations to demonstrate that, from a scientific standpoint, 
Betriebswirtschaftslehre was on par with economics. Accordingly, a ceremony 
was held on 2 July 1930 in Leipzig’s old theatre, when the chairman of HHL’s 
8  Königsberg obtained the Promotionsrecht only a few months later. 
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senate, a director from the Sächsisches Wirtschaftsministerium, the dean of the 
University of Leipzig, the mayor of Leipzig, the student’s representative and 
HHL’s dean gave speeches. 
While these talks were not necessarily to report on past developments, the repre-
sentatives of HHL felt obliged to justify why the school obtained the Promotions-
recht. As a result, the speeches display a high level of professional accountability 
and thus give an indication of accountability practices in the pre-Nazi era. The 
chairman of HHL’s Senat, Richard Schmidt, asserted that the socio-political envi-
ronment further emphasized the need to establish Betriebswirtschaftslehre as an 
academic discipline. He pointed to a draft for a Stock Companies Act, which was 
about to be published and which, inter alia, expanded the role of “highly qualified 
economic trustees, which assume legal functions.”9 Since Germany lacked these 
experts, Schmidt argued that “they are needed in great numbers and have to be 
educated quickly. What prospects these are for our students! […] To educate them 
at our school, we have the most favorable conditions, after we have expanded and 
specialized our faculty and created new useful facilities to obtain the Promotions-
recht.” Similarly, he pointed to the benefits for students’ careers: “Once, every 
one of Napoleon’s soldiers had a marshal’s baton in his knapsack. Likewise, each 
of our students will have his mortarboard in his wardrobe. […] However, only the 
most able, industrious and capable will obtain that decoration.” Despite the mili-
tary notion of this comparison, Schmidt focused on the academic advances gained 
over the years. He urged professors and students to go on in their striving for aca-
demic excellence thus committing every member of the school to safeguard the 
9  All German excerpts were translated as closely to the original German text as possible. For 
reasons of brevity, the German passages are not provided. 
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
199
conditions that are necessary to maintain university rank. He closed his speech by 
referring to a new flag hoisted at HHL, whose “contemporary and always genuine 
motto will guide [the school]: ‘Trade unites the nations.’” This open-minded re-
mark and the general positive tone were repeated in subsequent speeches and give 
testimony that the school, like its supporters, was dedicated not only to the school 
and their tasks but also to the advancement of Betriebswirtschaftslehre as an aca-
demic and international discipline. Professional accountability to further know-
ledge and the standing of academe was the focal point of the schools’ role in so-
ciety. 
Hermann Grossmann, then the dean of HHL,10 gave the official speech for the 
occasion on the synthesis of the economy and science. Grossmann’s elaborations 
are a convincingly presented plea for the need of education in social, economic 
and political dimensions. Grossmann repeatedly referred to the term Führer,
which was not yet a synonym for Adolf Hitler, but was frequently used in an eco-
nomic context, e.g. to talk of business leadership.11 The dean asserted that “the 
German people has sustained its position as the intellectual Führer of the world” 
and “the German intellect will not slow down in its wish and urge to explore in 
order to do great things for the true blessing of the German economy and the true 
welfare of mankind.” Nationalistic statements such as these were common at the 
time but had not yet taken the extremist notion of a few years later. Accordingly, 
the dean emphasized the merits of academe and intellectual work, regarding the 
education of effective business leaders as a central pillar of a school’s work and 
10  The appendix includes a list of HHL faculty from 1933 to 1945. 
11  Prior to his speech, Dean Grossmann awarded Richard Schmidt a doctorate honoris causa and 
praised him as “the proven Führer of the economic area of Leipzig.” 
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society’s success. Like Schmidt, he seemed to view academe as a competitive 
environment, in which HHL would operate on a level playing field, further striv-
ing for academic excellence and proving itself worthy of its newly obtained status. 
Grossmann’s term as dean ended on 31 March 1931, when another opportunity 
was given to observe accountability practices.12 Traditionally, the school held 
festivities for the inauguration of a new dean, in this case Alexander Snyckers, at 
which the outgoing dean reports on major events of his term. In 1931, these festiv-
ities took place on 3 June and Grossmann was the first to speak, emphasizing the 
need to look back and give an account of his deanship. He identified HHL’s ob-
taining of the Promotionsrecht as the dominating event of his term and reported 
only factually about all other important developments regarding research, teaching 
and administrative activities, nonetheless documenting HHL’s ability to perform 
well in these areas. His term was further characterized by an extraordinarily 
strained economy in the aftermath of the Great Depression such that he also struck 
some negative notes regarding the school’s funding. Given that these were the 
only critical issues he mentioned, Grossmann seemingly attempted to position the 
school well and, in light of the attendance of all deans of academic institutions in 
Saxony, impress his colleagues by documenting excellence in all academic areas. 
Handing over the office to Snyckers, Grossmann concluded: “I present your Mag-
nificence the constitution of our school, which you are required to guard. May the 
burden of the office bring you satisfaction in your successful endeavor to the ben-
efits of our school. May God grant it.” In his final words as dean, Grossmann em-
12  To award Grossmann for obtaining the Promotionsrecht, he had been given a second two-year 
term, which he did not complete on health grounds. The dean’s terms coincided with traditional 
school terms: The Winter term ran from 1 October to 31 March, while the Summer semester 
ran from 1 April to 30 September. Teaching typically began on 15 October and 15 April, re-
spectively, and lasted over 14 to 15 weeks. 
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phasized the office’s dedication to the advancement of the school within the limits 
of the law, clearly appealing to the dean’s accountability. 
Alexander Snyckers’ speech on “Statisches und Dynamisches in deutscher und 
französischer Wesensart” (“On the Static and Dynamic Nature of the German and 
French Culture”) was intended to make apparent distinctions between the French 
and German society and, to a large extent, represented a factual assessment of the 
topic. In concluding, Snyckers characterized the French as the more static nation – 
static being understood as balanced, favoring the status quo – and the German 
people as the more dynamic one – i.e. being in motion, being driven, advancing, 
but also being uncertain. By implying superiority of Germany over France, 
Snyckers’ speech featured a nationalistic tone that becomes more severe towards 
the end. Emphasizing that Germany’s colonies had been taken away following the 
war, he claimed that the German people did “not have sufficient space to live”, 
which later became an argument used by the Nazis to justify the expulsion of 
people from Eastern Europe. Concluding his speech, he warned of rising conflicts 
in Germany that may also endanger the rest of Europe: “And the excessive dy-
namic, which the German people unwillingly were pushed to as a result of the 
peace treaty [of Versailles] and its catastrophic consequences, are not constructive 
anymore, but lead to increasingly severe social turmoil. Those fights are not only 
an enormous danger for Germany, but for the whole of Europe. And that is some-
thing that the countries that are currently in power should think about instead of 
pushing our German nation further into disaster by their lack of understanding for 
the difficulty of our situation. That is what they should consider, not only in our, 
but also in their own interest.” 
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Snyckers’ posture was considerably different from the one of his predecessor. Had 
Grossmann avoided much political notion in his addresses did Snyckers now con-
clude with a political statement that bordered on a threat to other countries. 
Snyckers, who was born in Belgium, had worked for the press department of the 
German general governor in Brussels in World War I when Belgium was occu-
pied by Germany. Possibly, this involvement in the military and politics made him 
take a more militaristic stance compared to Grossmann, who was never politically 
active or involved in either of the world wars.13 Thus, their understanding of the 
dean’s political role may have differed, although both were subject to the same 
political environment when Germans were getting increasingly anxious of their 
economic situation. 
13  Grossmann’s political involvement was limited to his friendship with Gustav Stresemann, a 
Nobel Peace Prize laureate and foreign minister, who in 1923 served as Reichskanzler when 
Adolf Hitler’s Munich Putsch failed. 
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3 Gleichschaltung of Charters and Regulations: 
1933 to 1935 
3.1 First Steps towards Coordination: 1933 
Being appointed Chancellor of the German Reich on 30 January 1933, Adolf Hit-
ler quickly took a number of measures to entrench his position and to suspend 
democratic principles in Germany. Over the course of the next two years, Hitler 
seized, inter alia, the power to issue laws without parliamentary involvement, 
abandoned the constitution, deprived the German states of most of their legislative 
powers, outlawed or restricted parties other than his Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nazi party, NSDAP), and suspended or restricted nu-
merous human rights. Centralizing power was a key feature of Hitler’s regime and 
was implemented by the Führer principle throughout every aspect of public life. 
The Nazi-driven understanding of the term Führer based on two main aspects 
(Gmähle, 1968, pp. 230-231): First, referring to Darwinism, the strongest or best 
man would emerge and lead. Democratic principles were in the way of the 
Führer’s reign. Second, given his strong personality, the Führer was solely in 
charge and, while relying on other institutions for advice, took all decisions him-
self. As a result, the Führer had authority towards his subordinates and was strict-
ly accountable to his superiors. Implementing the Führer principle throughout all 
organizations and institutions by issuing laws, orders and directives gave the re-
gime total control and introduced strict hierarchical accountability coordinating 
the entire society in line with the regime’s principle ideology. 
Like any other university, HHL was subject to the political change as well, which 
can be observed during the subsequent festivities for the new dean’s inauguration. 
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
204
On 14 June 1933, Dean Snyckers reported on his term lasting from April 1931 to 
March 1933 and handed over his office to Gerhard Wörner. The political rhetoric 
Snyckers had displayed in his 1931 report continued on this occasion and was 
further enriched by ideology. He explicitly welcomes the mayor as the Führer of 
the city, the Führer of the local Sturmabteilung (SA, storm troopers) and other 
military and paramilitary organizations, giving an indication of the political 
change. Snyckers compared the school’s current situation to the one a decade ear-
lier, finding that the year 1923 had been characterized by significant material dis-
tress and widespread despair. Ten years on, the economic situation was still very 
difficult but “the German people believes in the future again. Today’s omnipre-
sent optimism […] emerges from the awareness that, although there is still some 
considerable rebuilding to do, due to its new leadership the German nation has the 
power to accomplish its mission. […] Given the developments of the recent 
months, we are confident in a bright future, in which our business school will also 
contribute to the reconstruction of Germany.” The nationalistic introduction of the 
speech conveys the impression that the political change had casually changed the 
minds and feelings of people, or at least made their previously held beliefs appar-
ent. Snyckers reinforced this notion by stating that “through the gates of our 
school, the wave of the national movement has also flowed. Hoisting the black-
red-white [flag] and the swastika was the symbol for this. A symbol, which, so 
far, signals readiness and hopefully soon fulfillment.” Besides honoring national 
and political symbols, he encouraged faculty members and students to join him in 
this new spirit of optimism and enthusiasm for the regime, requesting them to 
politically align: “All of you know the plans for a ‘political university’ […]. And 
it will only be possible for HHL to maintain its standing among the universities, if 
it gets involved in the process of renewing and transforming university educa-
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tion.” Snyckers’ announcement and plea to the school’s constituents demonstrated 
not only political alignment, but showed that a new variable had entered the com-
petition for academic excellence. Schools’ objectives started to modify and their 
professional accountability seemed to increasingly include a political component. 
His call for political alignment also aimed at sustaining HHL’s independence, for 
which he considered political engagement necessary. 
In his speech, Snyckers noted several organizational changes that resulted from 
amendments to HHL’s regulations and statutes, due to which e.g. the Senat was 
re-named Kuratorium. Although the outgoing dean emphasized that neither the 
school’s constitution nor the regulations for the habilitation were affected, he did 
not mention his attempt to change HHL’s constitution at the end of 1932 when he 
prepared a handwritten draft that showed his ideas of an early political alignment. 
Inter alia, he proposed to make the dean the Führer of the school with sole and 
comprehensive authority. However, Snyckers’ efforts were silenced by the meet-
ing of the Kuratorium on 5 January 1933, which refused to accept his constitu-
tional draft. It seems likely that Snyckers was an early follower of the Nazi ideas. 
However, his failure and his disregarding of the episode suggest that the Nazis 
had not yet cemented their power. Instead, Snyckers, relegating other issues, such 
as lectures or funding, to an appendix, wished the incoming dean well, hoping that 
“all parts of the school will work together for the advancement of the scientific 
research and education, which we serve.” Again, while demonstrating his political 
attitude, Snyckers’ speech does not imply that the Nazis were as entrenched yet. 
Professional accountability still related to academic advancement and education. 
Nonetheless, it seems that by 1933 political aspects started to encroach on the 
school’s conduct of business. 
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Supporting this notion, Dean Wörner underscored in his otherwise balanced 
speech, entitled “Wesen und Quellen der Versicherungsbetriebslehre” (“Nature 
and Sources of the Management of Insurances”), that his role as university teacher 
was in line with the above-cited Führer principle, which Wörner called “generally 
accepted by now”.14 His job was “to find the one among the many aspirants and 
prepare his path for Führung (leadership). It is the fortune of a professor to find 
the one, to support the one, who once will be called to be a Führer.” Wörner, who 
had fought in World War I from 1914 to 1918, was the founder of the Leipzig 
chapter of the Stahlhelm (steel helmet), a paramilitary organization of war veter-
ans. His militaristic tone is thus not surprising and seemed like a foreboding for 
the political alignment HHL, like other schools, was due to undergo. 
In their hastening to follow the new regime, Snyckers and Wörner were not alone. 
Numerous scholars of all academic disciplines had signed a “vow of allegiance of 
the professors of the German universities and high-schools to Adolf Hitler and the 
national socialistic state”, which was proclaimed on 11 November 1933 in Leip-
zig. In their pledge, which was translated into English, Italian, French and Span-
ish, the professors appealed “to the intelligentsia of the whole world to cede their 
understanding to the striving German nation – united by Adolf Hitler – for free-
dom, honor, justice and peace, to the same extent as they would for their own na-
tion.” HHL’s entire faculty signed the pledge, which, however, cannot necessarily 
be regarded as a sign of political commitment. According to Mantel (2009, 
p. 567), some schools’ deans insisted that all professors sign the vow to politically 
14  This conclusion seems a little premature since the Gleichschaltung had not been fully devel-
oped. Most likely, Wörner referred to his own political beliefs giving the regime a vote of con-
fidence. 
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align their school.15 Although we do not have evidence that the latter was the case 
at HHL, it is possible that Dean Wörner solicited all professors’ signatures be-
cause, later on, he also “encouraged” HHL professors to join Nazi associations 
(see below). The vow of allegiance stands as early evidence for professors’ chang-
ing their moral beliefs, or hiding their true beliefs by committing themselves to a 
despicable political regime to not endanger their careers.16
3.2 Dissemination of the Ideology: Aryan Faculty, Party Member-
ship and Denunciations 
A major reason to align politically had been given to professors on 7 April 1933 
when the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums (law for the rees-
tablishment of the public office) was issued. According to this regulation, Beamte
(tenured civil servants), such as professors, could be fired to simplify administra-
tion and reestablish a national public office. Reasons for dismissal or early retire-
ment were inaptitude, non-Aryan ancestry and political unreliability.17 An excep-
tion for the dismissal due to non-Aryan lineage was made only if a civil servant 
had been in office prior to World War I, had fought in the war or if his father or 
son was killed in the war. Having served the national interest thus saved people 
from the ideology, again pointing to the militaristic notion of the time. 
15  Ironically, the vow begins with a statement by the Führer of the Saxonian teachers who em-
phasized that the professors “willingly and deliberately” aligned with the party. 
16  However, this trend was not yet visible everywhere. For example, the Festschrift for the tenth 
anniversary of HHL’s institute for world economy by Haushofer and Vogel (1934), entitled 
Weltwirtschaftsdämmerung (the world economy in the twilight), did not contain an obvious 
Nazi slant. Instead, the title was chosen to signify the challenges experienced in previous years 
and the looming changes for the world economy. 
17  The definition of Aryan lineage remained unclear until the infamous Nuremberg laws were 
passed in 1935. 
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Against this background, HHL in 1933 acted to “free” its faculty from non-Aryan 
lecturers. Siegfried Berliner, who taught at HHL from 1908 to 1913 and since 
1928, was not able to renew his teaching assignment following a letter from the 
department of education to HHL on 25 April 1933.18 In a similar vein, Hans 
Kirchberger had been teaching as Privatdozent since Summer 1927 and as nicht-
planmässiger ausserordentlicher Professor since Summer 1931. In its delibera-
tions on 10 May 1933, the Senat decided against renewing Kirchberger’s teaching 
assignment because of his non-Aryan lineage. While having been in the military 
in World War I, his file did not show that he participated in a battle, which for the 
Senat was reason enough not to keep Kirchberger on the faculty. On 11 July 1933, 
the dean reported to the department of education that two non-Aryan lecturers had 
been dismissed and that the school now featured an Aryan faculty. 
HHL’s remaining faculty members had to adjust, if necessary, to the new reality. 
Several professors were “encouraged” to join the NSDAP or show some other 
sign of support for the regime. For example, Dean Wörner approached Hermann 
Grossmann as the senior member of HHL’s faculty to join the party “in the inter-
est of the school”, which Grossmann did on 1 May 1933.19 Similarly, Walther 
Löbner, at the time writing his habilitation, joined the party, being instigated by 
“his tutor and father-like friend” Professor Karl von der Aa to “strengthen the par-
ty’s decent elements.”20 Karl Thalheim, at the time nichtplanmässiger ausser-
18  Schneider (2001, pp. 223-224) and Mantel (2009, p. 373) assert that Berliner continued to 
teach evening classes at HHL until 1938. Based on HHL’s course catalogues, which list Ber-
liner as Lehrbeauftragter until 1933, we were not able confirm this piece of information. 
19  Or so Grossmann claimed in his eight-plus pages report on his behavior during the Nazi re-
gime. He asserted that “at that time, every German could consent with good conscience to the 
party’s efforts”, which, in retrospect, seems an illusory claim. 
20  Letter from then-Dean Lütge to the regional government, dated 22 November 1945, to keep 
Löbner in office. 
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ordentlicher Professor, claimed that he was approached both by the Führer of the 
lecturers at the University of Leipzig and the Führer of the student body at HHL 
to show a sign of loyalty to the regime. Otherwise, his university career would be 
in peril, which seemed plausible given that Thalheim had repeatedly criticized the 
Nazi ideology between 1930 and 1933 and had in 1930 run for the Saxonian state 
parliament on the ticket of a liberal party. To avoid this consequence, he joined 
the SA, choosing “the lesser of the evils.”21
A somewhat absurd account is given by Wilhelm Hasenack, who joined HHL 
only in 1938 and who in 1933 was a planmässiger ausserordentlicher Professor at 
Technical University of Berlin (TUB). Along with his wife, he had been photo-
graphed at a ceremony not singing along and not showing the Nazi salute. Upon 
the urging of TUB-Dean von Arnim, himself a major SA figure, to enter a party 
organization, Hasenack joined the SA as “the mildest form of showing a party 
relationship”. When recruited to HHL, Hasenack was encouraged by Dean 
Snyckers to join the NSDAP because the local government would not approve a 
non-party member. These anecdotes demonstrate that career concerns, in particu-
lar of younger scholars, were exploited by Nazi followers to instigate party mem-
bership or other forms of commitment to the regime. The threats implemented by 
the regime seemed to work as they resulted in a political alignment, at least on a 
formal level, of many individuals. Likewise, the pressure by superiors or other 
followers of the regime displays a form of universal accountability in that anyone 
could be required to align or else. As a result, the anecdotes suggest that party 
21  In a letter to the regional government, dated 22 November 1945, Lütge claimed that Thalheim 
joined the SA because admission to the NSDAP had been restricted. 
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membership can ex post not be regarded as a sufficient instrument to discriminate 
between nominal and actual Nazi followers.22
While it seemed that being loyal to the Nazi regime would be a job guarantee, 
there is an episode surrounding Franz Findeisen, professor for merchandise and 
advertising, which gives testimony to the contrary. Findeisen, who in the early 
1920s became a respected scholar publishing on a wide range of topics, had been 
on medical leave in 1927 due to being diagnosed with schizophrenia. Upon his 
return, he asserted that he, along with Professor Ernst Schultze, was discriminated 
against by HHL’s faculty. After the Nazis had taken over, he saw his chance for 
payback, claiming that he had been a Nazi follower for a long time.23 He appealed 
to the local Nazi administration that HHL lacked commitment to the new regime 
and that he was discriminated against because of his political beliefs. A member 
of the state parliament replied to the school on 18 July 1933 listing numerous 
questions that reiterated the professor’s claims and doubted the school’s political 
alignment. One of the issues concerned Findeisen’s allegation that the habilitation 
of his assistant, Curt Sandig, was “communistic”. Claiming that all assistants were 
“lice”, Findeisen had refused to sponsor the work.24 Only later did he “substan-
tiate” his claims accusing Sandig of quoting from Jewish sources.25
22  Hermann Grossmann later in his report demanded that the question should not be “party mem-
ber or not”, but “guilty or not”. Even in 1933, Nazi activists derided as opportunists those who 
joined the NSDAP after the March 1933 election, which was won by Hitler. As a result, party 
membership was restricted starting 1 May 1933. 
23  He suggested in a 3 April 1933 letter to the dean to award Adolf Hitler a doctorate honoris 
causa.
24  Findeisen had also fallen out with two of his earlier assistants, Arthur Lisowsky and Walter 
Weigmann, and had sabotaged several theses defenses by doubting students’ commitment to 
the regime and asking preposterous questions on the connection between the regime and busi-
ness theory. 
25  Possibly to clear any doubt of his political attitude, Sandig, in 1933 and 1934, authored four 
articles on Betriebswirtschaftslehre and National Socialism and Führer responsibility in stock 
companies, which, inter alia, appeared in the Nazi daily Völkischer Beobachter.
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
211
Given the widespread demand for political commitment and accountability, these 
allegations could be expected to result in severe difficulties for both Sandig and 
the school. Findeisen’s denunciations, however, were blocked by the school’s 
concerted efforts. The student representative revealed in a written statement that 
Findeisen had only recently joined the Nazi movement, possibly to strengthen his 
cause against the school, and that he was a nuisance to everyone at the school. 
When a committee concluded that Sandig’s habilitation was not communistic, 
Findeisen stated: “Of HHL’s nine professors, eight belong into a concentration 
camp.” Most likely due to his prior behavior and his history of ill health, Findei-
sen’s attempted revenge failed. Instead, he was recommended to file a retirement 
request and, when he objected, was dismissed. Over the course of the next years, 
Findeisen appealed repeatedly to the decision, entering retirement only in January 
1937.26
3.3 Implementing New Forms of Accountability: 1934 to 1935 
On 29 March 1935, the Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und 
Volksbildung (department of science and national education, henceforth: Ministe-
rium)27 announced to Dean Wörner, whose deanship was due to end on 1 April 
1935, that his term would be extended for another year.28 As a consequence, the 
ceremony, which would normally be held, was replaced by a written business re-
26  In 1938, still listed as full professor of business at HHL, Findeisen (1938) wrote a book on 
marketing that was laden with Nazi rhetoric, quoting a wide range of Nazi books and outlets 
and treating topics such as “blood and property in marketing”, “blood types in marketing” or 
“racial issues in marketing”. 
27  The Ministerium was created on 1 May 1934 under supervision of Bernhard Rust. It appro-
priated the responsibility to appoint deans, but mostly based its decisions on the schools’ sug-
gestions. 
28  Wörner suffered from a declining health in his second term and, on 13 November 1936, soli-
cited his dismissal from the department of education, which was granted effectively 31 De-
cember 1936. Vice Dean Snyckers had taken over as acting dean on 15 November 1936. 
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port, which the Ministerium requested from each school. The report was given on 
15 February 1935 and contains only the dean’s statement as well as faculty’s re-
ports on their activities. 
Following some introductory remarks and thanks to HHL’s contributors, Wörner 
showed his militaristic attitude by talking about his experiences as a soldier in 
World War I. In that account, he documented strong ideological alignment with 
the Nazi regime by stating “for the reporting dean, the National Socialist revolu-
tion […] was a mentally releasing event”. He also reported that the transformation 
of HHL according to the new political and ideological conditions along the 
Gleichschaltung was well on track: “Right from the first day of my term, no ad-
justment was needed to entirely integrate HHL ideologically and organizationally 
into the empire of Adolf Hitler.” Providing examples for the smooth transforma-
tion, he referred to the instruction at the entrance of HHL stating “The German 
salute has been implemented here. We say Heil Hitler!” and to the institution hav-
ing ordered a portrait of Hitler in January 1934, which was unveiled in ceremony. 
Before drafting his report, Dean Wörner had requested from each professor a con-
tribution on their academic activities of about one page, which he presented in a 
subsequent section of his business report. As Wörner did not give any guidelines, 
each professor made up his report in the way he felt most adequate: Some of the 
accounts demonstrate strong ideological and political alignment (e.g. Wörner, 
Deutsch), whereas others simply list or briefly describe their lectures (e.g. von 
Hibler). In light of Snyckers’ rhetoric in the June 1933 report, it is surprising that 
the former dean was amongst those that did not employ political slant. Possibly, 
he did not perceive a need for accountability since he was not dean, i.e. not in a 
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position exposed to political accountability, and hence only compiled a list of his 
lectures. The episode shows how the perception of accountability is capable of 
changing the account. 
Closing his report, Wörner confessed his wish “that HHL will continue to be able 
to work in self-administration, self-determination and self-reliance for the great 
tasks, which the Führer and Reichskanzler has set for the German commerce. Heil
Hitler!” As an appendix, a number of student statistics are presented, inter alia on 
the proportion of non-Aryan and half-Aryan students. The disclosed figures show 
a decline from 1.1 percent in Summer 1933 (six non-Aryans) to 0.66 percent in 
Winter 1934/1935 (three half-Aryans). This report is the only one presenting such 
numbers on non-Aryan students. Both the statistic and Wörner’s final remark imp-
ly that the dean aimed to ensure that HHL had been coordinated according to the 
Gleichschaltung.
Nonetheless, Wörner’s report mentioned only in passing the constitutional change 
HHL had gone through during his term. Following Snyckers’ attempt to imple-
ment a new constitution, the city of Leipzig, represented in the Senat by Council 
Member Stahl, raised the point again in August 1933 and presented a draft for a 
new constitution aiming to harmonize regulations with the University of Leipzig. 
Wörner, not agreeing with this draft, proposed a stronger integration of the Führer
principle in the new constitution. Based on other German business school’s con-
stitutions, Wörner presented his own draft in October 1933, which was to make 
the dean the Führer of the school, granting him far-ranging authority. According 
to this draft, the dean was no longer accountable to his colleagues or the school’s 
shareholders but only to the department of education. In November 1933, Stahl 
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postponed further deliberations on the new constitution because a regulation from 
the department of education was to be expected. 
Indeed, state secretary Michael in January 1934 asked Wörner for sample consti-
tutions from other German business schools. Based on these documents and fur-
ther discussions, the department of education drafted a tentative constitution, 
which specified that the purpose of HHL was to serve the German nation by eco-
nomic education, teaching and research. HHL’s Kuratorium amended this purpose 
by requiring an “education according to National Socialist ideology”, further 
aligning the school’s mission with politics. The change implies that, by being re-
sponsible for education and research, HHL’s mission had technically remained the 
same. However, the objective of the mission was tilted in that HHL now had to 
contribute to the welfare of the German nation and subordinate its activities to-
wards this goal. Gone was the guidance given by academic excellence and scien-
tific advancements, which now seemed to be considered useless if they did not 
contribute to the German nation’s welfare. 
The remainder of the tentative constitution was approved in June 1934. Compre-
hensive authority was granted to the dean, who was appointed by the Ministerium
and who, in turn, appointed his deputy and committees. Further implementing the 
Führer principle, the dean was given decisive power for all academic and curricu-
lar issues of the school. Had the Senat earlier been responsible for these decisions, 
did it now take only an advisory function. True to the Nazi regime’s objective, 
power was concentrated on one person and had thus been centralized. The tenta-
tive constitution was superseded in April 1935 by the Richtlinien zur Vereinheit-
lichung der Hochschulverwaltung (ministry directives for a harmonization of uni-
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versity administration), which replaced all university constitutions and made all 
university deans Führer of the school, being solely accountable to the Reichsmi-
nister of Science and Education. 
At about the same time, in June 1934, a decree was issued that united all lecturers 
at universities. The Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund (association of National 
Socialistic teachers, NSLB), which had been part of the NSDAP since 1929 and 
which, in 1933, had sponsored the professors’ pledge to Adolf Hitler, comprised 
of a division for university teachers, within which a subdivision for lecturers had 
been founded.29 Besides a federal and a state Führer, each university had its own 
Führer of the Dozentenschaft (i.e. all lecturers), who automatically took a place in 
the school’s academic decision-making body. 
A 4 July 1934 article in the local newspaper Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten ex-
plained the change introduced by the Dozentenschaft as follows: “In the past, the 
scholar trained himself solely in his research interests; he did not need the com-
munity, he abstained from it. His physical and political education was his private 
matter. The German revolution requires foremost a commitment to the communi-
ty, an equal education of body and mind, the community of all German workers. 
The German university teacher is also a German worker. His responsibility is 
huge; his task is the education of emerging academics towards a German man, 
towards a strong character, towards a competent scholar. As a result, the aim of 
the German Dozentenschaft will be to promote the physical, political and scientif-
ic training of its members. The German Dozentenschaft wants to and will create a 
29  Membership was voluntary, although Professor Menz wrote to the dean on 24 July 1934: “I 
believe that it is appropriate that all faculty members that are concerned act uniformly in this 
regard.” 
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new type of German academic, who is to an equal extent capable physically and 
scientifically and is thus qualified to contribute to the education of the academic 
youth and the erection of the Nazi state.” 
In July 1935, the position of Führer of the Dozentenschaft was renamed head of 
the lecturers in the course of a further centralization of power to the regional and 
national offices. Nonetheless, the local head of the now called Dozentenbund (as-
sociation of National Socialistic lecturers, NSDB) still had significant rights be-
cause he was to be consulted prior to any staffing decisions made by the dean of 
the universities. Consequently, there were double checks not only regarding the 
scientific capabilities of a job candidate, but also, and foremost, regarding his po-
litical adequacy, as assured by the Dozentenbund. Deans, although being Führer,
started to be accountable to the Dozentenbund. On the surface, the dean was solely 
responsible for every aspect of a university, but from then on his political com-
mitment was monitored. For lecturers, the Dozentenbund implied that the regime 
was further encroaching on their lives. They were forced into an organization 
whose sole responsibility was to ensure its members’ political alignment, dis-
guised as a plea to stay physically fit and to socialize.30
Paul Deutsch, HHL’s Dozentenschaftsführer, who ex officio replaced Karl Thal-
heim in HHL’s Senat, reports in a 25 February 1935 letter to the dean that his 
tasks were to oversee that research and classes were aligned with the political 
30  In 1937, the NSDB became a compulsory organization in that membership was earned ipso 
jure, i.e. upon employment at the school. The tasks of the Dozentenbund were further reduced 
as they were solely seen to have an educational responsibility, which furthered political align-
ment. 
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ideas of National Socialism.31 Special attention was to be given to students and 
young scholars, which were to become symbols of the Nazi state. Thus, beside the 
scientific education, the character of the young academics was given attention, 
e.g. by conducting obligatory camps, held jointly with National Socialist organi-
zations. Members of the Dozentenschaft were also held accountable in terms of 
public political events. For example, the Leipzig chapter of the Dozentenschaft
participated in the public march on 1 May 1935, which was the Nationaler Feier-
tag des Deutschen Volkes (national holiday of the German people). In a letter to 
all lecturers, dated 29 April 1935, Deutsch noted that absence had to be explained 
in written form and was acceptable only in case of ill health or participation in a 
different organization’s march. 
In summary, the regime introduced new hierarchies in the course of the Gleich-
schaltung to assure political commitment. As a result of the Führer principle, a 
strict line of command was installed along which everyone was accountable to 
their superiors. In addition, other organizations, such as the NSLB and the NSDB, 
introduced additional control of faculty’s and staff’s commitment to the regime. 
Accountability was not required by only one, but by many, superiors or supervi-
sors and, consequently, dispersed throughout institutions and society. Due to cen-
trally imposed responsibilities and lack of resistance to a timely organizational 
alignment, deviations from the ideologically and politically driven novel require-
ments were risky for professors and were thus avoided or done covertly. 
31 When Deutsch left HHL in 1941, Liebisch became the new local head of the NSDB. 
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4 Dispersion of Accountability: 1935 to 1945 
4.1 Major Changes of HHL’s Faculty: 1935 to 1937 
Following the Gleichschaltung, the new reality at universities meant that com-
pliance with the ideology was on display everywhere and at every opportunity. 
Arguably, it was in the years after the Gleichschaltung and prior to the war that 
the regime was the most entrenched. On the one hand, the economy had been re-
covering; on the other hand, the Nazi ideology emphasized the collectiveness of 
the nation and gave large parts of the German people a feeling of self-assurance 
and pride. 
In this context, the formal inauguration of HHL’s new dean was held. Although 
Snyckers had already taken over as dean from Wörner in the fall of 1936, he was 
entitled to a ceremonial act, which, at his choosing, took place on the Führer’s 
birthday, i.e. on 20 April 1937. Accordingly, the invitations were for festivities in 
honor of Hitler’s birthday, which coincided with the transfer of the deanship. 
Snyckers unveiled a bust of Adolf Hitler at the school giving a short speech, 
which was sent to Hitler himself, honoring the Führer “in his dearest worship, 
thanks, and full of faithful wishes for you and your work. In the honor room of 
Handelshochschule Leipzig, your bust will from now on urge teachers and stu-
dents alike to deploy everything for Nazi Germany and its Führer, for the idea and 
the man, in which we believe.”32 In his representation of the school, Dean 
Snyckers thus demonstrated the importance of the tone at the top. His actions, 
32  In his comments on the interim period from November 1936 to March 1937, Snyckers also 
mentioned the festivities for the beginning of the Nazi movement on 30 January 1937. At that 
occasion, Snyckers had urged students to be thankful to the Führer and to get engaged for his 
ideas.
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undoubtedly, convey the impression that the school was fully aligned with the 
regime without leaving room for other opinions. 
In the business report, which covered the period from Summer 1935 to Winter 
1936/1937, a more factual account was offered. Wörner, not present due to ill 
health, reported on his deanship from April 1935 until November 1936, displaying 
political rhetoric only at the very beginning of his speech: “The legitimate claim 
to leadership by National Socialism, its special attention to the military sovereign-
ty of the Reich and to the economic sovereignty, also need to determine the course 
of university policy.” Thereafter, he elaborated sternly on university issues, such 
as contributions, faculty or lectures, without revealing ideological or political 
slant. This fact stands in stark contrast to Wörner’s February 1935 written busi-
ness report, which was full of ideological rhetoric. Either his ill health had gotten 
in his way of sporting enthusiasm for the regime or the nature of a written report, 
instead of a public speech, took away the pressure of political accountability.33
Overall, the report leaves a relatively neutral impression in that it did not include 
any political rhetoric. Even Snyckers’ promise to perform his duty “for the salva-
tion of our German fatherland” was reserved compared to the previous report. 
Possibly, holding the ceremony on the Führer’s birthday sufficiently displays 
commitment and compensates for a lack of ideological rhetoric. 
Wörner also reported on the recruiting process for a Professur für Men-
schenführung (professorship for human leadership). The professorship could not 
33  The fact that Wörner’s implementation of the Führer principle in the new constitution went 
unmentioned gives credence to this assumption. The chairman of the Kuratorium, Max Köhler, 
by contrast, acknowledged Wörner’s efforts in this regard in his speech.  
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be implemented due to a veto by the city of Leipzig. The outgoing dean referred 
to the mayor of Leipzig, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, who stated that HHL was first 
to give a number of lectures, e.g. by people from industry, before recruiting a pro-
fessor. Mantel (2009, p. 233) conjectures that, behind closed doors, Goerdeler 
considered such a professorship to be an instrument for Nazi ideology. Confirm-
ing Goerdeler’s fears, Snyckers, an advocate of that professorship, stated in a 
meeting of the Kuratorium that HHL should only recruit a man “who is fully 
trusted by the NSDAP”. 
The subsequent years were characterized by major changes of HHL’s faculty. At a 
meeting of the Kuratorium on 19 January 1937, the need to recruit became appar-
ent since two professors, Grossmann and Penndorf, were about to reach retirement 
age, one faculty member, von der Aa, had recently passed away, one professor, 
Schultze, had been dismissed, and two other faculty members, Wörner and 
Snyckers, were approaching sixty and were not in good health. As a result, a 
number of new faculty had to be recruited, being sought from HHL’s own ranks 
and beyond. As will be shown, political concerns, officially termed “political re-
liability” of the candidates, often took a major role in the recruitment decisions, 
sidelining professional values such as academic or teaching excellence.34
In his 26 May 1945 report to the Allied military government, Thalheim claimed 
that, in spite of his SA membership, he had been unable to become a planmässiger
34  We focus on those cases of relevance for accountability, whereas Mantel (2009, pp. 234-242) 
documents HHL’s failed recruitments of Le Coutre, Lohmann, Stadler, Ruberg and Tiburtius in 
more detail. It is noteworthy, however, that, in 1944, the rejection of HHL’s candidates went 
far enough for the chairman of the Kuratorium, Max Köhler, to write a letter of protest to the 
Ministerium asserting reputational damage for the school, referring to the severe lack of profes-
sors and lecturers during the war. 
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ordentlicher Professor and that several requests to the Ministerium had been de-
nied. This bullying continued and, “in 1937/38, the then-dean of HHL, Professor 
Hasenack, who campaigned a lot for me, approached me following a meeting with 
the Saxonian department of education, telling me that he did not see a reasonable 
chance for me to obtain a paid professorship and that, as a result, he needed to 
recommend that I start looking for a position in industry.”35 Looking back, Thal-
heim asserted that at that point he surrendered, “demoralized by the years of fight-
ing, being endangered time and again” (cited in Seeliger, 1966, p. 38). Automati-
cally joining the NSDAP in 1937 due to his SA membership, Thalheim wrote a 
number of articles full of Nazi rhetoric, possibly showing political commitment to 
improve his career perspectives.36 In 1940, he was given a full professorship for 
economics, claiming in his 1945 report that the department of education’s change 
of mind was inexplicable for him. 
Possibly, Thalheim became politically aligned as his 1943 service as an informant 
to the Sicherheitsdienst (the intelligence agency of the NSDAP) may suggest. 
Nonetheless, his association with the former mayor of Leipzig, Carl Friedrich 
Goerdeler, sheds different light on the HHL professor. Goerdeler was an active 
member of the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler and stood ready to 
serve as Reichskanzler, had the attempt succeeded. Via his secretary, who also 
worked for Thalheim, the mayor approached the professor at the end of 1943, re-
vealing his antipathy towards the regime, and asked the professor to compile a 
study of the economic consequences of Germany’s military collapse. When the 
35  Thalheim’s account needs to be assessed with a grain of salt because Hasenack joined HHL 
only in April 1938 and became dean in January 1939.  
36  A number of excerpts are reprinted in Seeliger (1966, pp. 27-35). 
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attempt on Hitler’s life failed, Thalheim, who had started working on the study, 
destroyed his manuscript and escaped an interrogation by the Geheime Staatspoli-
zei (secret state police, Gestapo). Goerdeler was less lucky and, on 2 February 
1945, paid with his life for participating in the plot. 
The anecdotes suggest that Professor Thalheim had partly kept his moral integrity, 
as evidenced by his assistance to Goerdeler. By contrast, his party membership 
and the change in his publishing behavior and writing style illustrate how career 
concerns caused him to disguise his posture. This behavior influencing effect of 
extreme accountability results in his betrayal of his own beliefs and his overtly 
abandoning of his morals. What remains are his published articles, likely written 
as disguise, whereas his true stance is ex post unknown. 
Of particular interest is another recruitment case, in which the school witnessed an 
attempt to abuse the criterion of political compliance. In 1935, when HHL was 
looking to recruit a professor for wholesale and foreign trade, three candidates 
were considered. One applicant was excluded due to being a Social Democrat and 
another because of his health. The remaining candidate, Erich Schäfer from Nu-
remberg, was widely considered an adequate contender for the position. In a 12 
December 1935 meeting, the Kuratorium agreed that it was the Ministerium’s job 
to decide on Schäfer’s political reliability. HHL’s Dozentenschaftsführer Paul 
Deutsch, who had been eyeing the position for himself, saw his chance to inter-
vene for his own benefit. In a meeting with an employee of the Ministerium,
Deutsch proclaimed that he had heard from the Führer of Nuremberg’s student 
body that Schäfer “does not get along with the politically interested students. In 
addition, he is not politically active.” Deutsch was only partly successful, mainly 
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because his intrigues were seen through. Hence, he did not hinder Schäfer’s re-
cruitment to HHL, but succeeded in delaying Schäfer’s appointment, who, first 
starting as a substitute, had to accept an adjunct position at HHL, only in 1939 
becoming full professor. Paul Deutsch was nevertheless appointed full professor 
of merchandise and advertising in 1938, becoming the successor to Franz Findei-
sen.
Although not a success, Deutsch’s attempted exploitation of the “political reliabil-
ity” criterion shows that far-reaching accountability requirements encouraged de-
nunciations, thus leading to abuse. On the part of Deutsch, personal interests had 
succumbed moral standards and truthful reporting. His allegations implied a bent 
in the recruiting of Schäfer, whose career became a pawn in Deutsch’s striving to 
beat his rival for the position. If successful, his efforts would have had severe con-
sequences for Schäfer, likely beyond the opening at HHL. Denunciations, encour-
aged by extreme accountability, thus have severe consequences for the affected 
person, but also for the informer, who is likewise ethically violated. 
4.2 A Zealot Hands Over to a Liberal: 1937 to 1939 
In October 1938, Dean Snyckers had left his office due to ill health and Paul 
Deutsch, Vice Dean since May of that year, took over as acting dean until January 
1939. Snyckers wanted a much younger successor for his office and suggested as 
his successor one of his new colleagues, Wilhelm Hasenack, who had already 
been considered for the vice deanship in May 1938.37
37  It is not known whether Snyckers was aware of Hasenack’s critical attitude towards the regime 
(see below) or whether Hasenack was chosen simply because of his academic excellence. 
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At the inauguration of Hasenack on 24 April 1939, Snyckers, holding up the tradi-
tion, first reported on his term. Beginning his speech with a “Führer quote” on the 
definition of National Socialism, he added “to the honor of all my employees” that 
everyone at the school was always aiming to act as a good Nazi, thus guaranteeing 
political integrity for all of his subordinates. Within the factual part of his report, 
which named faculty changes, activities of the school’s departments, and gave 
thanks to HHL’s supporters, Snyckers also talked about the new examination and 
doctorate regulations, concluding that the changes were “essentially only formali-
ties“. However, the new doctorate regulations, approved in June 1938, restricted 
access to the doctoral examination. Foreigners needed approval from the Reichs-
erziehungsminister (Secretary of Education) and Jewish applicants were excluded 
altogether from obtaining a doctorate. Instead, doctoral candidates needed to 
prove theirs, and their wife’s, Aryan heritage. Besides changes to the format of the 
examination, the revocation of doctorates was reformed. Not only did academic or 
severe social misconduct induce the process of revocation. Anyone unworthy of a 
German academic title could lose their doctorate. The rule hinted at those who had 
lost their citizenship due to the Reichsgesetz über den Widerruf von Einbür-
gerungen und die Aberkennung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit (law on the 
revocation of naturalization and deprivation of the German citizenship) of July 
1933. Thus, although the dean did not consider them of relevance, the changes to 
the regulations were substantial by bringing them further in line with the Nazi 
doctrine.38
38  We are not aware of any HHL doctorates being revoked as a consequence of the amended 
regulations. 
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Snyckers continued his speech with accounts from his deanship, all of which were 
heavily influenced by political rhetoric. In these narratives, the dean averted any 
factual matter, demonstrating his fervor for the political regime. Reflecting on his 
first term, i.e. 1931 to 1933, Snyckers referred to the economic troubles and the 
changing political environment back then: “The screws of war contributions poin-
tlessly squeezed out the last life from our economy and hunger seized large circles 
of our people. […] The time of the Führer was just beginning; his idea was em-
braced only by a minority of our fellow comrades. […] When I handed over my 
office on 14 June 1933 […], a new epoch, the concentration of our national power 
under the sign of the National Socialism carried by the Führer, had dawned upon 
Germany. It was at the last minute, at a time when Germany was starting to be 
flooded by Bolshevist chaos […] that the Führer stepped in at the top of our na-
tion as the legitimate chancellor of the German Reich. […] And I was able to say 
from the bottom of my awestruck heart […]: ‘The German nation believes in the 
future again.’” Coming from a dean of a university, these words display crudeness 
and show the indoctrination of large parts of society, ranging far into university 
ranks.
Snyckers perceived his second term as being characterized by a thorough imple-
mentation of a Nazi-oriented education. Quoting from his June 1938 essay titled 
“The Significance of Handels-Hochschule Leipzig for the German economy”, he 
stated: “Business schools are to educate spearheads, who carry their belief in sub-
ordinating their own economic interests to the needs of a national fight for life, to 
their sense of responsibility for the entire economy.” Underscoring these words, 
Snyckers commented: “Those, who are obdurate to the Führer’s message and who 
are not earnestly trying to live up to the unequally minor things that are expected 
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from their small existences compared to the welfare of the nation, affront the work 
of the Führer and thus their own people.” 
Concluding his speech, Snyckers appealed to the students, whose fortune it was to 
live in these times: “[N]o sacrifices were demanded from you […], the least you 
can do now is to fulfill your duties towards the Führer and the Reich, wherever 
your commitment is required. Open your hearts for the greatness and duty of our 
time and, through your actions, prove yourselves worthy to be Germans in the 
Reich of Adolf Hitler!” Exposing students to such an education and corresponding 
values did not bode well for students’ education, but likely contributed to the Na-
zis’ striving for uniform beliefs throughout society.39
Being the new dean, Hasenack followed the tradition of giving a scientific inau-
gural speech on “Wissenschaft und Leben” (“Science and Life”), whose title 
closely resembled Grossmann’s 1930 speech. While his speech showed some rhe-
toric corresponding to the Zeitgeist, at times, it featured subtle criticism of the 
Nazi movement. Both elements were combined in a speech that aimed at defend-
ing science against ideological and political censure by proving how science posi-
tively affects life, making Hasenack’s critique less apparent. 
Mentioning the approving comments of German scholarship by people such as 
Hitler, Göring and Rust, Hasenack clarified that “thorough and clear work of the 
mind has nothing to do with sophisticated distortion of facts and doctrinaire ob-
39  Seemingly responding to this plea, the Führer of the student body, Hoheisel, in a subsequent 
speech described the two virtues of the best German students on the basis of Hitler’s ideas as: 
“First: Frenetic Nationalism […] Second: Profound earnest towards the true scientific problems 
of our time!” 
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tuseness. Otherwise, the political Führer and the General Staff, who also need to 
perform hard and rigorous work of mind, would be doctrinaires.” Likewise, he 
mentioned three values that education needed to be directed at: “1. Absolute un-
conditional fulfillment of duties, 2. The skill to keep the mind clear if adverse 
circumstances create a confusing situation, 3. The strength not to succumb to mass 
suggestive influences of a negative kind as much as less educated people. […] 
The special task of the universities is to develop in people, who have the power to 
be a Führer, the skills of self-reliant evaluation, the power to assess life regarding 
whether or not its evolvement is in line with the political-national values of life. 
To do so, it is necessary for faculty and students alike to be components of the 
indestructible block of uniform faith and willing unity as which the Führer sees 
and creates his people.” Appealing to universities’ special task, Hasenack empha-
sized the moral integrity and self-reliance education was to convey. Mixing his 
plea with a call for political alignment allowed him to utter criticism. 
Towards the end of his speech, Hasenack modified the widely used military slo-
gan “Führer, Nation, Fatherland” by claiming that “the highest laws of life are 
united in the trinity: Nation, God, Truth”. Concluding his talk, the new dean’s 
approach towards regime criticism became most apparent: “[Science] can help 
overcome the great strangeness between some nations and let them find common 
parts of their tasks without giving up their cultural and racial particulars. At the 
end of our festivity, we honor the Führer, the man who in the next days will face 
difficult and directive decisions. To the Führer and Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler, 
the man, whom every German, be it a manual or mental worker, follows in un-
conditional devotion, a triple Sieg Heil!” The quote illustrates Hasenack’s efforts 
to merge critical comments with ideologically and politically necessary rhetoric 
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balancing political accountability with moral integrity. By doing so, he was able 
to go further in his criticism, which would become more apparent over the years 
of his deanship. 
4.3 Hasenack’s Opposition in Times of War: 1939 to 1944 
Hasenack remained critical of the regime and avoided alignment with the Nazi 
ideology.40 In 1939, he was able to leave the SA, which was extremely difficult 
and possible only if one was unfit to do service. Later claiming that he wanted to 
protest against the Reichskristallnacht of November 1938, in which the SA had 
taken a major role, Hasenack was examined, and deemed fit, by the medical de-
partment. Eventually, he was able to leave the organization by blaming his exit on 
the high workload, which he had as a dean. 
When, following the war, students accused him of being a “Nazi professor”, Ha-
senack gave a detailed account of 37 pages, signed 20 December 1946, of his time 
at HHL and his covert work against the regime. Claiming that he had to disguise 
his true attitude by employing a “mimicry” strategy, he was able to criticize the 
regime, particularly in classes. He asserted that in HHL’s student body only few 
supported the regime. All others fully trusted him and saw through his Schutzan-
passung (protective alignment). They even supported him when, in 1941, Hase-
nack was reported to the Gestapo as a result of his rants against “science in march-
ing boots” and “science with a sledgehammer”, defying Nazi propaganda against 
academe as the “rude tone of pigs”. Hasenack had been tipped off by Professor 
40  On 20 August 1946, the special committee of the Anti-Fascist Democratic Block of Saxony 
confirmed Hasenack’s “conscious fight against Nazism”, giving credibility to Hasenack’s case 
as an opponent of the regime. Still, Hasenack was dismissed from HHL’s faculty due to his 
party membership and subsequently struggled to find re-employment. Only in 1949 was he re-
employed at the University of Göttingen. 
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Kurt Schmaltz of Halle, who had an informant at the Sicherheitsdienst and was 
substituting at HHL for Friedrich Henzel, who at the time served in the military. 
Hasenack recognized the threat and immediately resigned as dean in Summer 
1941.41 At his initiative, he obtained funding from HHL’s Kuratorium to draft a 
brochure on HHL, especially its work during the war, with which he aimed to 
redeem himself (Hasenack, 1941). In the brochure, Hasenack wrote about the ac-
tivities of the school and described how the school could grow further. Employing 
Nazi rhetoric,42 he sent his work to all HHL students and faculty43 aiming at paci-
fying students and avoiding further spying and denunciations. Also, he distributed 
the brochure to all party organizations to discourage them from further investiga-
tions, which had been his intention with the brochure in the first place. Hasenack 
apparently succeeded in his efforts to portray himself as politically reliable, re-
maining at HHL until the end of the war. 
His further actions give credence to this account because Hasenack continued to 
criticize the regime in his lectures. Some students, who complained that his com-
ments made them doubt the regime, approached his assistant to make Hasenack 
stop from further statements. Others were less forgiving and, in February 1945, 
again attempted to report Hasenack to the Gestapo. At the forefront was the 
Führer of the student body of the University of Leipzig, who stated that Hasenack 
41  He later claimed that his fear of consequences of his constant fighting against the regime chal-
lenged his health. Indeed, he had been receiving medical treatment since1940 and later took a 
medical leave. 
42  The extensive appendices to his 1946 report, in which he listed as proof for his criticism ex-
cerpts from lectures, speeches and publications, show that the brochure included a considerable 
amount of subtle critique. 
43  Hasenack asserted that “only two [of his colleagues] were more than nominal party members.” 
One, who by 1946 had passed away, was a fervent advocate of the regime and the other, who 
by then had left the school, acted out of career concerns. Most likely, Hasenack referred to 
Snyckers, who as dean had shown his enthusiasm for the regime, and Deutsch, who was the 
head of the NSDB and published an article on Weltanschauung and Wirtschaftsführung (ideol-
ogy and economic leadership) (Deutsch, 1934). 
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did not belong in a classroom, but in a concentration camp. The Führer of HHL’s 
student body along with other students of the school sided with their professor, 
also because he was one of the few business professors left at HHL by then. 
When Hasenack stepped down in 1941, the new dean, Arnold Liebisch, needed to 
be inaugurated. In the report on his deanship, which lasted from January 1939 
until August 1941, Hasenack mainly referred to the effects of the war on HHL, 
giving largely a factual account.44 Besides commemorating students who had died 
in the field, he mentioned that the school was closed from September to October 
1939 when the war began. By ministerial order, the academic year 1940 had been 
restructured from semesters to trimesters, giving the faculty a higher teaching 
load, especially because half of HHL’s male faculty and staff, among them all but 
one of the assistants, were in army service at that time. As a result, doing research 
became practically impossible for the remaining faculty.45 In his speech, Hase-
nack explained how the school adapted to the war-time necessities and used the 
opportunity to complain about the war, thus indirectly criticizing the regime. 
Hasenack’s careful opposition is further demonstrated by an episode surrounding 
HHL’s most prominent alumnus, Eugen Schmalenbach, who in 1923 became an 
honorary citizen and in 1930 an honorary member of HHL’s Senat. Schmalenbach 
in 1933 was forced into retirement because of his critical attitude towards the re-
gime and his wife being Jewish (see, e.g., Kruk, 1984, pp. 150-153; Mantel, 2009, 
44  To the best of our knowledge, the report exists as a manuscript only, but was not published, 
most likely due to shortage of paper during the war. 
45  The three major German business research journals stopped publishing soon thereafter: The 
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft appeared until 1942, Die Betriebswirtschaft until 1943 and 
the Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung until 1944. Hasenack later claimed that, 
in 1942, he stopped publishing anything other than reissues of books due to increasing censor-
ship.
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pp. 392-405). Due to his reputation, at least a considerable part of the academic 
community stood by Schmalenbach’s side even during the Nazi regime. Accor-
dingly, a 4 June 1936 ministry decree regarding the tacit omission of the names of 
Jewish lecturers and honorary members of schools’ senates from directories re-
mained of no consequence and Schmalenbach remained listed in HHL’s directory. 
Nonetheless, repressions increased over the years and the academe’s support wa-
vered. When on 14 September 1939 Schmalenbach’s house was raided by the 
Gestapo and a defaming article appeared in two newspapers, Hasenack in a 5 Oc-
tober 1939 letter asked Schmalenbach’s closest disciple, Ernst Walb, to appeal to 
Schmalenbach to resign as honorary member. He wanted to avoid the school to 
become active against such a reputable man. In his answer, dated 7 October 1939, 
Walb calmed Hasenack down stating that it would be harmful to HHL if the 
school withdrew Schmalenbach’s title. He further pointed out that there was no 
need for HHL to take any action since at the moment they did not have to print a 
directory and, by the time they had to, things would look differently. Indeed, Ha-
senack let the matter rest and, subsequently, became an advocate for Schmalen-
bach, enjoying professional and personal correspondence over many years.46
In 1943, professor emeritus Findeisen raised the issue again, asking for Schma-
lenbach’s removal as an honorary member of the senate. In a concerted effort, 
Dean Liebisch and Hasenack appealed to the department of education to avoid 
Schmalenbach’s removal, pointing to his reputation and alleging that Schmalen-
bach’s work was used by the military. While the matter dragged on for several 
46  According to Kruk (1984, p. 142), Hasenack was a frequent guest of Schmalenbach’s. In addi-
tion, Schmalenbach supported Hasenack financially, when Hasenack was unable to find re-
employment following the war (Kruk, 1984, p. 144). 
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months, HHL eventually removed Schmalenbach’s name from their directory in 
Summer 1944. 
4.4 Outlook – The Regime’s Dissolution: 1945 
As dean, Hasenack had also had several disputes with the department of education 
and later asserted that, upon his stepping down, the relationship between HHL and 
the Ministerium improved considerably. This effect was rather due to a personal 
feud of Hasenack’s than the political alignment of Dean Liebisch, who was eager 
to have a less turbulent relationship with the Ministerium. Liebisch, who became 
close friends with Hasenack, led HHL in increasingly difficult times from August 
1942 until April 1945. Fulfilling the teaching duties had become complicated: 
Some of HHL’s professors, such as Friedrich Henzel, were fighting in the war; 
others, such as Deutsch and Schäfer, had left HHL or, in the case of Snyckers, 
retired due to ill health. Liebisch was not able to recruit substitutes due to political 
concerns regarding the candidates (see above).47 When HHL was hit in an air-
strike on 4 December 1943 and briefly closed in a war-time effort in the fall of 
1944, Liebisch grew increasingly frustrated and was looking forward to the end of 
his deanship. Nonetheless, without asking for Liebisch’s, or other deans’, consent, 
the department of education extended the dean’s term in office as a result of the 
war. When, in April 1944, the department of education indicated that a change in 
office was possible, the chairman of the Kuratorium, Max Köhler, against the 
dean’s will, petitioned to extend the term. By then, the war had rendered any mea-
ningful university activities difficult and it slowly dawned upon Germany that the 
regime’s days were numbered. In letters, HHL professors were increasingly talk-
47  The fact that the candidates he preferred were put down by the Ministerium gives an indication 
of Liebisch’s political attitude. He seemed to prefer scientifically qualified over politically 
aligned candidates. 
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ing about “the time after the war.” In April 1945, Leipzig was seized by the U.S. 
army. In the same month, Liebisch resigned from his office. 
On 1 May 1945, the remainder of the Kuratorium elected Friedrich Lütge as 
HHL’s new dean. The appointment of Lütge, who had not been a member of the 
NSDAP, showed that the school started planning for the time after the Nazis, 
whose regime collapsed only days after Lütge’s election. Due to his lack of party 
affiliation, the new dean oversaw the end of the war and the dismissal of most of 
his colleagues due to their party membership in November 1945. In a subsequent 
letter writing campaign, most likely to the military government, he requested that 
HHL’s faculty remain in office. His letters included mainly two arguments: One 
was that his colleague was indispensable for HHL and the other explained how 
their party affiliation came about. As a result, several professors were re-
appointed on temporary “emergency” contracts. Nonetheless, the school itself did 
not survive for much longer. As early as July 1945 did HHL’s Senat follow up on 
a long-held plan and consider integrating the school into the University of Leip-
zig, which was successfully completed in February 1946. 
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5 Conclusions
In this article, we examined the concept of accountability under extreme societal 
conditions at Germany’s first business school, the Handelshochschule Leipzig,
during the Nazi regime. In narrating and interpreting school activities, we shed 
light on how the Nazi regime affected universities, particularly business schools. 
We argue that the political reign of Adolf Hitler imposed extreme external condi-
tions on the German society, including universities as institutions of higher moral-
ity. The regime centrally designed changes to the universities’ regulations, aiming 
to coordinate them with party ideology. It became clear early in the regime that 
schools and their faculty had to consider Nazi ideas in education, research and 
recruiting alike. The state, and its quest for “political reliability”, affected almost 
every decision and constantly required accounts, which were given, in the case of 
supporters, by expressing their devotion and commitment to the ideology and, in 
the rarer cases of opponents, by considering potential repressions and negative 
consequences of their actions. 
The regime implemented a control state that took advantage of the socio-
economic travails in Germany by creating wide-spread enthusiasm for the Nazi 
ideas. As a result, commitment to the regime was required and, if not displayed, 
entailed severe negative consequences. In turn, to avoid penalties, the accountable 
self was either to lie quiet or to politically align and give up his moral beliefs. We 
report several cases of the latter kind when, out of career concerns, people com-
mitted themselves to the regime. 
On the Ubiquity of Accountability 
235
As a result, professional accountability changed considerably for professors. Had 
they traditionally been dedicated solely to scientific advancement and educating 
students, were they now obliged to, or chose to, show political alignment. Conse-
quently, while their tasks did not change, objectivity, scientific rigor, and educa-
tional objectives were distorted by political concerns. A new line of command, the 
Führer principle, and new forms of bureaucracy formed a control state and aimed 
to ensure political alignment. In addition to superiors checking political reliability, 
inferiors and colleagues could also question an individual’s commitment. Denun-
ciations, as we report, were attempted to a considerable extent, also in cases when 
the allegations were not true. Such actions, which were a consequence of the re-
gime’s paranoia, violate the integrity and dignity of both informer and victim. 
Thus, besides forcing alignment upon individuals, denunciations represent a major 
threat of excessive accountability by pressuring the accountable self to abandon 
internalized morals, that, due to being enforced by psychological controls, are 
otherwise “particularly powerful and binding” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 230). 
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Appendix: HHL Faculty during the Period from 1933 to 1945 – 
Ordered by when they joined the Faculty48
Name Faculty Member Office Held 
Wörner, Gerhard 1911 – 1940 
Management of insurances 
VD: Apr 1912 – Mar 1924 
D:  Apr 1933 – Nov 1936 
Grossmann,  
Hermann 
Apr 1916 – 1938* 
Tax accounting 
D:  Apr 1928 – Mar 1931 
VD: Apr 1931 – Mar 1933 
 Apr 1937 – May 1938 
Schultze, Erich May 1922 – Mar 1940 
Economics 
D:  Aug 1922 – Mar 1924 
VD: Apr 1924 – Mar 1926 
Penndorf, Balduin Oct 1922 – Dec 1938 
Business
D: Apr 1926 – Mar 1928 
VD: Apr 1928 – Mar 1931 
von der Aa, Karl Apr 1923 – 1936 
Business school pedagogy 
(Handelsschulpädagogik)
D: Apr 1924 – Mar 1926 
VD: Apr 1926 – Mar 1928 
 Aug 1934 – Dec 1936 
Findeisen, Franz Apr 1925 – 1933 
Merchandise and
advertising 
–
Menz, Gerhard Oct 1925 – 1951 
Management of book trade 
–
Snyckers,
Alexander
Apr 1929 – Mar 1945 
French business language 
D:  Apr 1931 – Mar 1933 
VD: Apr 1933 – Jul 1934 
AD: Nov 1936 – Mar 1937 
D: Apr 1937 – Oct 1938 
von Hibler, Leo Nov 1929 – 1945 
English business language 
–
Deutsch, Paul 1931 – Sep 1941 
Merchandise and
advertising 
VD: May 1938 – Oct 1938 
AD: Nov 1938 – Jan 1939 
   
48  This list includes HHL professors at all levels and was compiled from course catalogues, staff 
records and other files in the archives. In several instances, we could not confirm the exact 
dates of professors’ employment since we found contradictory dates. 
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Geyler, Friedrich Apr 1931 – Nov 1945* 
Tax law 
–
Kirchberger, Hans Apr 1931 – 1933 
Industrial property law 
–
Thalheim, Karl Apr 1932 – Nov 1945* 
Economics 
–
Wünschmann, 
Feodor
Apr 1932 – Sep 1935 
Tax law 
–
Schäfer, Erich Apr 1936 – Mar 1942 
Wholesale and foreign trade 
–
Löbner, Walther Jan 1938 – Nov 1945* 
Business school pedagogy 
(Wirtschaftspädagogik)
VD: Aug 1941 – May 1945 
Hasenack,
Wilhelm 
Apr 1938 – Nov 1945* 
Banking and taxation 
D: Jan 1939 – Aug 1941 
Henzel, Friedrich Nov 1938 – Nov 1945* 
Industrial management 
–
Liebisch, Arnold Nov 1938 – Nov 1945* 
Commercial law 
VD: Jan 1939 – Aug 1941 
D:  Aug 1941 – Apr 1945 
Lütge, Friedrich Apr 1940 – Mar 1947 
Housing development 
D:  Apr 1945 – Feb 1946 
Tiburtius, Joachim 
(substitute)
Oct 1943 – Mar 1945 
Trade management 
–
Note: D = Dean; VD = Vice Dean; AD = Acting Dean; * denotes faculty members who were dis-
missed for political reasons after the war. Following his retirement, Grossmann had continued to 
teach part-time at HHL. 
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